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ABSTRACT 
It is acknowledged that sustainable development, which is generally understood as the 
achievement of an equal balance between economic development, social progress and 
environmental protection, is a new paradigm of international investment protection 
law which requires finding a balance between the State’s regulatory responsibilities 
and a foreign investor’s interests. This new paradigm is to be taken into account when 
planning domestic investment policies and drafting future investment agreements. 
However, this study aims to prove that the sustainable development paradigm, and its 
consequent extension of protected interests in investment law, is already applicable in 
the currently existing investment protection regime and in the application of the 
indirect expropriation standard requiring a reconsideration of the methodologies used 
for the establishment of indirect expropriation. 
An investor’s protection against indirect expropriation is a basic component of 
international investment law, and often investors challenge as expropriatory general 
legislative acts, administrative measures and compliance measures with non-
economic international obligations of host States dealing with the protection of non-
economic public interests. Investment agreements do not contain a precise definition 
of indirect expropriation leaving considerable discretion in the hands of adjudicators 
for deciding what measures do amount to indirect takings in specific cases.   
Consequently, arbitrators have developed distinct methodologies for the assessment of 
the existence of indirect expropriation. These methodologies differ regarding their 
responsiveness to legitimate public welfare objectives that have motivated a State’s 
interference in a foreign investment raising concerns about the capacity left for host 
States to exercise their regulatory responsibilities.  
Therefore, the thesis is designed to prove that sustainable development has reached a 
capacity to guide the contextual and effective interpretation of the indirect 
expropriation standard. It is claimed that sustainable development forms part of the 
object and purpose of the investment protection regime within which the indirect 
expropriation standard must be applied. Consequently, it requires altering perceptions 
of applicable law and the methodologies used for the establishment of indirect 
expropriation requiring focus on wider interests than the ones of foreign investors.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The protection of investors against indirect expropriation is a basic component of 
international investment agreements (IIAs) and customary international law protecting 
foreign investment.
1
 Together with the fair and equitable treatment standard (FET) it 
is the core investment guarantee that foreign investors invoke in order to challenge the 
regulatory and administrative measures of a host State that may have a detrimental 
effect on their investments like revocations of licences and changes to domestic 
regulatory frameworks. 
However, IIAs do not contain a precise definition of indirect expropriation. IIAs 
mostly refer to indirect takings as ‘measures having effect equivalent to 
nationalization or expropriation’ or ‘measures tantamount to nationalization or 
expropriation’.2 Hence, a textual meaning of the definition of the standard provides 
only a limited guidance for the conduct of States leaving considerable discretion in 
the hands of adjudicators for deciding what measures amount to indirect takings in 
specific cases.
3
 Using their wide discretion, arbitrators have developed distinct 
methodologies for the assessment of the existence of indirect expropriation, such as 
those focusing on the context and public interest of the interference in foreign 
investment on the one hand and those limited to the protection of the interests of 
foreign investors on the other. These methodologies differ regarding their 
responsiveness to environmental considerations, the crisis management actions of a 
State, or other essential interests for the entire population that have motivated the 
interference of a State in foreign investment and which foreign investors have 
challenged as indirect expropriation. 
                                                 
1
 It is assumed that the network of IIAs refers to customary international law on expropriation, see 
Pope & Talbot Inc v The Government of Canada, Interim Award, June 26, 2000, NAFTA, UNCITRAL 
[96], [104]; S.D.Myers, Inc. v Government of Canada, Partial Award, November 13, 2000, NAFTA, 
UNCITRAL [285]-[286]; Glamis Gold, Ltd. v The United States of America, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), 
Award, 8 June 2009 [354]. 
2
 UNCTAD, Taking of Property, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/15 (UN 2000) 18. Historic reasons for this 
situation are explained in UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Key Issues, Volume 1, 
UNCTAD/IIT/2004/10 (UN 2004) 236-237. The Tribunal in Feldman noted: ‘The Article 1110 [of the 
NAFTA] is of such generality as to be difficult to apply in specific cases’, see Marvin Roy Feldman 
Kappa v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, 16 December 2002 [98]. 
3
 On arbitral jurisprudence as the main developer of the particular content of the vague investment 
guarantees see SW Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (CUP 2009) 321-
357. See also Ole K Fauchald, ‘The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An Empirical Analysis’, 19 
EJIL (2008) 301. 
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While not always neglectful of public policy objectives pursued by the host State, 
several investment tribunals have perceived a narrow focus on foreign investor’s 
protection as being their central mission. The possibility that an adjudicator will focus 
exclusively on foreign investment protection, disregarding other interests involved, 
has raised concerns about the capacity left for host States to exercise their regulatory 
responsibilities to protect legitimate public welfare objectives.
4
 These concerns of 
States are grounded in the fact that foreign investors have challenged a vast array of 
general legislative acts,
5
 administrative measures
6
 and compliance measures with non-
economic international obligations of host States
7
 (allegedly) dealing with the 
protection of non-economic public interests as expropriatory measures.  
Currently, it is possible to assess these concerns from the perspective of sustainable 
development which is generally understood as the achievement of an equal balance 
between economic development, social progress and environmental protection at 
every level of decision-making.
8
 The concept of sustainable development is process 
based,
9
 namely it implies flexibility for each and every state to take its own 
particularities into account in deciding what best suits its developmental needs and to 
choose the appropriate means for its facilitation.
10
 
                                                 
4
 F Francioni, ‘Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and International Investment Law’, in  (2009) 
Vol.20 EJIL No.3, 729-747, 729; Susanne A Spears, ‘The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation 
of International  Investment Agreements’ (2010) 13 JIEL 4, 1037-1075. 
5
E.g., in Methanex v United States, UNCITRAL (NAFTA) Final Award, 3 August 2005, which 
involved general legislation banning a toxic gas ingredient that polluted the environment. In Glamis 
Gold v US (n
52
), California imposed new restrictions on gold mining. California invoked 
internationally protected rights of indigenous groups among the reasons for limiting rights to gold 
extraction in the area of cultural property of Indian tribes. 
6
E.g., Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v The United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. 
ARB (AF)/00/2), Award of 29 May 2003 that involved the revocation of the operation licence by the 
local municipality for alleged environmental protection purpose. 
7
E.g., Chemtura v Canada, NAFTA, UNCITRAL, Award August 2 2010, in which the gradual 
phase-out by Canada of the agro-chemical lindane was supported by the 1998 Aarhus Protocol on 
Persistent Organic Pollutants and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. Lindane 
was gradually eliminated because it endangered public health and the environment. 
8
 M-C Cordonier Segger, ‘Sustainable Development in International Law’ in Hans Christian Bugge 
and Christina Voigt (eds), Sustainable Development in International and National Law (Europa Law 
Publishing 2008) 139. 
9
 V. Lowe, ‘Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments’ in A. Boyle and D. Freestone 
(eds.), International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17. 
10
 P. Birnie, A. Boyle, C. Redgwell, International Law & the Environment, (3.
rd
 ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 126-7; A. Boyle, C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 224. 
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Foreign direct investment (FDI)
11
 promotion and protection is generally associated 
with such economic development-related inputs as long-term capital in-flows in the 
host State, transfer of technology, access to new markets and knowledge spillovers;
12
 
hence, attracting FDI is intended to function as one of the principal tools for pursuing 
economic development in the globalized world.
13
  
Since FDI protection is inherently a related field of (economic) development law,
14
 
the sustainable development perspective requires its extension so that it also covers 
the other two pillars of sustainable development, namely the social and the 
environmental dimensions. 
The necessity to shift the narrow focus of foreign investment protection as an element 
of economic development to consider wider development implications is reflected by 
                                                 
11 
The OECD defines FDI as: 
 “[A] category of cross-border investment made by a resident in on 
economy (the direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise (the 
direct investment enterprise) that is resident in an economy other than that of the direct investor. The 
motivation of the direct investor is a strategic long-term relationship with the direct investment 
enterprise to ensure a significant degree of influence by the direct investor in the management of the 
direct investment enterprise. The “lasting interest” is evidenced when the direct investor owns at least 
10% of the voting power of the direct investment enterprise [...] The objectives of direct investment are 
different from those of portfolio investment whereby investors do not generally expect to influence the 
management of the enterprise.” OECD, OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment 
(4.
th
 ed, 2008) 17 [11]. 
12
 P Economou, JH Dunning, KP Sauvant, ‘Trends and Issues in International Investment’, in KP 
Sauvant (ed) Yearbook on International Investment Law& Policy 2008-2009, (OUP 2009) 26-27; AT 
Guzman, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties’, (1997-1998) 38 Virginia Journal of International Law, at 666-686. 
13
 Jeffrey D. Sachs, Common Wealth. Economics for a Crowded Planet (Penguin Books, 2008) 208-
212. J.E.Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work, (W.W.Norton&Company: New York, London, 2006), 
187-210; Johannesburg Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 
2002, UN Doc A/AC.257/32 [47]. Aaron Broches, ‘Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of other States of 1965, Explanatory Notes and Survey of its 
Application’ (1993)18 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 627, at 641-647; Parra, ‘Provisions on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Multilateral Instruments’, 12 ICSID Rev-FILJ 287 (1997) 301. UNCTAD Report, Development 
Implications of International Investment Agreements (2007), UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2007/2; 
Theodore H Moran, Harnessing Foreign Direct Investment for Development. Policies for Developed 
and Developing Countries (Brooking Institution Press 2006); International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, Report of the Executive Directors on the ICSID Convention, March 18, 1965 
(Report of the Executive Directors), [12]; Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. the Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/5, Award, April 15, 2009 [87], Mr. Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case 
No.ARB/07/20, Award July 14, 2010, [111]. 
14
 See P Economou, JH Dunning, KP Sauvant, ‘Trends and Issues in International Investment’, in 
KP Sauvant (ed) Yearbook on International Investment Law& Policy 2008-2009 (OUP 2009), 26-27; 
Vaughan Lowe, ‘Changing Dimensions of International Investment Law’, University of Oxford 
Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No 4/2007, March 2007 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/Abstract=970727 at 25> accessed on 31 March 2012; AT Guzman, ‘Why 
LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties’, 38 
Virginia Journal of International Law (1997-1998) 666-686. 
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the recent UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development
15
 
that acknowledges sustainable development as a new paradigm of international 
investment protection law. For this reason, it proposes drafting future IIAs and, 
among others, the indirect expropriation standard in a way that would explicitly 
balance a State’s regulatory responsibilities and foreign investor’s interests.16 
However, the aim of this study is to prove that the sustainable development paradigm, 
and its consequent extension of protected interests in investment law, is already 
applicable in the investment protection regime which currently exists and in the 
application of the indirect expropriation standard, which requires a reconsideration of 
the role that investment arbitrators have, altering perceptions of applicable law and 
the methodologies used for the establishment of indirect expropriation. 
Structure of the Thesis 
 
In order to prove the existence of the legal consequences sustainable development has 
on the interpretation process of indirect expropriation standard, the study consists of 
four main parts and focuses on the proposition that sustainable development is the 
actual object and purpose of the network of IIAs within which the indirect 
expropriation standard must be applied. As an object and purpose it guides the 
contextual and effective interpretation
17
 of the indirect expropriation standard 
requiring a focus on wider interests than merely those of foreign investors. 
Furthermore, it is claimed that sustainable development has the capacity not only to 
guide the contextual interpretation process but is itself a legal principle leading to 
precise outcomes – namely, the integration of economic and non-economic concerns 
in the assessment of the existence of indirect expropriation.  
The second chapter of the thesis focuses on the impact the sustainable development 
objective has on the jurisdiction and applicable law in investment treaty arbitration. 
While being limited in their jurisdictional competence, investment tribunals have also 
shown a tendency to look too narrowly at the applicable law when it comes to 
                                                 
15
 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012, Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies 
(UN 2012). 
16
 ibid 139, 148, 153. 
17
 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; see R Gardiner, Treaty 
Interpretation (OUP 2008) 148, 161; on effective treaty interpretation see also Iron Rhine ("Ijzeren 
Rijn") Railway, (Belgium/Netherlands) PCA, Award May 24, 2005, [79]-[81]; United States – Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US-Shrimp/Turtle Ι), AB-1998-4, Report of the 
Appellate Body 6 November 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, [152], [154]. 
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considering and applying non-investment international law in the context of indirect 
expropriation claims. Consequently, the narrow focus is leading to the impression of 
investment tribunals acting in isolation from other fields of law. This could happen 
because investment tribunals often adopt a mindset that is centred on foreign 
investment protection, which is the directly pronounced purpose of the system of 
BITs. The narrow focus of the applicable law makes arbitral tribunals less likely to 
consider wider public policy considerations that are often grounded in external, non-
investment international obligations by host States. It also makes the tribunals less 
likely to focus on the protection of third party stakeholders’ interests related to social 
or environmental considerations of host States. It is argued that the sustainable 
development objective requires a change in the mindset of those investment 
arbitrators that have taken the approach which is predisposed to investment 
protection. Further, it is proposed that the sustainable development objective 
establishes the necessary bond between investment rules and prima facie external 
rules, the lack of which has contributed to the reluctance to address potential 
normative conflicts between investment and non-investment international law. 
Against this background, the third chapter of the study assesses the compatibility of 
the methodologies used for the interpretation of the indirect expropriation standard 
with the sustainable development objective and principle. The chapter deals with the 
assessment of which of the methodologies or doctrines guarantee that commercial 
interests are not prioritized but balanced and reconciled with competing non-
economic interests in the interpretation of indirect expropriation standard. In essence, 
sustainable development calls for the process of weighing and balancing conflicting 
investment protection and public policy goals aimed at safeguarding human rights, the 
environment, public health and cultural heritage
18
 limiting or excluding some of the 
existing ways of interpreting indirect expropriation. 
The last chapter is designed to establish that, methodologically, the most appropriate 
way for incorporating wider societal concerns in setting the scope of the indirect 
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 Taking the position of Boyle and Chinkin that the principle of sustainable development requires 
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International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 224 (emphasis added). See also V. Lowe, 
‘Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments’, in A. Boyle and D. Freestone (eds.), 
International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 17; P. Birnie, A. Boyle, C. Redgwell, International Law and the 
Environment (3
rd
 ed, OUP 2009), 126-7. 
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expropriation standard is through the effective interpretation of its legitimate 
expectations element. It is suggested that a careful interpretation of legitimate 
expectation sub-element of indirect expropriation standard allows for the 
internalization of the required balance between investor’s private interests and the 
State’s public responsibilities, taking the wider context rather than the narrow 
commercial interests of foreign investors into account. Legitimate expectations 
element has an inherent flexibility that stems from interpretation of its sub-elements –  
the reasonableness of investor’s expectations for stability and predictability of a 
business and legal regime, general knowledge about business and the legal framework 
in the host State, competent businessman criterion and the investor’s own conduct. It 
is suggested that deliberate and effective interpretation of these sub-elements (in the 
context of sustainable development) implies balancing investor’s private interests and 
the State’s regulatory responsibilities.  
Overview of the functioning of international investment protection regime 
  
Before going into a detailed analysis of the indirect expropriation standard and its 
interpretation in light of sustainable development, it is necessary to give a brief insight 
into the complexity of the organization of international investment protection law, 
since its heterogeneous structure directly contributes to the varied understanding of 
the role of arbitrators and clashing interpretations of the investment guarantees. 
Unlike many other international legal regimes, the international investment protection 
regime
19
 consists of a network of international investment agreements (IIAs) rather 
than of one multilateral treaty. The network of IIAs is established to protect FDI from 
potential mistreatment (political risks) by States who receive investment (the so-called 
host States) through various investment protection guarantees.  
Presently, there are around 2,800 ‘common-form’ bilateral investment treaties (BITs), 
with some of them being gradually replaced by free trade agreements (FTAs)
20
 and 
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 On the network of IIAs as a legal regime, see Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment 
Treaties (Oxford University Press) 2010, 1-17. Cf. Stephan W. Schill, The Multilateralization of 
International Investment Law (Cambridge University Press) 2009. 
20
 BIT-like chapters in these treaties have no substantial difference with BITs, apart from the 
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another 309 multilateral, regional and sectoral IIAs,
21
 such as the most frequently 
used, the ECT,
22
 the NAFTA
23
 and the CAFTA
24
. EU law is gradually gaining 
importance in the regulation of FDI.
25
 In addition, there are several voluntary 
instruments addressing social and environmental aspects of foreign investment like 
corporate social responsibility.
26
 
There have been three unsuccessful attempts within the OECD (in 1962, 1967 and 
1995) to propose multilateral agreement on investment.
27
 Several non-governmental 
initiatives have been established to create a multilateral treaty but they were never 
adopted by States.
28
 Similarly, all United Nations efforts to establish multilateral rules 
on FDI protection have failed except for the UN General Assembly (GA) Resolution 
1083 of 1962 on permanent sovereignty over natural resources.
29
 The 1974 GA 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO),
30
 
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
31
 and the 1976-1992 General 
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“Responsibility of States for Injuries in their Territory to the Person of Property of Foreigners”.  
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 Declaration on Permanent Sovereignity over Natural Resources, UNGA, Res. 1803 (XVII) 
(1962); N.Schrijver, Sovereignity over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
30 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, UN Doc. A/RES/S-
6/3201 (1974), reprinted 13 ILM 715.  
31
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Code of Conduct on MNEs
32
 had never gained the support of developed countries and 
thus they did not result in internationally binding investment rules. 
All these multilateralization attempts have failed mainly because of the stark 
disagreement on the substance of (customary) international law governing the 
protection of property of aliens that was a topical issue during the decolonization 
process after the Second World War. The process of decolonization led to the 
establishment of new states in the 1950s and 1960s. These newly developed nations 
maintained hostility towards investors from former colonial States. They nationalized 
and expropriated the aliens’ property and terminated various concession contracts in 
extracting industries as an attempt to gain back their economic sovereignty and to 
establish a new order of justice.
33
 
The only two multilateral agreements on foreign investment that States managed to 
agree on were the ICSID Convention establishing the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and its Additional Facility
34
 and the 
MIGA Convention.
35
  
In the meantime, general international law on diplomatic protection and the ICJ
36
 
proved to be insufficient for the needs of the international business society and for 
both developed and developing States,
37
 the latter realizing that FDI attraction through 
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 See Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards 
of Treatment (The Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2009), 35-39. 
37
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its protection might facilitate their development.
38
 In particular, the ICJ judgement in 
Barcelona Traction Case,
39
 in which the Court rejected the protection of shareholders 
for the harm done to the company,
40
 led to the ‘treatification’41 away from customary 
international law on the protection of aliens. 
Since multilateral negotiations on FDI rules were already heavily politicized, 
developed and developing States shifted to the bilateral negotiations of investment 
protection rules. Thus, with the first bilateral investment treaty (hereinafter: BIT) 
concluded between Germany and Pakistan in 1959, states commenced the alternative 
bilateral and regional treaty approach to the multilateral protection of foreign 
investment, creating the network of IIAs and deviating from secondary norms of state 
responsibility under customary international law.
42
 
Investor-state arbitration and its raison d'être 
 
A highly specific characteristic of foreign investment protection law is its novel 
dispute settlement mechanism. Most of the IIAs
43
 supplement the state-state dispute 
settlement mechanism
44
 with the investor-state arbitration clause. Investor-state 
dispute settlement mechanism was first introduced in the BIT between Indonesia and 
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 The more traditional inter-State (state-state) arbitration is left for solving issues that arise directly 
between the signatories of IIAs, see, for instance, the discontinued Lucchetti S.A. and Lucchetti Peru 
S.A. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4. 
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the Netherlands (1968).
45
 Since then, investor’s direct access to arbitration has been 
seen as the most essential element of the BIT regime.
46
 The investor-state arbitration 
mechanism allows persons or entities other than states to invoke state responsibility 
before ad hoc tribunals, usually consisting of three party-selected arbitrators.
47
 IIAs 
usually leave an investor with a choice between different arbitral venues like ICSID, 
ICSID Additional Facility (ICSID has been the most frequent forum for a settlement 
of investor-state disputes
48
), UNCTIRAL, the Dispute Resolution Rules of the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the London Court of International 
Arbitration (LCIA) or the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce.  
The investor-state arbitration mechanism was established with the intention to 
depoliticize foreign investment disputes, since the objectivity and effectiveness of 
domestic courts was subject to doubt when ruling against foreigners. The previously 
used diplomatic protection mechanism also contained political tensions between the 
home State of an investor and the investment-receiving host State.
49
 The rationale of 
depoliticization and impartiality is also reflected by the narrow range of remedies 
available to investors, mainly entitling them to compensation for monetary damages 
in the case of a violation of host State obligations towards a foreign investor.
50
  
In sum, international investment protection standards contained in IIAs and investor’s 
direct access to a dispute settlement mechanism are meant to be tools for encouraging 
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in-flows of foreign investment in States, and thus, contributing to their  
development.
51
 
Inconsistency and unpredictability of the scope of indirect expropriation 
standard  
 
The protection of foreign investors against indirect expropriation is a basic component 
of IIAs and customary international law protecting foreign investment;
52
 it occurs 
‘when measures short of an actual taking, result in the effective loss of management, 
use or control, or a significant depreciation of the value of the assets of a foreign 
investor’.53 
However, IIAs do not contain a precise definition of indirect expropriation. IIAs 
mostly refer to indirect takings as ‘measures having effect equivalent to 
nationalization or expropriation’ or ‘measures tantamount to nationalization or 
expropriation’.54 A typical clause on expropriation may be found in, for example, the 
US-Ecuador BIT (1997)
55
 Article III(1): 
Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either directly or indirectly 
through measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization 
(“expropriation”)except: for a public purpose; in a non-discriminatory manner; 
upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation; and in accordance 
with due process of law and the general principles of treatment provided for in 
Article II(3). Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the 
expropriated investment immediately before the expropriatory action was taken or 
became known, whichever is earlier (...). 
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The textual meaning of indirect expropriation standard is overly abstract
56
 providing 
only a limited guidance for the conduct of States and making it difficult to interpret 
the standard ‘in accordance with the ordinary meaning’ as required by customary 
treaty interpretation principles codified in Article 31 of the VCLT.  These kinds of 
international norms have been characterized as ‘open-textured’, unsettled, vague or 
ambiguous because they provide only a limited guidance for the conduct of States.
57
 
As a consequence, adjudicators enjoy considerable discretion and policy choices in 
deciding what measures amount to indirect takings in specific cases.
58
 
Although the scope of the indirect expropriation standard has been among the key 
matters of concern in international investment protection law already for decades, 
dating back to the period of decolonization and the New International Economic 
Order,
59
 it has received considerable attention since the Ethyl Corporation v. Canada 
claim in the late 1990s.
60
 In the Ethyl claim, an American producer and exporter of 
fuel additive (MMT) sued Canada in the first arbitration case under the NAFTA 
Chapter 11 claiming compensation for an alleged expropriation of its investment.
61
 
The company claimed that the legislation banning intra-provincial and international 
trade of the fuel additive (MMT) for human health and environmental protection 
reasons constituted indirect expropriation. The case was settled amicably but part of 
the settlement required a revocation of the MMT ban and a significant compensation 
to the investor.
62
 The Ethyl claim thereby opened up room for challenging general 
legislations and administrative measures adopted by host States for such public policy 
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goals as human rights protection, public health and the environmental protection as 
potential acts of expropriation.  The Ethyl case also raised the question of the scope of 
the regulatory capacity left for States to adopt precautionary actions for the 
environmental and health protection with an effect of banning investors’ activity.  
A further significant contribution to the unexpectedly wide reach of the indirect 
expropriation standard was established by Metalclad v. Mexico award, where the 
Tribunal declared that measures ‘tantamount to expropriation’: 
[I]ncludes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, such as 
outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host State, 
but also covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the 
effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or 
reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to 
the obvious benefit of the host State.
63
 
Ever since, foreign investors have increasingly sought compensation under indirect 
expropriation standard for alleged damages to their investments caused by host State’s 
general legislative acts,
64
 administrative measures
65
 or compliance measures with the 
non-economic international obligations of host States
66
 that are purportedly designed 
to safeguard non-economic public interests like the environment or public health (see 
Box 1 in Appendix
67
).  
These claims may arise out of a genuine misconduct on the part of the host State that 
intends to hide its mala fide behind public interest.
68
 At other times, foreign investors 
threaten to initiate investment treaty arbitration and claim violations of investment 
guarantees as an attempt to block the effort of a host State to regulate important public 
interest issues. For instance, in Piero Foresti v. South Africa,
69
 investors complained 
about the South Africa’s Black Economic Empowerment programme requiring the 
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introduction of compulsory equity divestiture benefiting the historically 
disadvantaged South Africans. Italian investors claimed that these South African 
attempts to deal with the consequences of apartheid amounted to expropriation of 
Italian investment in the granite sector.  In the end, investors discontinued the claim 
because they managed to reach an agreement with the State on individual Black 
Economic Empowerment arrangements;
70
 however, the indirect expropriation claim 
was used as a mechanism to put pressure on the State. Exerting such a pressure was 
possible because the scope of the indirect expropriation standard is rather 
unpredictable, fuelling concerns that the indirect expropriation standard permits 
overly broad limitations on a host State’s ability to safeguard legitimate public 
welfare objectives unduly limiting its administrative, legislative and judicial powers.
71
  
This concern is strengthened by the fact that the line between a State’s legitimate non-
compensable regulatory activity interfering in foreign investment and compensable 
indirect expropriation is deeply fact-sensitive
72
 and mostly contingent on arbitral 
jurisprudence as the main instrument for filling the vague standard with content in 
specific cases.
73
 Different international courts and tribunals under various treaties 
have relied on different criteria for guiding the distinction between indirect 
expropriation and non-compensable regulation developing various methodologies or 
doctrines, ‘such as those recognizing the public interest on the one side and those 
protecting the integrity of property rights on the other’74, by which to assess if a 
State’s regulatory action amounts to indirect expropriation. The parallel existence of 
these doctrines contributes to the uncertainty and unpredictability of whether a State’s 
responsibility for safeguarding public interest and therefore interfering in foreign 
investment is a measure ‘tantamount’ to expropriation requiring compensation (see 
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Comments in Box 1 in Appendix) or is a non-compensable exercise of State’s police 
powers. 
Thus, for instance, the Metalclad v. Mexico
75
 award is a textbook example of the ‘sole 
effects’ doctrine. In making a decision of whether indirect expropriation takes place 
the ‘sole effects’ doctrine focuses exclusively on the intensity of the State’s 
interference on foreign investor’s property. In Metalclad, the Tribunal was asked to 
analyze, inter alia, a municipal Cactus Protection Decree with a stated purpose to 
safeguard a rare cactus habitat. The Tribunal focused merely on the effect that the 
Decree had on the foreign investor and concluded that the Ecological Decree was in 
itself an act of indirect expropriation as it prohibited any commercial activity on the 
investor’s property.76 The Tribunal’s line of reasoning excluded any other qualifying 
elements save for the effect on the assessment of the existence of indirect 
expropriation, leaving other circumstances like the legitimate and predictable interests 
of the local population or investor’s competence outside of consideration. 
A different approach is represented by the so-called ‘proportionality doctrine’ 
developed by Tecmed v. Mexico.
77
 The claim involved a revocation of the investor’s 
waste landfill operation licence. The local municipality insisted that the revocation of 
the licence was done for environmental protection reasons. In its assessment of the 
existence of indirect expropriation, the Tecmed Tribunal supplemented the paramount 
‘effects’ criterion with an assessment of whether the expropriatory effect was 
imposing on the investor an ‘individual and excessive burden’. 
Some other investment tribunals give emphasis to customary rights of the State to 
regulate for public interest as far as a regulation affecting foreign investment is 
performed in good faith, for instance the Methanex v. US
78
 award which dealt with the 
suppression of trade in a harmful gasoline additive that polluted the environment. The 
company producing the banned chemical initiated investor-state arbitration claiming 
its market share had been indirectly expropriated. In contrast to the sole-effects 
methodology, the Methanex Tribunal started its analysis with a statement that a bona 
fide non-discriminatory regulation for public purpose affecting foreign investment, 
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was not deemed to be expropriatory and compensable.
79
 Thus, in its assessment of the 
existence of indirect expropriation, the so-called ‘context doctrine’ emphasizes 
respect for wider circumstances for which an interference in a foreign investment 
occurs rather than a narrow focus on foreign investment protection. 
These three landmark awards represent the diversity of approaches to drawing the line 
between compensable expropriation and non-compensable regulation for public 
interest. There is no consistency and predictability regarding the choice of the criteria 
and doctrines which arbitral tribunals are going to apply in setting the content of the 
vague and ambiguous indirect expropriation standard; that choice mostly falls to the 
discretion of arbitrators. Hence, interpretation and application of the indirect 
expropriation standard may or may not be well-balanced between the investor’s 
interest in protecting its investment and the host State’s responsibilities to safeguard 
public interest that may result in interference with a foreign investment.
80
 That is to 
say, even if some arbitral awards appear to balance a host State’s and investors 
interests in the application of indirect expropriation standard, it does not mean that 
other arbitral tribunals will find that line of argumentation persuasive;
81
 therefore the 
alleged de facto practice of precedent in investment treaty adjudication
82
 does not 
solve the situation.  
For that reason this study argues that the current meaning of the inherent object and 
purpose of the foreign investment protection regime is sustainable (economic) 
development. It consequently leads to limiting arbitrators’ discretion in choosing the 
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criteria for establishing the existence of indirect expropriation excluding the sole 
focus on the effect of the measure. It also requires arbitrators to adopt methodologies 
which allow for the integration of wider interests than merely economic ones in 
setting the scope of investment guarantees. 
Potential clinical isolation problem 
 
Another interrelated aspect that significantly contributes to the uncertainty and 
unpredictability of the scope of the indirect expropriation standard is its application in 
a way which contributes to the ‘fragmentation of international law’,83 i.e., investment 
tribunals often do not take account of arguments based on external (non-investment) 
sources of law brought forward by defending host States or amicus curiae (see Box 2 
and Box 3 in Appendix
84). Fears of clinically isolated or ‘self-contained’ international 
investment law regime emerged after the notorious pronouncement by Santa Elena v. 
Costa Rica
85
 Tribunal: 
While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may be classified as a 
taking for a public purpose, and thus may be legitimate, the fact that the Property 
was taken for this reason does not affect either the nature or the measure of the 
compensation to be paid for the taking. That is, the purpose of protecting the 
environment for which the Property was taken does not alter the legal character of 
the taking for which adequate compensation must be paid. The international source 
of the obligation to protect the environment makes no difference.
86
  
In this paragraph the Santa Elena Tribunal unduly reduced Costa Rica’s argument that 
its international obligations to protect the site had an effect on the fair market value of 
the expropriated property to the mere declaration that even a lawful expropriation for 
environmental protection reasons raises the duty for the expropriating state to pay 
compensation (a fact that was never questioned by Costa Rica). The Tribunal did not 
consider the 1972 UNESCO Convention, obligations of which served as a motivation 
to expropriate the site. Hence, the Santa Elena Tribunal crafted the content of the 
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indirect expropriation standard and its compensation requirement solely in the context 
of investment law, autonomous from other legal regimes. Such an interpretation 
unjustifiably excludes the possible effect that a host State’s non-investment 
commitments may have on the content of indirect expropriation and, in particular, on 
its sub-elements like investor’s legitimate expectations. 
These two aspects, namely the uncertainty whether, and to what extent, the 
surrounding circumstances and State’s regulatory responsibilities to safeguard such 
public interests as the environment and a State’s crisis management actions87 will be 
taken into account for the determination of whether the regulation mechanisms of the 
State is a measure ‘tantamount’ to expropriation. And, secondly, the unpredictability 
regarding the importance and effects non-investment international law might have on 
the content of the indirect expropriation standard and its sub-elements have resulted in 
the ambiguity of indirect expropriation and insecurity surrounding the policy space 
left for host States to safeguard non-investment public interests.  
Consequently, there is substantial doubt among the international community whether 
the legal regime of FDI protection actually promotes development of host States.
88
 
Fears from an overly limited regulatory space for public interests have created a 
negative attitude towards the international investment protection regime, effectively 
impeding instead of promoting the development of host States. These fears are not 
merely theoretical; in the most extreme way they are made material, for example in 
the case of Bolivia,
89
 Venezuela
90
 and Ecuador
91
 withdrawing from or limiting the 
jurisdiction of the ICSID system and Australia’s opposition to investor-state dispute 
settlement in its future IIAs
92
 by claiming that investor-state arbitration is lacking 
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fairness, legitimacy, and democratic accountability and arbitrators are using overly 
flexible and inconsistent interpretative practices.
93
 Therefore, limiting access to 
investor-state arbitration is believed to protect States from possible policy and 
financial restrictions on their policy space to legislate for social, environmental and 
economic matters.
94
  
Suggestions for improving the balance between State’s regulatory 
responsibilities to safeguard non-economic public interests and investor’s 
property protection  
 
There are other less radical doctrine, treaty drafting and investment policy planning
95
 
suggestions on how to ensure that states regain trust in the system of international 
investment protection which most of them consider being unduly prejudiced towards 
the interests of foreign investors. In one way or other, all these suggestions call for a 
consistent approach in reviewing state regulatory behaviour by arbitral tribunals 
always paying due respect to a State’s ‘public interest’ defence based on domestic or 
international commitments and policies. 
Propositions for solving the potential clinical isolation or ‘fragmentation’ 
problem 
 
Some authors insist that only treaty negotiators may alleviate the fragmentation 
problem associated with the Santa Elena award through future treaty drafting. They 
propose, for instance, the inclusion of explicit indications in treaties that treaty 
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investment guarantees are not to be read in isolation but must be interpreted in light of 
other international law and domestic policies.
96
 Treaty interpretation to that effect is 
seen as a second best solution.
97
 That same position is reflected in the World 
Investment Report 2012 that discloses the UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework 
for Sustainable Development. It summarizes various best-practice solutions of already 
existing IIAs, arbitral jurisprudence and doctrine and advocates for explicit balancing 
in future treaty drafting between the interests of investors and the host States’ non-
investment policies and agendas. For instance, the UNCTAD Investment Policy 
Framework proposes the inclusion of various reservation and general exceptions 
clauses for public policy regulations diminishing the exposure of a host State to 
investment treaty claims.
98
  
However, as the experience with the aborted Norwegian Model BIT shows,
99
 
fundamental changes are difficult to achieve by treaty drafting and, if possible, they 
are time consuming.
100 
 Hence, the work will offer ways to mitigate the imbalances in 
the application of the indirect expropriation standard as it currently stands. 
Other scholars insist on the need to reconsider the application of customary methods 
of interpretation in a way that would resist the fragmentation of international law. 
Scholars indicate that the proper use of customary treaty interpretation principles, in 
particular the much neglected Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, which requires interpretation of 
treaty obligations in light of ‘relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
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relations between the parties’, should avoid the ‘self-contained’ regime approach.101 
Kingsbury and Schill, on their part, note that the potential clinical isolation problem 
may be dealt with by ‘a good faith reading of the text of the applicable treaty in its 
context and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty’.102  A good faith 
reading of the treaty ‘may well indicate that interpretation calls for a balance to be 
struck between investor protection and state regulatory power’.103  
A broader perspective is taken by Petersmann who argues for a ‘constitutional’ 
framework, in which international economic law should operate,
104
 subsequently 
affecting the role of adjudicators. By ‘constitutionalization’ Petersmann means the 
possibility to identify certain elements of a specific status in international law that 
must be given special weight in international adjudication.
105
 Typical elements of this 
kind are jus cogens norms, basic human rights, the transnational rule of law and its 
associated elements of due process and access to justice.
106
 The special status of these 
elements stems from Article 1 of the UN Charter and the Preamble of the VCLT that 
calls for dispute resolution ‘in conformity with principles of justice’ and by taking 
into account ‘universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’.107 
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This customary judicial administration of justice is in the hands of international 
adjudicators
108
 requiring them to provide reasoned interpretation, application and 
clarification of legal principles and rules so as to ‘balance all private and public 
interests affected by the dispute’.109 Consequently, Petersmann sees all the 
international courts and tribunals as balancing judges guarding the values of the whole 
system of international law.
110
 
However, the substantive problem with the above-mentioned doctrinal and treaty 
drafting proposals for the more scrupulous application of customary treaty 
interpretation principles is their high level of abstraction. Use of customary treaty 
interpretation principles that are in the hands of international adjudicators provide 
equal amounts of solutions and problems, since the methods of application are much 
debated
111
 – by using the same customary treaty interpretation principles arbitral 
tribunals often reach conflicting conclusions.
112
 The inability to determine 
connections between the terms of high levels of generality has contributed to the 
clinical isolation and imbalance concerns of investment law. For instance, even the 
NAFTA containing explicit references to the promotion of sustainable development 
and environmental protection has been interpreted in a way that has raised serious 
concerns about the ability of States to safeguard these particular values and inflamed 
                                                 
108 However, Fauchald’s research on the legal reasoning of ICSID tribunals indicates ‘the relatively 
low number of cases that used the context, object and purpose (...) and general principles of law in their 
argumentation, see Ole K. Fauchald, ‘The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An Empirical 
Analysis’, (2008) 19 EJIL 301, at 326, 357. 
109
 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘International Rule of Law and Constitutional Justice in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration’ (2009) 16 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 513. 
110 
See also Alex Stone Sweet, ‘Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier’ (2010) 1 
Law & Ethics of Human Rights 4, Article 4, 59. 
111
E.g., Mark E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties (Martinus 
Nijhoff); R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); J. Pauwelyn, 
Conflict of Norms in Public International Law. How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International 
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003); Enzo Cannizzaro (ed) The Law of Treaties Beyond the 
Vienna Convention (OUP 2011); I Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body 
(OUP 2009). It is even more so with Article 31(3)(c), since none of the known arbitral awards has 
applied it in practice, see A Van Aaken, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: The Case of 
International Investment Protection’ (2008) U. of St. Gallen Law & Economics Working Paper No. 
2008-1. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1893692 (accessed at 12 December 2011), 16: 
‘ICSID tribunals have heavily relied on the application of the VCLT, especially Art. 31 (1) of the 
VCLT. They have not however resorted explicitly to Art. 31 (3) (c) of the VCLT for interpreting the 
clauses of BITs, even if they used other special international law for interpretation.’ (footnotes 
omitted). 
112
 See Ole K. Fauchald, ‘The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An Empirical Analysis’, 
(2008) 19 EJIL 301. See the sub-section of Chapter 1 ‘1.3.1.Interpretation of object and purpose of ‘old 
generation’ BITs: pro investore, in dubio mitius presumptions and balanced approach ’ below. 
 35 
 
doubts about the practical value of these clauses.
113
 The arbitral jurisprudence 
examined in Box 2 and Box 3 in the Appendix reflects the need to find a clear and 
predictable justification of considering non-investment law in informing the content 
of indirect expropriation and other investment guarantees.  
Thus, one takes up the positions by Kingsbury, Schill and Petersmann of the need of 
scrupulous employment of customary treaty interpretation principles and the 
acknowledgement of the potential capacity of arbitrators to act as balancing judges 
between the equally important interests of host States and foreign investors.  
However, the study is aimed at establishing a definite connection or link of 
interpretative value that provides a clear guideline for interpreting concepts of high 
levels of generality, such as the indirect expropriation standard, in a way that 
necessarily integrates other concepts of high levels of generality like the promotion of 
sustainable development, human rights and safeguarding the environment. It is argued 
that the link is established through the interpretation of the very object and purpose of 
international investment law. This study argues that it can be defined as sustainable 
development, the content of which is definite enough for limiting or guiding the 
discretion of investment arbitrators in their employment of customary treaty 
interpretation principles and tools of resolution of normative conflicts. Thus, the 
sustainable development objective affects the application of Article 31 of VCLT that 
requires interpretation of the treaty ‘in the light of its object and purpose’ guiding 
teleological and effective treaty interpretation of the indirect expropriation standard 
towards an outcome that integrates economic and non-economic interests. It also 
allows the extension of the understanding of the clause ‘the same subject matter’ 
within Article 31 of the VCLT beyond the mere focus on investment rules when 
applying the indirect expropriation standard.
114
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Propositions for solving the potential inbalance between State’s and investor’s 
interests by improving the methodology of setting the content of international 
investment guarantees 
 
With regard to the inconsistency in criteria establishing the content of indirect 
expropriation, the UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework proposes the inclusion of 
factors in future IIAs that should be taken into account in establishing the existence of 
indirect expropriation and for calculating appropriate compensation.
115
 
For the interpretation of the existing IIAs, a number of scholars propose the 
implementation of additional standards of review in investment treaty arbitration, 
taken from comparative public international and domestic law,
116
 that could help to 
mitigate potential imbalances in the assessment of whether the conduct of a host State 
is in violation of international investment guarantees, in particular within the 
application of the FET standard. These scholars propose extracting common 
principles from comparable legal regimes, such as international human rights law
117
 
and WTO law, that share the so-called ‘common paradigm of global administrative 
law’118 and influential domestic regimes employing balancing mechanisms between 
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one’s rights and rights-limiting policy actions. Scholars suggest these balancing 
argumentation methods which would create room for the accommodation of the 
impact of non-investment related matters on the scope of investment guarantees may 
be implemented in investor-state arbitration as general principles of international 
law
119
 or as part of the inherent procedural powers of adjudicators.
120
 However, there 
is disagreement on the most appropriate interpretative techniques to be employed and 
on their foundational justification in investment treaty law. For instance, Burke-White 
and von Staden argue for ‘margin of appreciation’ as the most appropriate 
interpretation technique disagreeing on the capacity of ad hoc arbitral tribunals to 
employ proportionality balancing since they are ‘too far removed from the polities 
over whom they exercise control and may lack necessary expertise in the particular 
circumstances and fact patterns of the case’.121 Others note that the margin of 
appreciation may not be seen as a self-standing standard; it is rather an element of 
proportionality balancing.
122
 Schill refers to the ‘margin of appreciation’ not as an 
interpretative technique but as the most appropriate institutional relationship between 
domestic legal systems and arbitral tribunals that have the power to review legitimacy 
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They see that good faith reading of applicable law would allow integrating proportionality analysis in 
setting the scope of investment guarantees. I take up the point of contextual interpretation in Chapter 1, 
but differ with respect to the proportionality as an external element that must be integrated in setting 
the content of indirect expropriation through Article 31(3)(c); rather I claim for indirect expropriation 
having an inherent flexibility to balance the State’s and investor’s interests, and this inner flexibility 
may be achieved through effective interpretation of the indirect expropriation standard. 
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 Jean-Pierre Cot, ‘Margin of Appreciation’, Max Planck Encyclopedia, The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 2007, online edition, available at 
www.mpepil.com,  (accessed on 31 March 2010) [12]. Some arbitrators have already shown a tendency 
in their judicial argumentation to get ‘inspiration’ from judicial balancing methods from other legal 
regimes; however, it is often done without sufficient justification, see SR Ratner, ‘Regulatory Takings 
in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of Fragmented International Law’ (2008) 102 AJIL 3, 475. 
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 William Burke-White and Andreas von Staden, ‘The Need for Public Law Standards of Review 
in Investor-State Arbitrations’ in Stephan W Schill (ed), International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law (OUP 2010) 717. However, there is a general disagreement on what ‘margin 
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ECtHR, see Jean-Pierre Cot, ‘Margin of Appreciation’, Max Planck Encyclopedia, The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 2007, [1], [25], [29]. In contrast, 
Stone Sweet comments on Burke-White and von Staden understanding of ‘margin of appreciation’ as a 
misconception, arguing ‘margin of appreciation’ forms part of the wider proportionality balancing in 
the ECtHR way, and it is not a stand-alone doctrine, see A Stone Sweet, ‘Investor-State Arbitration: 
Proportionality’s New Frontier’ (2010) 4(I) Law and Ethics of Human Rights, 68, footnote 65. 
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 Andreas Kulick, Global Public Interest in International Investment Law (CUP 2012), 194. 
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of domestic actions
123
 granting ‘a space for manoeuvre, within which host state 
conduct is exempt from fully fledged review by an international court or tribunal’.124 
Stone Sweet, on his part, argues for the use of proportionality analysis. He sees 
proportionality balancing as the most appropriate interpretative technique for finding 
a balance between foreign investment protection and a State’s regulatory 
responsibility to protect public interest. He focuses on the application of FET standard 
and the treaty specific ‘non-precluded measures’ clause under Article 11 of the 
Argentina-US BIT, which Argentina has invoked in several arbitrations dealing with 
its social and economic crisis management measures in 2001-2002.
125
 Stone Sweet 
likens balancing to proportionality analysis as the best and most developed 
argumentation technique to be employed in investment treaty arbitration
126
 admitting 
that this particular proposition is questionable.
127
 He insists on the use of 
proportionality balancing because ‘it allows arbitrators to “see” the entire contextual 
field and to narrow or expand their intervention’128 and provides an accurate 
assessment of the balancing process as an analytical way to ‘reduce the losses 
occurring to the loser as much as is legally possible’.129 He claims that ad hoc arbitral 
tribunals have the capacity to employ proportionality analysis because investment 
protection regime is currently undergoing a process of judicialization. That is, there is 
a de facto precedent system in investment arbitration, acceptance of amici briefs and 
‘flirtation with the proportionality analysis’ by some arbitral awards130 that indicates 
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 Stephan W. Schill, ‘Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Reconceptualizing the Standard 
of Review through Comparative Public Law’, SIEL, Working Paper No. 2012/33, available 
<http://www.ssrn.com/link/SIEL-2012-Singapore-Conference.html> (accessed on 15 August 2012).  
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 Ibid, 6 referring to Yuval Shany, ‘Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in 
International Law’, 16 EJIL (2005) 907. See also Michael R Hutchinson, ‘The Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights’, (1999) 48 ICLQ, 638-650, at 639;  Jean-Pierre Cot, 
‘Margin of Appreciation’, Max Planck Encyclopedia, The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, Oxford University Press, 2007 [2]. 
125 A Stone Sweet, ‘Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier’ (2010) 4(I) Law and 
Ethics of Human Rights, 47, at 62. 
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Ibid 63. 
127
 Ibid, footnote 40. See, for instance, Arbitrator Nikken, Separate Opinion in Suez, Sociedad 
General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. and The Argentine Republic, 
Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, [37] disagreeing with the Tribunals 
capacity to assess the existence of alternative means than might have existed for Argentina during the 
crisis. 
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 A Stone Sweet, ‘Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier’ (2010) 4(I) Law and 
Ethics of Human Rights, 47, at 62. 
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 Ibid 63, see also footnote 43. 
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 The most recent example of using proportionality language is the Occidental v. Ecuador Award 
that employed the proportionality assessment under the FET standard. The Tribunal referred to the 
proportionality principle under the Ecuadorian law (and also international  law) that was applicable to 
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the shift towards the public law character of investment treaty arbitrations indicating 
that arbitrators are ready to function as public law judges.
131
  
Schill and Kingsbury express similar views on the need to adopt proportionality 
analysis in the interpretation process, in particular within the FET standard, by noting 
that its adoption would ‘ensure that tribunals consider the relevant interests under the 
applicable principles’, and proportionality analysis would ‘produce better and more 
convincing reasoning, and enable clearer assessment, critique, and accountability of 
tribunals...justifying their decisions in a detailed fashion’.132 
However, arbitrators have differed significantly in their understanding of the scope of 
their inherent powers and on the necessity to refer to external norms of investment 
protection and promotion, including various balancing techniques developed under 
other fields of law.
133
 This is despite the fact that there are notable developments 
towards weighing and balancing of investors’ and States’ interests by some arbitral 
tribunals under some investment guarantees.  Fauchald, who undertook empirical 
analysis on the extent ‘to which ICSID tribunals contribute to creating a predictable 
legal framework in which the interests of investors, states, and third parties are taken 
properly into account’, proved the existence of two extremes. At the one end of the 
spectrum is a ‘dispute oriented’ tribunal that limits itself strictly to the relationship 
between the parties to the dispute. At the other end of the spectrum is a ‘legislator-
oriented’ tribunal, which also considers interests of third parties, ‘the general 
functioning of the ICSID system, the potential impact of its reasoning or conclusions 
for future cases, the general need to clarify issues of law, or the need to prevent future 
disputes’.134  
                                                                                                                                            
determine the legitimacy of Ecuador’s action by terminating an oil contract as a response of the 
Investor’s breach of that contract, see Occidental Petroleum Corporation Occidental Exploration and 
Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, 5 October 
2012, US-Ecuador BIT (1997) [384]-[455]. 
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 A Stone Sweet, ‘Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier’ (2010) 4(I) Law and 
Ethics of Human Rights, 47, at 62. 
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 Benedict Kingsbury and Stephen W Schill, ‘Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Right 
with State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest – the Concept of Proportionality’ in Stephan W 
Schill (ed), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (OUP 2010), 103. 
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E.g., criticism by Fireman Funds on Tecmed ECtHR inspired proportionality balancing, see 
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. Mexico, Award, NAFTA, ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/02/01, 17 
July 2006, para.174(j), footnote 161. 
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 Ole K. Fauchald, ‘The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An Empirical Analysis’, (2008) 19 
EJIL 301, at 306-307. Fauchald also highlighted looking ‘beyond the arguments presented by the 
parties’ as the main challenge for arbitral tribunals, see p.359. 
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Therefore, one agrees with Burke-White and von Staden
135
 rejecting Stone Sweet’s 
claim that because of certain arbitral tribunals applying modified proportionality 
analysis as a balancing mechanism in setting the scope of some particular clause in 
particular IIAs,
136
 earlier awards applying less balanced approaches ‘have now been 
destroyed’.137 The fact that some arbitral jurisprudence appears to pay due respect to 
public interest involved in the interference of foreign investment does not guarantee 
that other tribunals will take a similar approach. In other words, there needs to be 
persuasive arguments put forward for justifying why the non-balanced approaches in 
establishing content of the protection against indirect expropriation are clearly 
excluded.  
The rationale for introducing these external balancing mechanisms in investment 
treaty arbitration is to ensure that arbitrators always take the wider context of the case 
into account and avoid limiting themselves strictly to the focus on the investment 
promotion and protection that may lead to unjustified limitations on host State’s 
regulatory powers. 
In contrast to the above-mentioned proposals, this study aims to prove that the same 
rationale may be achieved by staying within the framework of foreign investment law 
through the careful reading of the inherent object and purpose of the regime that 
equally applies to ‘old generation’ IIAs, which are mostly based on the model of the 
OECD 1967 Draft Convention and narrowly focus on foreign investment protection 
representing the vast majority of IIAs,
138
 and more balanced ‘new generation’ IIAs.139 
Namely, the thesis will show that the current meaning of economic development as 
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Not all treaties concluded later in time belong to ‘new generation’ IIAs, for example, the 
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If the language of ‘old generation’ BITs mainly focus on foreign investment promotion and protection, 
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Vandevelde, ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’, 12 U.C. Davis J.INt’L & Pol’y 
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the inherent objective of international investment promotion and protection is 
sustainable development. For this conclusion there are several legal consequences. 
First, by formalizing the content of sustainable development one may extract elements 
that are directly applicable to the interpretation process of foreign investment 
guarantees, including the necessity to address investment disputes from a broader 
perspective than the narrow focus on foreign investment protection. Second, the 
requirement to take into account the wider context, and third stakeholders’ interests, 
therefore stems from the very international investment protection regime facilitating 
arbitrators to consider the connection between prima facie non-investment aspects and 
investment protection. Furthermore, good faith, contextual and effective 
interpretation140 of the indirect expropriation standard subsequently requires the use of 
weighing and balancing mechanisms not as external techniques but as internal 
requirements that may be achieved by scrupulous analysis of the inherent flexibility of 
the sub-elements of indirect expropriation standard. 
To conclude, such proposals as that of introducing changes in future treaty drafting, 
more careful employment of customary treaty interpretation principles and the 
inclusion of external standards of review in investment arbitration with the aim of 
ensuring that arbitrators always take the wider context of the case into account and 
avoid limiting themselves strictly to the focus on the foreign investment promotion 
and protection are remarkable. Nevertheless, apart from these suggested 
improvements in future treaty drafting, they suffer from being overly abstract for 
clearly linking investment protection (economic development) with other pillars of 
sustainable development, namely social development and environmental protection.  
Hence, these proposals do not ensure certainty and predictability with respect to the 
balanced outcome of their application.  
Aim of the thesis 
 
For the above-mentioned reasons the study aims at establishing the required legal link 
between international investment protection regime as an inherently development 
oriented field of law and the global commitment to promote sustainable development 
in the application of indirect expropriation standard. The central claim is that a 
                                                 
140
 By effective interpretation/understanding interpretation of treaty norms that in a way that most 
effectively fulfills the object and purpose of the treaty, see Ole K. Fauchald, ‘The Legal Reasoning of 
ICSID Tribunals – An Empirical Analysis’, (2008) 19 EJIL 301, at 317.  
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sufficient degree of systematic and conceptual considerations are required when 
delimiting the meaning of indirect expropriation and its sub-elements, and they are 
provided by the sustainable development objective. 
The thesis will prove two interrelated points.  
First, sustainable (economic) development is the inherent object and purpose of the 
already existing network of IIAs consisting of both ‘old generation’ and more-
balanced ‘new generation’ IIAs. This object and purpose requires the assurance that 
commercial interests are not prioritized but balanced and reconciled with competing 
non-economic interests in the application and interpretation of the indirect 
expropriation standard.  Subsequently, the promotion of sustainable (economic) 
development serves as a context, in which the vague indirect expropriation standard 
must be applied allowing for the internalization of the global commitment to promote 
sustainable development in the ‘old generation’ IIAs. Due to the context of the legal 
regime, sustainable development limits the discretion and policy choices of 
adjudicators for filling the vague standard with content in specific cases and facilitates 
arbitrators to consider the connection between prima facie non-investment aspects and 
investment protection. Thus, the proposed contextualization of investment protection 
through the prism of sustainable development will influence and guide the application 
and interpretation of the indirect expropriation standard without waiting for the 
adoption of more-balanced future IIAs.  
Second, and in contrast to the doctrines which view various balancing mechanisms as 
external elements to investment guarantees, the study shows that balancing is inherent 
within the sub-elements of the indirect expropriation standard and its content stems 
from the inherent object and purpose of the international investment protection 
regime. 
The thesis is not designed to go beyond customary treaty interpretation principles; 
instead, it endeavours to establish the link of the interpretative value that provides a 
clear guideline for interpreting indirect expropriation standard in a way that 
necessarily integrates prima facie non-related aspects, e.g., human rights and the 
safeguarding of the environment. In sum, it will solve the imbalances inherent in the 
current of the indirect expropriation standard. 
Methodology  
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The study provides an interpretative tool for ensuring that balancing takes place 
between the divergent interests of foreign investors and host countries within the 
interpretation process of the indirect expropriation standard, which is a key 
investment guarantee invoked to challenge the public interest regulations of a host 
State. Interpretation of the FET standard will also be taken into account, since most of 
the time investor’s allegations under FET and indirect expropriation standards are 
substantially the same, and these two standards share the legitimate-investment 
backed expectations element. 
As the thesis focuses on the application and interpretation of indirect expropriation, it 
will analyse developments in treaty drafting and divergent arbitral jurisprudence. 
The study will assess the network of IIAs as a legal regime despite the lack of one 
multilateral treaty. This approach is supported by Salacuse, who notes that the 
network of IIAs fulfils the regime elements.  These elements are the common aim of 
the regime participants – ‘the belief that increased investment between and among 
contracting states will increase their prosperity’ and ‘that favourable conditions in 
host states will [...] lead to increased investment’; the existence of regime norms and 
regime rules – all IIAs contain similar investment protection guarantees; IIAs provide 
for state-state and investor-state arbitration as a decision-making procedures of the 
regime.
141
 The regime perspective allows applying two levels of object and purpose to 
IIAs – the ‘immediate’ one of the particular IIA and the overall one of the regime. 
Since the network of IIAs is not invented from scratch but to a great extent codifies 
customary international law norms,
142
 a comparison of arbitral jurisprudence under 
various IIAs is justified. At least it is a case of indirect expropriation standard, fair 
and equitable treatment standard (and/or international minimum standard) and their 
legitimate expectations element which forms part of the good faith principle. The 
indirect expropriation standard is also an evolutionary legal term whose content 
changes over time
143
 justifying the use of international law in force at the time when 
the standard is applied. 
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In order to limit the scope of the thesis, the focus is on the available arbitral 
jurisprudence dealing with sustainable development related matters (summarized in 
Box 1- Box 3 in the Appendix). 
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CHAPTER 1.  SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AS THE INHERENT 
OBJECTIVE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROTECTION REGIME 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Sustainable development is clearly acknowledged as a paradigm of future 
international investment protection regime, in particular of investment policy 
making,
144
 though the influence of the global commitment to promote sustainable 
development in the currently existing investment protection regime is still unclear. 
The current investment regime is criticised as blocking instead of promoting 
development because of its unpredictability whether host State’s measures for 
safeguarding non-investment public purpose goals will be tolerated. 
Investment protection regime consists of both ‘old generation’ IIAs and more 
balanced ‘new generation’ IIAs. Even if ‘new generation’ IIAs are more balanced 
between the interests of investors and those of the State – namely these treaties 
address wider development aspects of the operation of foreign investment than the 
narrow focus on the investment protection element, e.g. the necessity to respect basic 
workers rights and to protect the environment, some of them even contain references 
to sustainable development – they represent only around 8% of all the IIAs.145 
Consequently, the question remains open about the interpretation of ‘old generation’ 
IIAs in a way that would not be contrary to the idea of the promotion of sustainable 
development. Moreover, even those ‘new generation’ IIAs as the NAFTA are 
sometimes interpreted in a way that narrowly focuses on the investment protection 
aspect rather than on their overall development elements.
146
 Consequently, the 
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usefulness of NAFTA clauses on non-investment public policy goals has been 
questioned.
147
 This paradoxical situation reapproves the necessity to establish a clear 
link between statements of ‘high level of generality and abstraction’ of non-
investment public interests in these treaties
148
 and the content of indirect expropriation 
standard. The clearness of this link is necessary to ensure that arbitrators always take 
the wider context of cases into account and avoid limiting themselves strictly to the 
focus on the investment protection and promotion.   
Hence, this chapter aims at demonstrating the required interpretative relationship 
between indirect expropriation as a specific term in IIAs and the general commitment 
to promote sustainable development. 
The already proposed reconciling mechanisms, through more considerate application 
of customary treaty interpretation principles, are remarkable. Nevertheless, they suffer 
from being overly vague in linking the interpretation of specific investment treaty 
norms in light of such abstract terms and prima facie external elements to investment 
protection as social development and environmental protection. Even more, by using 
the same treaty interpretation principles arbitral jurisprudence has developed the 
interpretative arguments, which has raised criticism of the investment protection 
regime. 
Hence, the Study is designed to demonstrate that promotion of sustainable 
development serves as a context (object and purpose) in which the vague indirect 
expropriation standard must be applied, limiting discretion and policy choices of 
adjudicators while filling (interpreting) investment standards with content in specific 
cases. 
This chapter aims to prove the following: (1) there is a global commitment to promote 
sustainable development; (2) the core content of this global commitment to promote 
sustainable development is the principle of integration; (3) investment protection 
regime consisting of ‘old generation’ and ‘new generation’ IIAs has economic 
development as its inherent object and purpose. It requires a construction of particular 
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(2000) 33 Canadian Business Law Journal 92. 
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 In words of S.D.Myers Tribunal, see S.D.Myers, Inc. v Government of Canada, Partial Award, 
November 13, 2000, NAFTA, UNCITRAL, [196], [197], [202]; see also ADF Group v. United States 
of America, Award, January 9, 2003, [147]. 
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clauses in IIAs in light of Article 31(1) of the VCLT.
149
 From the methodological 
perspective – since most IIAs are ‘common-form’ because of their comparable 
historic origin
150
 they have a uniform structure and rather standardized language 
introducing ‘uniform principles of investment protection’151 – it is permissible to draw 
conclusions about their inherent rationale by analysing just few of them. 
(4) Further, it is argued that economic development is intrinsically a generic legal 
term, and its current meaning is sustainable development. Hence, the study is 
designed to provide a contextualization of the existing network of IIAs through the 
perspective of the global commitment to promote sustainable development by arguing 
that the inherent object and purpose of the international investment protection regime 
is promotion of sustainable (economic) development. It will be argued that the 
sustainable development objective applies to both ‘new generation’ IIAs (since they 
contain direct or indirect references to sustainable development) and to ‘old 
generation’ IIAs (as an inherent objective of the investment protection regime).  (5) 
Last but not least, it is suggested that sustainable development is a general principle of 
development related international law, which is applicable as a principle of 
interpretation in establishing the existence of indirect expropriation.  In other words, it 
guides treaty interpretation in good faith and in light of its object and purpose towards 
a specific outcome – integration of economic and non-economic interests, excluding 
those interpretative methodologies that solely benefit foreign investors.  
1.1. GLOBAL COMMITMENT TO PROMOTE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
The underlying aim of economic globalization, of which FDI protection forms part, is 
the raising of living standards throughout the world in line with the general 
assumption that widening market access and attracting foreign investment optimizes 
economies and prosperity.
152
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However, since 1972 and the UN Conference on the Human Environment held in 
Stockholm it has been realized that economic growth is necessarily limited due to the 
environment degradation aspect. In 1987, the UN World Commission on Environment 
and Development in the Report Our Common Future (the Brundtland Report)
153
 
formulated the concept of sustainable development and brought the concept to the 
forefront of the international community.
154
 The Brundtland Report provides the most 
often quoted definition of sustainable development:  
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.
155
 
As an expression of community interest
156
 or ‘the principle of collective ethics’157 
sustainable development contains the idea of limitations
158
 ‘imposed by the present 
state of technology and social organization on environmental resources and by the 
ability of the biosphere to absorb the effects of human activities.’159 Thus, sustainable 
development is intended as a corrective concept to economic development and 
various processes of globalization. Its intention is to achieve the overall harmonious 
growth that benefits all.
160
 The concept of sustainable development extends the 
context in which we think about economic development. As the sole focus on 
economic development, e.g. in policy making, might lead to possible negative 
externalities, its current context requires a balancing between economic interests, 
social development needs and environmental protection.  
Furthermore, promotion of sustainable development is not just a theoretical idea. The 
global community has committed to promote sustainable development in three UN 
Conferences– in the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, 
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known as the Earth Summit or Rio Conference,
161
 in the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in 2002,
162
 known as the Johannesburg Conference,
163
 and 
in the Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development, which took place in Rio on 
June 20-22, 2012.
164
 All three conferences had had wide attendance by heads of 
states, representatives of national and local governments, other reprezentatives of 
states, international organizations, NGOs and businesses. The 1992 Rio Conference 
involved over 100 heads of state and government, representatives from 178 countries 
and around 17,000 participants. In the Johannesburg Conference, there were members 
from 191 governments and participants from intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations.
165
 The Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development 
was one of the largest international conferences in recent history with more than 
40,000 participants, among them more than fifty heads of state and hundreds of 
ministers.
166
 
This wide attendance by the reprezentatives of States and the final documents 
approved by the attendees indicate the universal commitment to promote sustainable 
development, creating legitimate expectations towards actions which are in line with 
this commitment on all development related matters,
167
 including protection of 
foreign investment.  
Since 1987, when the concept of sustainable development was formulated, promotion 
of sustainable development had become a paradigm of international economic law. 
For instance, reference to sustainable development was included in the preamble of 
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167  M-C. Cordonier Segger, ‘Sustainable Development in International Law’, in HC Bugge, C. 
Voigt, (eds.), Sustainable Development in International and National Law, (Europa Law Publishing, 
2008), 139, 178-182; C.M.Chinkin, ‘The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in 
International Law’, (1989) 38 ICLQ 4, 851, at 857. Chinkin notes that: ‘State practice is evidenced by 
what states do, as well by what they say.’ 
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the WTO Marrakesh Agreement (1994) and some ‘new generation’ IIAs.168 
Integration of sustainable development in economic law is widely supported by 
scholars, for instance Petersmann has ceaselessly insisted on internalization in 
international economic law of supply of such international public goods like 
transnational rule of law, human rights and sustainable development.
169
 
Sustainable development is also acknowledged as a paradigm of future international 
investment protection law and policy by the World Investment Report (WIR) 2012.
170
 
Namely, the WIR 2012 approves that international foreign investment protection has 
an underlying ‘social function’171 represented by the concept of sustainable 
development
172
 that needs to be taken into account in drafting future IIAs and shaping 
future investment policies. 
Nevertheless, the question remains open of the possibilities and methods of 
internalizing the global commitment to promote sustainable development in the 
currently existing regime of international investment protection regime that mostly 
consists of ‘old generation’ IIAs. The issue is addressed in the following sections. 
1.2.THE CORE CONTENT OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT – PRINCIPLE 
OF INTEGRATION 
Despite the universal commitment to promote sustainable development, determination 
of its content has turned out to be a complex and much contested issue.
173
 One way to 
reveal its content is to look at the so-called ‘international law in the field of 
sustainable development’174 that groups various lex lata and emerging self-contained 
                                                 
168
E.g., Preamble of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
169
 E.U. Petersmann, ‘The Future of International Economic Law: A Research Agenda’, EUI 
Working Papers, Law 2010/06, 23, 25. See also E.U. Petersmann, ‘International Economic Law, 
‘Public Reason’, and Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods’, in (2011) 14 JIEL 23-
76; EU Petersmann, ‘Introduction and Summary: ‘Administration of Justice’ in International 
Investment Law and Adjudication?’ in P.M Dupuy, F. Francioni, E.U. Petersmann (eds.), Human 
Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration, (Oxford University Press) 2009, 1-45. 
170
 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012, Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies 
(UN 2012). 
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 A.Ali Ghouri, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration and the Develpment of International Inevstment 
Law as a „Collective Value System”: A Synopsis of a New Synthesis’, JWIT, Vol 10, December 2009, 
No.6, 922-935.  
172
 See also M. Sornarajah, ‘Right to Regulate and Safeguard’, in UN Conference  on 
Trade&Development, The Development Dimensions of FDI: Policy and Rule –Making Perspectives 
189, UN Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2003/4 (2003), at 205. 
173
E.g., Handl, ‘Sustainable Development: General Rules versus Specific Obligations’, in Winfried 
Lang (ed.), Sustainable Development and International Law, (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 
1995), 36. 
174
 Principle 27 of the Rio Declaration, Brundtland Report (OUP 1987), 11, 17, 231-232.   
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norms under sustainable development as an overarching principle, goal or value.
175
 
Global legal experts in the Report of ILA New Delhi Conference
176
 have specified 
these principles – the duty to co-operate for the protection of the environment,177 
principles of equity and the eradication of poverty,
178
 strengthening rule of law and 
good governance practices in States,
179
 ensuring access to justice and access to 
information by civil society,
180
 and the duty of states to ensure sustainable use of 
natural resources.
181
 Newcombe emphasizes a significant overlap and also a clash 
between these principles and the functioning of international investment protection 
regime, approving the idea that sustainable development and the investment 
protection regime interact significantly.
182
 
Another way for revealing its content implies assessing sustainable development as a 
process rather than a fulfilment of a certain standard of substance.
183
 One may narrow 
down the scope of this process to the essence of integration of economic, social and 
environmental aspects; this integration aspect has been reapproved in the most recent 
global conference on sustainable development. The outcome-document of the Rio+20 
                                                 
175
 P. Sands, ‘Sustainable Development: Treaty, Custom, and the Cross-fertilization of International 
Law, in International Law and Sustainable Development-Past Achievements and Future Challenges’, in 
A Boyle and D Freestone (eds.), International Law and Sustainable Development-Past Achievements 
and Future Challenges (OUP 1999) 39-61.  
176
 ILA, Report of the Seventieth Conference   (Held at New Delhi, 2-6 April 2002) 397-8; M-C 
Cordonier Segger, ‘Sustainable Development in International Law’ in Hans Christian Bugge and 
Christina Voigt (eds), Sustainable Development in International and National Law (Europa Law 
Publishing 2008), 163-176. 
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of the Appellate Body 6 November 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R [167-168]. 
178
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81. 
180
 In this respect international investment regime undergoes significant improvements, gradually 
allowing submissions of amicus curiae briefs and amending several Model BITs and the ICSID and 
UNCITRAL Arbitration rules so as to integrate public hearings and transparency clauses. For example, 
2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, available at www.italaw.com (accessed at 1 April 2012) 
Article 29. 
181
 This principle originates from the well-recognized principle of a State’s sovereignty over natural 
resources (Principle 2 Rio Declaration, Schrijver N., Sovereignty Over Natural Resources: Balancing 
Rights and Duties, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 394) limited with another 
customary law principle not to cause transboundary damage (P. Sands P., Principles of International 
Environmental Law, (2.
nd
 ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 236-246; Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), pp. 241-242, [29]) 
coupled with a duty to protect the environment within a State’s own jurisdiction (For example, in 
Article 2 of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992). 
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 A. Newcombe, ‘Sustainable Development and Investment Treaty Law’, (2007) 8 Journal of 
World Investment and Trade, at 357 et seq. 
183
 Alan Boyle, David Freestone, ‘Introduction’ in Alan Boyle, David Freestone (eds) International 
Law and Sustainable Development. Past Achievements and Future Challenges (OUP 1999) 17. 
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Conference, ‘The Future We Want’ represents the most recent approval of the so-
called principle of integration
184
 by declaring in relevant parts: 
We therefore acknowledge the need to further mainstream sustainable development 
at all levels, integrating economic, social and environmental aspects and 
recognizing their interlinkages, so as to achieve sustainable development in all its 
dimensions.
185
 
Taking the wide presence in the conference of high-level representatives into 
account,
186
  we may assume that this principle of integration is a commonly accepted 
content of sustainable development.  
Therefore we may conclude that it is generally agreed that the essence of sustainable 
development means an equal balance between economic development, social 
development and environmental protection
187
  so as to overcome the negative 
externalities of the purely economic development with an overall aim in mind to 
achieve intergeneration equity.
188
 
1.3.PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS THE PRINCIPAL 
OBJECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PROTECTION REGIME 
The section is designed to prove that the international investment protection regime 
contains as its underlying harmonized object and purpose the representation of the 
will of States participating in the network of IIAs, irrespective of formal objectives of 
individual IIAs.
189
  Thus, the study treats the bundle of ‘old generation’ and ‘new 
generation’ IIAs190 as a legal regime191 that has its underlying object and purpose as 
representing the will of States participating in the network of IIAs. The idea of an 
                                                 
184 United Nations, A/CONF.216/L/1/, Outcome of the Conference ‘The Future We Want’, Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, 20-22 June 2012 [3].  
185
 Ibid. 
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 See footnote 166 above. 
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M-C Cordonier Segger, ‘Sustainable Development in International Law’ in Hans Christian Bugge 
and Christina Voigt (eds), Sustainable Development in International and National Law (Europa Law 
Publishing 2008) 139 and ILA Toronto Conference (2006), ‘International Law on Sustainable 
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188
 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (OUP 1987) 
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189
 For instance, the NAFTA and the ECT deals with wider issues other than investment protection 
including also market liberalization and harmonization. 
190
 On their distinction see K Vandevelde, ‘A Brief History of International Investment 
Agreements’, 12 U.C. Davis J.INt’L & Pol’y (2005)157. 
191
 On the criteria of the existence of the legal regime see JW Salacuse, The Law of Investment 
Treaties (OUP, 2010), 1-17. See also SW Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment 
Law (CUP 2009). 
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inherent objective of the investment regime is expressed in legal doctrine
192
 and in the 
evolving arbitral jurisprudence applying ‘old generation’ IIAs that usually remain 
silent on their objectives.
193
 
Context of the treaty is often revealed by the preamble as an element of textual and 
teleological interpretation.
194
  Traditionally, object and purpose reflects general tenor 
and atmosphere of the treaty, the circumstances in which it was made, and reveals the 
place it has come to have in international life.
195
 However, all preambles are not of 
equal value – some preambles contain detailed analysis of the aims and objectives of 
treaties and their negotiating history. Others are drafted with less care and they are 
less elaborate or even remain silent on the context of the respective treaties. The latter 
situation is often the case with ‘old generation’ IIAs. Their preambles are brief or 
remain silent on their purposes; at best, their preambles contain the reference to the 
promotion of economic development of the treaty Parties as their rationale. In 
addition, such traditional subsidiary sources as travaux préparatoires are rarely 
available for IIAs.
196
  
Therefore, the context of IIAs has been subject to interpretation, and arbitral 
jurisprudence has been the main developer of the more precise (and often 
contradicting) content and meaning of it, addressed below.  
1.3.1.Interpretation of object and purpose of ‘old generation’ BITs: pro 
investore, in dubio mitius presumptions and balanced approach  
 
                                                 
192
 On the theory of the ‘innate’ purpose of investment protection regime see Thomas W Waelde, 
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By using teleological interpretation of BITs in light of their object and purpose 
(Article 31(1) VCLT), arbitral tribunals have arrived at three essentially contradicting 
starting positions for the further interpretation of investment guarantees.  
Thus, for instance, Noble Ventures v. Romania,
197
 Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia
198
 and 
Siemens v. Argentina
199
 awards applied pro investore presumption that allows 
applying investment protection provisions extensively for the benefit of foreign 
investors. This presumption was justified by teleological interpretation, interpreting 
respectively the scope of an umbrella clause, denying the exclusive jurisdiction of 
national courts and the scope of the MFN standard. The Siemens v. Argentina 
Tribunal justified the pro investore interpretation as best serving the intentions of the 
contracting Parties of the German –Argentina BIT (1991):200 
The Tribunal shall be guided by the purpose of the Treaty as expressed in its title 
and preamble. [..] The intention of the parties is clear. It is to create favourable 
conditions for investments and to stimulate private initiative.
201  
Similarly, the SGS v. Philippines Tribunal excused its overly broad interpretation of 
the umbrella clause by the reference to the objective of the BIT and stated that: 
The BIT is a treaty for the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments. 
According to the preamble it is intended “to create and maintain favourable 
conditions for investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of 
the other”. It is legitimate to resolve uncertainties in its interpretation so as to 
favour the protection of covered investments.
202  
In sum, these awards have interpreted the object and purpose of BITs so as to allow 
‘one-sided doctrinal advantage’ for foreign investment.203 It was argued that the pro-
                                                 
197
 Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11 (US/Romania BIT) Award, 12 
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 Siemens v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction [81]. 
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A. Newcombe, ‘Sustainable Development and Investment Treaty Law’, Journal of World Investment 
and Trade, 2007; see also Pinsolle P., Schlaepfer A.V. and Degos L. (eds.), Towards a Uniform 
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investor approach was legitimately derived from the very titles of BITs, namely they 
are agreements on the promotion and protection of foreign investment. Also, investors 
often argue for pro investore interpretation claiming it is a logical consequence of the 
existence of BITs.
204
 Finally, the tribunals choosing to apply the pro-investore 
approach see themselves as merely ‘dispute oriented’ tribunals. Thus, they limit their 
interest and fail to take account of issues other than those represented by BITs.
205
 As a 
result, argumentation of these tribunals is often overly formalistic for assessing the 
content of purpose of IIAs.  Such a mindset leads to unfair restrictions on the 
regulatory flexibility of a host State giving the impression that the interests of the 
investor are placed above the public interests, contributing to the view of the existence 
of ‘regulatory chill’.  
Some other arbitral tribunals, while interpreting comparable ‘old generation’ BITs, 
have explicitly rejected in dubio pro investore presumption as not justified by the 
teleological interpretation of these BITs.
206
  
Thus, in El Paso v. Argentina, the tribunal applied the ‘old generation’ Argentina-US 
BIT (1991) preamble, which is similar to the above-mentioned German-Argentina 
BIT, and decided on the balanced approach with respect to the interpretation of 
substantive norms and is worth quoting at length: 
On the one hand, some contend that the treaty should be interpreted so as to favour 
State sovereignty; on the other, it has been argued that the interpretation should 
favour the investor’s protection [...]This Tribunal considers that a balanced 
interpretation is needed, taking into account both State sovereignity and the State’s 
responsibility to create an adapted and evolutionary framework for the 
development of economic activities, and the necessity to protect foreign investment 
and its continuing flow.
207
 
Also, a pro-state approach has been rejected as not acceptable; the tribunal in 
Methanex v. United States took the position that the intention of the NAFTA Parties 
                                                                                                                                            
International Arbitration Law, IAI International Arbitration Series No.3., (New York: Juris Publishing, 
2005). 
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EJIL 301, at 359. 
206
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207
 El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 
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the Parties [..]’ 
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was to interpret the treaty ‘in good faith in accordance with their ordinary meaning (in 
accordance with Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention), without any one-sided 
doctrinal advantage built in to their text to disadvantage procedurally an investor 
seeking arbitral relief’.208 This statement by the Methanex Tribunal illustrates well 
that such interpretation of IIA that unjustly sides one of the disputing parties is 
considered to be contrary to the good faith principle. 
To conclude, the outcome of the teleological interpretation of ‘old school’ BITs has 
led to three clashing propositions on how to interpret substantive norms of the 
BITs.
209
 The balanced interpretation favouring none is supported by the inherent 
wider context of economic development concretized by the arbitral jurisprudence and 
analysed below.
 
 
1.3.2.Two tiers of objectives for teleological interpretation: promotion of 
economic development as the inherent and principal objective 
 
Arbitral jurisprudence has gradually developed two levels of object and purpose – the 
‘immediate’ one that is mentioned in a specific IIA and that is mostly related to 
foreign investment promotion and protection,
210
 and the ‘overall’ or the inherent one 
of the promotion of economic development, even if this wider context is not explicitly 
indicated in the IIA.
211
  
Thus, the tribunal in Saluka v. Czech Republic
212
 famously noted:  
The protection of foreign investments is not the sole aim of the Treaty, but rather a 
necessary element alongside the overall aim of encouraging foreign investment and 
extending and intensifying the parties’ economic relations.213 
                                                 
208
 Methanex v. United States, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Partial Award, August 7, 2002, [105]. 
209
 However, statistical data of decided cases under the ICSID does not indicate that the por-
invesoter approach would have an overly burdensome practical effect for host States, since of the 
almost hundred concluded cases at the end of 2008, approximately half were decided in favour of 
States and half in favour of investors, see S.D. Franck, ‘Development and Outcomes in Investment 
Arbitration’, (2009), 50 Harv Int’ l L J 435. 
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212
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213
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Similarly, the tribunal in Charles Lemire v. Ukraine interpreting ‘old generation’ 
Ukraine-US bilateral investment treaty (BIT) (1996) declared: 
The main purpose of the BIT is thus the stimulation of foreign investment and of the 
accompanying flow of capital. (...) But this main purpose is not sought in abstract; 
it is inserted in a wider context, the economic development for both signatory 
countries.
214
 
As a result, arbitral jurisprudence interpreting object and purpose of ‘old generation’ 
IIAs has employed the inherent objective in teleological interpretation of individual 
IIAs and has shifted away from the narrow focus of investment protection as a goal in 
itself
215
  to investment protection as a tool for economic development of host states.
216
 
Even more, in the Charles Lemire award the tribunal not only established that 
economic development is the overall aim of foreign investment protection, it went 
further by explaining that ‘[e]conomic development is an objective which must benefit 
all, primarily national citizens and national companies, and secondarily foreign 
investor’.217 
Hence, the overall economic development objective of foreign investment protection 
indicates that the existence of international investment protection law does not stop 
short at protecting foreign investors and it allows an explanation of the participation 
of States in the network of IIAs that ‘might bite’218 by imposing significant 
restrictions on State’s regulatory powers.  
1.3.3.Support of the inherent objective of international investment protection law 
in scholarly work 
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The inherent or overall objective of investment protection regime is supported not 
only by arbitral jurisprudence but also by scholarly work.
219
  
Multilateralization theory developed by Schill supports the existence of the inherent 
object and purpose of the investment regime. Schill has developed a 
multilateralization theory dealing with the legal effects of the proliferation and the 
harmonization of the content and application of the network of BITs. Quintessentially, 
Schill asserts that BITs, although bilateral treaties, function analogously to a truly 
multilateral system. This is so because BITs ‘establish rather uniform general 
principles that order the relations between foreign investors and host States in a 
relatively uniform manner independently of the sources and targets of specific 
transborder investment flows’.220 In other words, Schill suggests that sufficient 
convergence of scope and structure of BITs and substantive investment protection 
standards of various IIAs has taken place creating a multilateral sub-system of 
international law rather than a fragmented/bilateral system.
221
   
Most importantly for the present focus, Schill indicates that the overall aim of States 
participating in the network of BITs is to ‘create an investment-friendly environment 
that is characterized by stability and predictability and leads to economic growth and 
development in both home and host states.’222 Moreover, the existence of common 
interest of States in uniform foreign investment protection rules ‘demands and 
justifies that international investment treaties should be interpreted and applied in a 
uniform manner’.223  
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Using the words of Schill, ‘investment tribunals do not confine themselves to a 
strictly bilateral interpretation of BITs’224 but their interpretation of particular 
investment treaty affects the interpretation of all BITs thus actively developing 
international investment law.
225
 This conceptual convergence justifies and explains 
the often practised ‘cross-treaty interpretation referring either to BIT practice of the 
States involved in the dispute or to BIT practice of wholly unrelated countries or to 
model treaties or, finally, using teleological interpretation method’.226  
Therefore, according to Schill,
 227
 it means not only textual convergence of treaties but 
also conceptual convergence towards an overarching legal framework of foreign 
investment protection,
228
 providing a justification for an innate purpose of 
international investment protection law that automatically creates an element of 
teleological interpretation of a specific BIT. 
Another argument in support of the existence of the inherent object and purpose of the 
investment protection regime dwells on the explanation of the motivation for States’ 
participation in the network of IIAs. 
Even if there are disagreements on the reasons why states have created international 
investment regime as it currently is,
229
 it is assumed that participation of states in the 
network of IIAs is inherently linked with expectations of host States to receive 
development input from FDI. In other words, FDI protection is associated with the 
promotion of economic development of host States assuming that the protection of 
investment will stimulate FDI, and FDI in-flows in country will lead to economic 
growth and development.
230
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Schill to go beyond VCLT to explain the reliance by investment treaty arbitration tribunals on the case 
law of their predecessors. Paparinskis attempts to explain the reliance on pari materia jurisprudence 
through traditional treaty interpretation and application rules. See M.Paparinskis, ‘Sources of Law and 
Arbitral Interpretations of Pari Materia Investment Protection Rules’, available at http://ssrn.com, 26. 
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 Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, 321, 339. 
229
E.g., Protopsaltis insists the investmet regime has resulted from the ‘race-to-the-bottom’ among 
States in attracting FDI. P.M.Protopsaltis, ‘The Multilateralization of International Investment Law by 
Stephan W.Schill (Book Review)’, TDM, Issue (provisional), November 2010, 14-19. 
230
 C.Schreuer, U.Kriebaum, ‘From Individual to Community Interest in International Investment 
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Bruno Simma  (OUP, 2011), 1082. 
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This assumption holds true irrespective of the controversial empiric evidence 
supporting the FDI-led growth hypothesis
231
 and the actual effect of the conclusion of 
IIAs as an aspect promoting FDI in-flows.
232
  
Although IIAs differ in many ways, for instance in the scope of application and 
institutional setting, all IIAs are comparable in their aim of protecting foreign 
investment from unjustified interference by host states through their commitment to 
good governance and rule of law standards.
233
 Hence, conclusion of IIAs is associated 
with a signal it gives to potential investors, namely that the country is ready to protect 
their investments while considerably constraining its regulatory capacity. Conclusion 
of IIAs thus improves the location determinant of the OLI paradigm.
234
 Dunning’s 
OLI paradigm attempts to explain investor’s motivation to invest in a State, noting 
that conclusion of IIAs improves State’s competitive advantage to be chosen by the 
investor as a final destination for FDI comparing to other similar states, which have 
not concluded IIAs.
235
 
Only States’ expectation for development input may explain why States undertake 
obligations which ‘could bite’236 by considerably constraining their regulatory 
                                                 
231
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wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/09/23/000094946_030911040
60047/additional/105505322_20041117160010.pdf, accessed on 2 January 2012; P Economou, JH 
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Malintoppi, A. Reinsisch and A. Sinclair, The ICSID Convention. A Commentary (2
nd
 ed, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 128-134; Mr. Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No.ARB/07/20, 
Award July 14, 2010, [111]. 
233
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234
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capacity
237
 and why the conclusion of new IIAs shifts away from the historically 
determined North-South relationship also to South-South dimension.
238
  
Therefore, one may conclude that the protection of FDI and conclusions of IIAs is not 
a goal in itself.
239
 It is rather a tool for states to achieve a public good – economic 
development.
240
  
On this score, the distinction provided in economic theory between intermediate and 
final public goods may add some clarity: one may distinguish between intermediate 
public goods, like the existence of international regimes, and final public goods, like 
economic growth.
241
 Hence, the existence of international investment protection 
regime at most may be considered as an intermediate public good
242
 that serves to 
achieve the final public good – development. 
1.4. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS A GENERIC TERM AND ITS CURRENT 
MEANING –  SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
It is argued that the notion of economic development fulfils the criteria of being a 
generic term, the interpretation of which requires its adaptation to present‐day realities 
at a time of its application. Thus, it is proposed that the dynamic nature of the term 
economic development results in the possibility of an evolutive re-interpretation of 
                                                 
237
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‘old generation’ IIAs even if they formally prioritize the economic rather than the 
social, environmental and human development dimension. 
In order to justify evolutive treaty interpretation, international law requires the 
fulfilment of several preconditions.
243
  A treaty (of continuing duration
244
) must 
contain a generic legal term that the treaty parties have intended to change its meaning 
through time. As a logical consequence, it is necessary to identify those authoritative 
statements that contain the present day meaning of the generic term. In relation to the 
term ‘economic development’ these criteria are addressed here in turn. 
First, presumption of the existence of a generic term is strengthened where the treaty 
is of continuing duration. Even though a typical duration clause of BITs indicates that 
they are in force on average for ten years,
245
  renegotiations of the existing BITs are 
undertaken hesitantly.
246
 In case of a renegotiation, BITs are replaced by new BITs or 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that contain similar investment protection standards 
with little amendments. Hence, it may be presumed that the network of IIAs functions 
as a legal regime of continuing duration.   
Further, it must be proved that the term has a content, which ‘the parties expected 
would change through time’.247 Thus, it is claimed that the term ‘economic 
development’ like the notions of ‘commerce’,248 ‘exhaustible natural resources’,249 
‘environment’,250 ‘sacred trust’251 or ‘sound recording distribution services’252 by its 
very logic  and definition is not a static but a dynamic term, requiring its interpretation 
                                                 
243
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‘in the light of modern day conditions’.253 This is because the evolving nature of 
economic development is clearly approved since at least the UN Conference on the 
Human Environment in 1972, where the global community acknowledged that 
economic growth was necessarily limited with the environment degradation aspect.
254
  
Its dynamic nature was later recognized by the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case,255 where 
the court declared that there was a need to reconcile economic development with the 
protection of the environment even for economic activities begun before the clear 
realization of the potential negative effects that economic development might have 
upon the environment.
256
 Therefore, States participating in the network of IIAs must 
be presumed to be aware of the inherently generic nature of economic development 
that requires constant adjustments to present day realities. 
Finally, there needs to be evidence on the current meaning of the term that is accepted 
by the treaty parties. Schreuer in his commentary on the Salini test,
257
 which 
introduced the contribution to host state’s economic development as a characteristic 
of the existence of an investment, writes: 
Any concept of economic development (...) should not be restricted to measurable 
contributions to GDP but should include development of human potential, political and 
social development and the protection of the local and global environment.258 
This logic is reflected by the consensus reached in three UN conferences
259
 where the 
global community has realized that the sole focus on economic development should 
be replaced by the global commitment to promote sustainable development, which, in 
essence, is a corrective element of various negative externalities that economic 
development and various processes of globalization might bring.
260
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Even more, this contemporary meaning of economic development is expressly 
integrated in preambles and operative parts of ‘new generation’ IIAs addressing 
foreign investment protection from the broader perspective than the narrow focus on 
economic development that is traditionally associated with foreign investment 
protection.  
Accordingly, several ‘new generation’ IIAs contain preambular acknowledgements of 
the importance of the enforcement of basic workers’ rights and environmental 
protection and conservation
261
 or of a more general reservation of customary state’s 
right to regulate for the public interest.
262
 Some ‘new generation’ IIAs have ‘corporate 
social responsibility’ clauses in their preambles or operative parts.263 Operative parts 
of numerous IIAs contain ‘no lowering of standards clauses’ (health, environment, 
safety, labour protection),
264 
various general exceptions clauses,
265
 exclusion of 
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 Preambles to the US-Colombia FTA (2011) and Canada- Colombia FTA (2008), see Spears S A, 
‘The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International  Investment Agreements’ (2010) 13 
JIEL 4, 1037-1075, at 1068, footnote 172. Spears classifies these as ‘self-standing’ objectives of IIAs. 
Statistically around 8% IIAS include reference to environmental concerns, see Kathryn Gordon, 
Joachim Pohl (2011), ‘Environmental Concerns in International Investment Agreements. A Survey’ 
OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2011/01, OECD Publishing 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg9mq7scjh-en> accessed 20 November 2012. Article 18, 19(1) and 19(2) 
of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) (1994) <http://www.encharter.org> accessed 20 November 2012. 
262
 For instance, preambles of the North American Free Trade Agreement between the United States, 
Canada and Mexico (1994) (NAFTA) <http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta> accessed on 20 November 2012, and the 
Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (2009) (CAFTA) 
<http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-
america-fta/final-text> accessed on 20 November 2012. See also Article 10.11. US – Colombia FTA 
<http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta/final-text> accessed on 20 
November 2012. 
263
E.g., Preamble and Article 816 of the Canada – Colombia FTA (2011) 
<http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/colombia-
colombie/can-colombia-toc-tdm-can-colombie.aspx?view=d> accessed on 20 November 2012; Article 
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November 2012. In the CARIFORUM EPA, sustainable development is a core objective of the treaty 
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significance, linking sustainable development with a body of legal norms that generate rights and 
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environment-related disputes from investor-state arbitration,
266
 specific chapters on 
environmental matters,
267
 transfer of technology clauses
268
 and/or guidelines for the 
interpretation of investment protection standards such as indirect expropriation that 
aims at ensuring that more than foreign investor’s interests are taken into account in 
the establishment of a violation of investment guarantees.
269
 Finally, several ‘new 
generation’ IIAs not only refer to separate elements of sustainable development but 
also contain explicit preambular references to the promotion of sustainable 
development as the objective of foreign investment protection, for instance, in the 
CAFTA (2004), the NAFTA (1994), the COMESA Common Investment Area 
Agreement (CIAA) 2007, Canada Model BIT (2004)
270
 and recent Canada and US 
free trade agreements (FTAs) like Canada–Peru FTA (2009)271 and US-Korea FTA 
(2011)
272
 and US-Colombia FTA (2011).
273
  
The most explicit linkage between sustainable development as a current meaning of 
economic development and foreign investment protection as its element is provided 
by EU law. Since the Treaty of Lisbon came into effect, the EU has the exclusive 
competence to regulate FDI within the common commercial policy as part of the 
Union’s external action.274 Through Articles 3 and 21 TEU, sustainable development 
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and its elements
275
 are applicable to all internal and external actions and policies of 
the EU,
276
 also with regard to foreign investment.  
Even before the changes in the constituting documents of the EU, sustainable 
development was well reflected as the objective of the EU development policies with 
Third states
277
 having been integrated in the Cotonou Agreement
278
 and such 
development oriented economic partnership agreements as the CARIFORUM EPA, 
which has a chapter on investment protection.
279
 The Future EU Model BIT is 
expected to contain obligations regarding the promotion of sustainable development 
since the EU competence under the Common Commercial Policy is linked to the main 
principles of the EU, including the promotion of sustainable development.
280
   
To conclude, the evidence on the current and extended meaning of economic 
development is provided by the commitment of the global community to promote 
sustainable development instead of merely economic development. The same 
approach is taken in several bilateral and regional legal instruments dealing with 
international economic law. Thus, the international community nowadays perceives 
economic development in the context of sustainable development. This paradigm shift 
is not only reflected by the global commitments achieved within the UN but is also 
mirrored in ‘new generation’ IIAs through their elements that shift the sole focus on 
economic development to wider development implications of FDI protection. 
                                                 
275
Chapter on Common provisions of TEU, Article 3(1), (3) and (5) (ex Article 2 TEU). Preamble 
TEU “determined to promote economic and social progress for their peoples, taking into account the 
principle of sustainable development and within the context of the accomplishment of the internal 
market and of reinforced cohesion and environmental protection, and to implement policies ensuring 
that advances in economic integration are accompanied by parallel progress in other fields”. 
276
 Article  3(5) and 21 TEU. 
277
 O.Babarinde, G.Faber, ‘From Lomé to Cotonou: ACP-EU Partnership in Transition’, in The 
European Union and the Developing Countries. The Cotonou Agreement, O.Babarinde, G.Faber (eds.), 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 1-12. 
278
 The Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of 
States of the one part and the European Community and its Member States of the other part, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/economic-partnerships/index_en.htm (accessed 
on 27 March 2010). D.Willem Te Velde, S.Bilal, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement: Building on Private Sector Initiatives’, in The European Union and the 
Developing Countries. The Cotonou Agreement, O.Babarinde, G.Faber (eds.), (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 197. 
279
 J.A.McMahon, ‘The Negotiations of the Cotonou Agreement: Negotiating Continuity or 
Change?’, in The European Union and the Developing Countries. The Cotonou Agreement, 
O.Babarinde, G.Faber (eds.), (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 52-53. 
280
 C.M.A. de Mestralls, ‘A Model EU BIT Possible-or Even Desirable?’ Transnational Dispute 
Management, Vol. 7, Issue 1, April 2010, M. Bungenberg, Centralizing European BIT Making under 
the Lisbon, Treaty Paper (draft version) to be presented at the 2008 Biennial Interest Group Conference 
in Washington, D.C., November 13 – 15, 2008. See Articles 205 and 207 TFEU with reference to 
article 21 TEU. 
 67 
 
Consequently, the object and purpose of IIAs that remain silent on it or reflect it 
narrowly as economic development are subject to evolutive treaty interpretation. 
To conclude, ‘old generation’ BITs, representing the vast majority of IIAs, usually 
indicate no treaty objectives or, at best, they refer to the promotion of economic 
development of treaty Parties as their rationale. This may be explained as a 
consequence of not understanding the full consequence of the BITs at the time of their 
conclusion
281
 or as the intention to keep silent on controversial issues.
282
 
Therefore, arbitral jurisprudence has developed the concept of the inherent object and 
purpose of the foreign investment protection regime, which participates in the 
interpretation of individual IIAs and also the ‘old generation’ IIAs, formally 
prioritizing the economic rather than the social, environmental and human 
development dimension. This inherent rationale of the network of IIAs is economic 
development, which, the study claims, is a generic legal term subject to evolutionary 
treaty interpretation. Evolutionary treaty interpretation of this inherent objective 
indicates that its present day meaning is sustainable development. This conclusion is 
achieved, first, by the reliance on the very nature of the term ‘economic development’ 
and its interpretation by the international community through its global commitment 
to promote sustainable (economic) development instead of economic development, 
which has been gradually achieved within the UN through several resolutions and 
declarations and thus has a global coverage. Second, an additional support of it is 
represented by the current trends in drafting economic law treaties. These new treaties 
clarify that the economic aspect of investment protection or international trade needs 
to be reconciled with social and environmental considerations by host States.
283
 Thus, 
the ‘dynamic re-interpretation’ of ‘old generation’ IIAs towards the promotion of 
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sustainable development is justified through the evolutive interpretation of the 
inherent and generic object and purpose of the network of IIAs.   
At the same time, theoretically and in specific cases, ‘re-interpretation’ of ‘old 
generation’ BITs towards the inclusion of sustainable development might also be 
achieved by the use of the systemic integration principle (Article 31(3)(c) VCLT), 
taking into account that its reach is limited by the requirement to apply relevant 
applicable rules between the disputing parties. Thus, in order to rely on this 
interpretation principle, disputing parties must prove that they are bound by treaty or 
customary international law (e.g., on human rights or the protection of the 
environment), which is relevant for the interpretation of terms in ‘old generation’ BIT 
(see section 2.2.4. below).  
As a result, sustainable development as the inherent object and purpose of the 
investment protection regime may and should participate in good faith and effective 
interpretation of the loose indirect expropriation standard and its sub-elements
284
  
requiring the review of the methodologies that arbitral tribunals have used for 
establishing the existence of indirect expropriation.  
Furthermore, indirect expropriation and FET standards are part of customary 
international law, which are codified in IIAs; thus, they may be compared with 
provisions in a treaty of a long duration. These standards themselves are considered to 
be generic in nature and, hence, subject to interpretation, which takes the present day 
conditions into account.
285
 These present day conditions are claimed to be the context 
of the promotion of sustainable development. 
1.5. NORMATIVITY OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT  
It is claimed here that sustainable development not only fulfils the interpretative 
function of investment treaties as their inherent object and purpose (Article 31 of the 
                                                 
284
 On effective treaty interpretation see Gardiner R, Treaty Interpretation (OUP 2008) 148, 161. For 
instance, the Appellate Body (AB) in the Shrimp/Turtle case provides an example of how the Treaty’s 
objective affects the interpretation of a specific treaty norm. The AB justified evolutive interpretation 
of the term ‘exhaustible natural resources’ by reference to sustainable development in the preamble of 
the Marrakesh Agreement, see United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products (US-Shrimp/Turtle Ι), AB-1998-4, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R [129]–
[130], [153]. Similarly, in S.D.Myers, the Tribunal took into account the sustainable development 
objective of the NAFTA as a context of the national treatment standard, see S.D.Myers, Inc. v 
Government of Canada, Partial Award, November 13, 2000, NAFTA, UNCITRAL [196], [221], [245], 
[247], [250]. 
285
 Fragmentation Report (2007), [478(a)]. 
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VCLT).  This section aims to prove that sustainable development has also gained a 
status of a legal principle of interpretation
286
 under Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ 
Statutes, which implies general principles of law belonging to international law in 
general and to some specific domains of international law such as environmental 
law
287
 or law of development. 
In order to prove this, the section assesses the criteria that a concept must fulfil to be a 
legal principle: (1) whether sustainable development as a primary norm is recognized 
in such principal sources of legal authority
288
 as treaties, practice of States (and other 
subjects of international law)
289
 and/or judicial decisions
290
 indicating the duty of 
officials to consider (take into account) sustainable development in their decision-
making; and (2) whether sustainable development meets the qualitative criteria that a 
concept ought to fulfil in order to function as a legal principle – whether sustainable 
development has a critical amount of clarity to guide adjudicators towards a particular 
outcome. These criteria stem from legal doctrine, analysed below. 
1.5.1. Sustainable development as a customary legal rule 
 
There have been various attempts to prove the existence of sustainable development 
as an international customary legal rule.
291
 However, the leading approach, also taken 
in this study, is that the concept itself fails the test of being a legal rule (customary 
law). For being a legal rule, sustainable development lacks several preconditions 
                                                 
286
 On international investment protection law as international law of development see P Kahn, ‘The 
Law of Development and Arbitration Tribunals’ in F Snyder, P Slinn (eds) International Law of 
Development: Comparative Perspectives (Professional Books 1987) 163-175. 
287
 Judge C Trindade, Separate Opinion, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 
Judgement (ICJ, 20 April 2010) [48]. 
288
 See HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2
nd
 ed, OUP 1994) 95, 100. Hart identifies several 
authoritative criteria (rules of recognition), such as references to authoritative texts, legislative 
enactments, customary practice or judicial precedent, that allow decision-makers to identify primary 
rules of obligation.  
289
  Judge C Trindade, Separate Opinion, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 
Judgement (ICJ, 20 April 2010) [18]. 
290 
On judicial precedents as a quasi-formal source of legal authority in the international community, 
see Sir G G Fitzmaurice, ‘Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of International Law’, (1958) 
Symbolae Verzijl 168-172 in Marti Koskenniemi (ed) Sources of International Law (Ashgate 2000); W 
Friedmann, ‘The Uses of “General Principles” in the Development of International Law’, (1963) 57 
AJIL 2, 279. See also Judge C Trindade, Separate Opinion, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay 
(Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgement (ICJ, 20 April 2010) [38]. 
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 P.Sands, ‘International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development’, BYIL, Vol.65, 1994, 303-
382. See also Virginie Barral, ‘Sustainable Development in International Law: Nature and Operation of 
an Evolutive Legal Norm’, (2012) 23 EJIL 2, 377-400. 
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which are summarized by Lowe
292
 and Handl
293– sustainable development does not 
have a norm-creating character, namely, it is not sufficiently precise and clear and it 
does not create an actionable right in itself,
294
 and there are no justifiable standards of 
review of its fulfilment. It is rather a specific process of thinking and interpretation 
than a fulfilment of a certain standard of substance.
295
 Thus, in line with Dworkin’s 
proposed distinction between rules and principles, sustainable development is not a 
rule because it is not ‘applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion’.296  
1.5.2. Sustainable development as a legal principle 
 
Even if most of the hard law references to sustainable development do not indicate its 
legal status,
297
 recognition of sustainable development as a legal principle is arguably 
to be found in the practice of states
298
 and other subjects of international law.
299
 Its 
capacity to function as a legal principle may be read into several judicial decisions by 
international courts and tribunals.
300
 Its ability to function as a legal principle is also 
                                                 
292
 V. Lowe, ‘Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments’ in Alan Boyle and David 
Freestone (eds) International Law and Sustainable Development. Past Achievements and Future 
Challenges (OUP 1999), 26, and V.Lowe, International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 
97-99. 
293
 G. Handl, ‘Sustainable Development: General Rules versus Specific Obligations’, in Winfried 
Lang (ed.), Sustainable Development and International Law, (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 
1995), 35-45. 
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(Germany/Denmark, Germany/Netherlands), ICJ Judgement of 20 February 1969 [72]. 
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 Alan Boyle, David Freestone, ‘Introduction’ in Alan Boyle, David Freestone (eds) International 
Law and Sustainable Development. Past Achievements and Future Challenges (OUP 1999) 17. 
296
 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London: Duckworth, 2005), 24. 
297
 With the exception of the preamble of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty of European 
Union: ‘[d[etermined to promote economic and social progress for their peoples, taking into account 
the principle of sustainable development.’ 
298
 Argentina and Uruguay had referred to sustainable development as a relevant applicable principle 
of international environmental law in the Pulp Mills case, see Memorial of the Argentina [3.177]-
[3.179] <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15425.pdf> accessed on 20 November 2012 and  
Uruguay Counter–Memorial [2.29]-[2.32] <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15427.pdf> 
accessed on 20 November 2012, see also Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), 
Judgement (ICJ 20 April, 2010) [55], [152]. Nigeria has expressed its acknowledgement of sustainable 
development as guiding its international relations with respect to international trade, see Nigeria as a 
Third Participant in United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US-
Shrimp/Turtle Ι), AB-1998-4, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R, [78]. 
299
 EU (then the European Communities) in the Shrimp/Turtles case has directly expressed its 
acceptance of the principle of sustainable development, see United States – Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US-Shrimp/Turtle Ι), AB-1998-4, Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS58/AB/R [67].  
300
 See also P Sands, ‘International Courts and the Application of the Concept of "Sustainable 
Development"’ (1999) 3 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 389-403; A Boyle, ‘Between 
Process and Substance. Sustainable Development in the Jurisprudence of International Courts and 
Tribunals’ in Hans Christian Bugge and Christina Voigt (eds), Sustainable Development in 
International and National Law (Europa Law Publishing 2008) 203-219. 
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recognized in such supplementary sources of international law as legal doctrine
301
 and 
soft law. Therefore, it may be concluded that normativity of sustainable development 
is recognized in the principal sources of legal authority, addressed here in turn. 
1.5.2.1.  Recognition of sustainable development as a primary norm in principal 
sources of legal authority 
 
It is a truism that adjudicators are bound to apply law that is contained in formal and 
material sources. The main guideline for where to search for legal norms in 
international law is Article 38 (1) of the Statutes of the International Court of Justice; 
however, it does not provide an exhaustive list and it does not distinguish clearly 
between formal and material sources of law.
302
  
Formal sources mean legal and direct authoritative statements on what law is, for 
example treaties, state practice and judicial decisions;
303
 whereas material sources of 
law are such indirect records of law
304
 as legal doctrine and soft law instruments.
305
 
The following sub-sections address references to sustainable development in these 
records of law.  
International Agreements 
 
Since the Report Our Common Future (1987)
306
 formulated the concept of sustainable 
development, it has developed from a mere political concept to a hard law norm
307
 
because reference to sustainable development is established in such hard law (formal) 
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 C Voigt, Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law (Nijhoff 2009)  145, 147, 
162, 171, 186; P Birnie, A Boyle, C Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (3
rd
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 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (OUP 1987). 
307
 It is common knowledge that any legal system consists of norms, namely – legal rules and 
principles, see A Allott, The Limits of Law, (Butterworths, 1980) 17-18. 
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sources of law as environmental
308
 and economic agreements.
309
 Apart from the 
Lisbon Treaty, most of the hard law references to sustainable development do not 
indicate its legal status;
310
 they merely refer to the ‘promotion of sustainable 
development’ without any other indications of its legal status.  
Nevertheless, if there is a reference to sustainable development in a hard law 
document, irrespective of its enforceability, it may be assumed that the treaty parties 
have intended it to be ‘taken into account’ in the application process of the document, 
and, thus, in a legal adjudication.
311
 Consequently, the criticism put forward by legal 
positivists that sustainable development is not a norm, since it is not contained in 
recognized sources of law, and therefore it is not formally binding,
312
 is already 
overturned. When principles are incorporated in international agreements they are 
necessarily legal, even if their reach and strength may vary.
313
 
Soft Law 
 
Declarations of the three UN conferences on sustainable development
314
 are having a 
significant degree of normative value in drafting and interpreting international 
treaties. For instance, the Johannesburg Declaration is explicitly integrated in the 
CARIFORUM EPA through its preambular language, and the Rio Declaration was 
used as an interpretative argument in S.D.Myers v. Canada
315
 award by the 
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  For instance, Article 3.4 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992, 31 
ILM 849 (1992) and Article 2.1. of its Kyoto Protocol. 
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 E.g., preamble, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the 
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Verlag 2008), 119. 
312
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Journal of International Law, Vol. 77, 413-442. 
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Verlag 2008), 115. 
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Development’ (14 June 1992) UN Doc A/CONF. 151/26/Rev 1 vol I, 3; Johannesburg Declaration 
2002, World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg Summit) ‘Report’ (26 August-4 
September 2002) UN Doc A/AC.257/32; United Nations, A/CONF.216/L/1/, Outcome of the 
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investment tribunal and in Nucelar Weapons case by the ICJ.
316
 Therefore, these soft 
law documents pronouncing sustainable development as a principle have a significant 
degree of normative value.
317
 
Moreover, their wide acceptance certainly reflects the importance of sustainable 
development as a principle and value,
318
 creating expectations towards the conduct of 
States
319
 that adjudicators are supposed to take into account. Therefore, some scholars 
suggest that in the case of a conflict between hard and soft law documents, 
adjudicators are supposed to ‘interpret away’ the conflict by interpreting the hard law 
documents in light of the soft law documents.
320
 
Practice of states and other subjects of international law 
 
State practice is a formal source of law that may indicate the existence of a binding 
legal norm.
321
  Recognition of sustainable development as a legal principle is found in 
the practice of states. Argentina
322
 and Uruguay
323
 had referred to sustainable 
development as a relevant applicable principle of international environmental law in 
the Pulp Mills case.
 324
 Additionally, Nigeria has expressed its acknowledgement of 
sustainable development as a guiding principle of its international trade relations.
325
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45/08, available at http://www.ssrn.com/link/SIEL-Inaugural- Conference.html, 2. 
318
 C M Chinkin, ‘The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law’, 
(1989) 38 ICLQ 4, 851, at 861. 
319
 Ibid, 862-865. 
320
 J.Klabbers, ‘The Redundancy of Soft Law’, (1996) Nordic Journal of International Law 65, 167-
182, at 177. 
321
 Theory proposes that ‘for a principle to exist [as a source of international law] it would be 
necessary that States acknowledge, albeit implicitly, that this principle applies to their international 
relations’, see G. Gaja, ‘General Principles of Law’, in The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, (Oxford University Press, 2007), online edition, available at www.mpepil.com, 
[19]. 
322
 Memorial of the Argentina, [3.177]-[3.179] „L’Argentine et l’Uruguay sont liés par le respect du 
principe du développement durable lorsque ces deux Etats entreprennent des activités sur le fleuve”, 
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay.), Judgement (ICJ, 20 April, 2010), [55]. 
323
 Uruguay Counter –Memorial, [2.29]- [2.32]; Pulp Mills Judgement, [152]. 
324
 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay.), Judgement (ICJ, 20 April, 2010). 
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Similarly, the EU (then the European Communities) in the Shrimp/Turtles case 
directly expressed its acceptance of the principle of sustainable development.
326
 
Even if the state and the EU practice mentioned here is not indicative of the general 
acceptance of sustainable development as a principle by all civilized states, together 
with other ‘evidences’ of law, like the outcome documents of the three UN global 
conferences on sustainable development, it serves as an additional argument for 
proving the existence of the principle of sustainable development. 
Legal Doctrine 
 
There is an additional proof of sustainable development as a norm in legal doctrine, 
albeit the doctrine remains much divided with respect to the normativity of 
sustainable development.
327
 
The most notable proponents of normativity of sustainable development are Judge 
Weeramantry and Judge Trindade from the International Court of Justice. They link 
the existence of normativity of sustainable development with natural law or natural 
justice
328
 that has been recognized as a formal (direct) source of law since Grotius.
329
 
Judge Trindade classifies sustainable development as a general principle of law under 
Article 38 (1) (c) of the Statute of the ICJ, which, in his opinion, also comprises 
general principles in specific fields of law such as international environmental law.
330
 
Judge Weeramantry in his Separate Opinion to Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case attributed 
normative status to sustainable development by noting that it is a ‘principle with 
normative value’ being ‘an integral part of modern international law’ because of its 
                                                 
326
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‘wide and general acceptance by the global community’, and ‘inescapable logical 
necessity’.331  
1.5.2.2.Qualitative capacity of sustainable development to function as a legal 
principle 
 
For a legal principle to exist, not only its recognition as a principle is relevant but also 
its qualitative aspect – whether sustainable development has a critical amount of 
clarity to guide adjudicators towards a particular outcome. 
In this regard, opponents insist that sustainable development is too vague to possess a 
normative character of a traditional type. For instance, Lowe contends that sustainable 
development is not sufficiently precise and does not create an actionable right and, 
thus, cannot itself provide legal guidance typical of principles of customary 
international law like the principle of equidistance.
332
  
However, one may not agree with this argument. Rule-creating or substantive 
principles of law like the customary principle of equidistance are only one group of 
general principles of law. Legal scholarship distinguishes other types of legal 
principles applicable to international legal relations that are autonomous sources of 
international law
333
 separate form treaty or customary rules,
334
 for instance, principles 
of approach and interpretation to legal relationship such as good faith and minimum 
standards of procedural fairness like due process.
335
 Friedmann highlights that 
principles of approach and interpretation to legal relationship by themselves do ‘not 
say anything on the specific content and extent of certain rights’ as their application is 
case sensitive;
336
 however, they provide guidelines for the application of particular 
norms.
337
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It is also accepted that general principles of law may belong to specific domains of 
international law like international environmental law
338
 or development related fields 
of law. These principles may find their expression not only in formal sources or 
manifestations of international law as treaties and customs but also in sources not 
listed in Article 38 (1) (c) of the ICJ Statute such as resolutions of international 
organizations.
339
 
Even though sustainable development does not fulfil the standard of being a rule-
creating legal principle, as it lacks direct legal consequences,
340
 it nevertheless has a 
capacity to function as a legal principle of interpretation,  ‘which bring out relevant 
arguments in support of one or another solution’.341  
In this respect, Dworkin notes that legal principle ‘states a reason that argues in one 
direction, but does not necessitate a particular decision’.  He continues: 
All that is meant, when we say that a particular principle is a principle of our law, 
is that the principle is one which officials must take into account, if it is relevant, as 
a consideration inclining in one way or another.
342
  
In this connection, Koskenniemi defines ‘binding force’ of principles as their effect to 
‘govern the solution of normative problems’ in a way that the solution seems 
rational.
343
  
Sustainable development has exactly this capacity, namely it is clear enough to guide 
adjudicators in their decision-making towards a particular outcome – integration of 
economic, social and environmental matters. This specific capacity, which is also the 
minimum content of sustainable development, has been explicitly recognized by 
states in three global conferences,
344
 legal doctrine,
345
 and it is approved by 
jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals.
346
 The latter is analysed below. 
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1.5.2.2.1. Analysis of a case law using sustainable development as a guideline for 
interpretation 
  
The capacity of sustainable development to function as a legal principle of 
interpretation may be read into several judicial decisions by international courts and 
tribunals, addressed below. 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ 
While answering the question of whether the threat of nuclear weapons as a measure 
of self-defence is permitted by international law, the ICJ in the Advisory Opinion on 
Nuclear Weapons347 noted:  
Respect for the environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an 
action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality [...] This 
approach is supported, indeed, by the terms of Principle 24 of the Rio 
Declaration.
348
 
The Court went on by ruling: 
[W]hile the existing international law relating to the protection and safeguarding 
of the environment does not specifically prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, it 
indicates important environmental factor that are properly to be taken into 
account in the context of the implementation of the principles and rules of the law 
applicable in armed conflict.
349
 
Hence, the ICJ brought to the forefront the core of sustainable development, namely 
the integration requirement of environmental and social aspects (‘quality of life’). The 
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Court ruled that this integration element is to be taken into account while exercising 
other rights under international law. 
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case, ICJ 
 
The first open reference to sustainable development was done by the ICJ in the 
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case analyzing the impact of the Dam Project upon the 
environment. The Court made notable observations which are worth quoting at length: 
Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other reasons, constantly 
interfered with nature. In the past, this was often done without consideration of the 
effects upon the environment. Owing to new scientific insights and to a growing 
awareness of the risks for mankind - for present and future generations - of pursuit 
of such interventions at an unconsidered and unabated pace, new norms and 
standards have been developed, set forth in a great number of instruments during 
the last two decades. Such new norms have to be taken into consideration, and 
such new standards given proper weight, not only when States contemplate new 
activities but also when continuing with activities begun in the past. This need to 
reconcile economic development with protection of the environment is aptly 
expressed in the concept of sustainable development. For the purposes of the 
present case, this means that the Parties together should look afresh at the effects 
on the environment of the operation of the Gabčikovo power plant.350 
In essence, the Court indicates that in order to renegotiate the Treaty on the operation 
of the Gabčikovo power plant, the Parties should be lead by the concept of sustainable 
development, namely they must take into consideration and ‘give proper weight’ to 
current standards of mitigating environmental risks. Therefore, it may be concluded 
that the Gabčikovo Nagymaros case proves that sustainable development possesses a 
normative value and power for governing a solution of a normative problem. Namely, 
it sets out a goal to be reached under international law in order to negotiate a new 
Treaty, and consequently excludes a behaviour that goes contrary to that goal. 
Pulp Mills case, ICJ 
In the Pulp Mills case,
351
 the Court recognized an objective of sustainable 
development in the object and purpose of the 1975 Statute. The Statute was concluded 
in order to regulate the use of the river; therefore the Court noted ‘that such use 
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should allow for sustainable development which takes account of the need to 
safeguard the continued conservation of the river environment and the rights of 
economic development of the riparian States’.352 As a consequence, the Court 
determined that the disputing riparian States should co-operate in order to reach the 
objective of sustainable development.
353
 Hence, the sustainable development goal was 
meant to function as a legal framework for their further cooperation. 
Thus, it may be concluded that the Court indirectly applied sustainable development 
as a legal principle in Dworkin’s sense because the reference to it served for stating ‘a 
reason that argues in one direction’, namely sustainable development was used for 
imposing a duty on the disputing Parties to cooperate in a particular way. 
Shrimp/Turtles Report, WTO AB 
In the Shrimp/Turtles Report by the Appellate Body (AB), the AB ‘took into account’ 
the objective of sustainable development as expressed in the preamble of WTO 
Agreement in interpreting the term ‘exhaustible natural resources’ under GATT 
Article XX(g).
354
 The AB stated: 
As this preambular language reflects the intentions of negotiators of the WTO 
Agreement, we believe it must add colour, texture and shading to our interpretation 
of the agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement, in this case, the GATT 1994.
355
 
As a result, the AB applied an effective and evolutionary treaty interpretation method 
to also include living natural resources in the term ‘exhaustible natural resources’. 
Therefore, sustainable development was applied as a legal principle which led the AB 
towards the justification of the wide interpretation of the term ‘exhaustible natural 
resources’.356 
                                                 
352
 Ibid [75], [119]-[120], [177]. 
353
 Ibid, [77], [177]. 
354
 AB Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, 6 November 1998, [129]. 
355
 Ibid [153]. 
356
 See ILA Committee report 2006 Annex II, Elements of the Principle of Integration in WTO 
Jurisprudence: Another Look at the Shrimp Cases. A Comment prepared for the International Law 
Association's Committee on the Law of Sustainable Development by Dr. Tomer Broude, Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem Israel. 
 80 
 
S.D.Myers v. Canada Arbitral Award 
The NAFTA Tribunal in S.D.Myers
357
 established the legal context of Article 1102 on 
national treatment, among others against the background of NAFTA’s companion 
agreement, the NAAEC, and principles that are affirmed by the NAAEC (including 
those of the Rio Declaration), namely – the principle that ‘environmental protection 
and economic development can and should be mutually supportive’.358 The Tribunal 
stated: 
[T]he interpretation of the phrase “like circumstances” in Article 1102 must take 
into account the general principles that emerge from the legal context of the 
NAFTA, including both its concern with the environment and the need to avoid 
trade distortions that are not justified by environmental concerns. The assessment 
of “like circumstances” must also take into account circumstances that would 
justify governmental regulations that treat them differently in order to protect the 
public interest.
359
 
Hence, the S.D.Myers Tribunal indirectly applied the core of sustainable development 
so as to set the limits on the scope of the national treatment standard in the NAFTA. 
Iron Rhine (Belgium/the Netherlands) Arbitral Award 
The Iron Rhine arbitration
360
 emerged from plans by Belgium to reactivate a railway 
line going through the Netherlands. Belgium had a right to do so under the 1839 
Treaty of Separation. The Tribunal was asked ‘whether the costs and expenses to be 
incurred by Belgium should include the costs and expenses of the environmental 
protection measures required by Netherlands law’.361 
In order to answer the question, the Tribunal set the legal background that would lead 
to the answer and remarkably noted:
 
 
Today, both international and EC law require the integration of appropriate 
environmental measures in the design and implementation of economic 
development activities.362 
In other words, the Tribunal referred to the core of the principle of sustainable 
development, namely the principle of integration. The integration requirement led the 
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Tribunal to the use of evolutive interpretation of the Treaty concluded back in 1839 
and to internalize the necessary environmental protection measures as an integral 
component of such a railway reactivation project and its costs.
363
 
1.5.2.3.Interim conclusions 
 
To conclude, sustainable development is applicable and participates in investment 
treaty interpretation where the relevant IIA contains explicit or implicit reference to 
it.
364
 In other cases, i.e., with respect to ‘old generation’ BITs, sustainable 
development has a capacity to participate in treaty interpretation as the inherent object 
and purpose of the network of IIAs. Furthermore, sustainable development has 
definite enough normative content (integration between economic, social 
development and the protection of the environment) to function as a legal principle, 
which does not dictate the solution of the case exhaustively, but which brings out 
relevant arguments in support of one or another solution, thus being a legal principle 
of approach and interpretation of legal relationships but not of norm-creating capacity. 
This capacity of sustainable development is directly or indirectly recognized in the 
practice of states and other subjects of international law, and it may be read into 
several judicial decisions by international courts and tribunals.  
Finally, the integration aspect of sustainable development is definite enough to limit 
the discretion of decision-makers in setting the content of open-textured indirect 
expropriation standard, i.e., the decision-maker is bound by an obligation not to focus 
exclusively on the interests of investor, since such an approach would contradict the 
sustainable development objective. 
1.6. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE INTERPRETATION PROCESS OF 
INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION 
 
First, since the textual meaning of indirect expropriation standard in IIAs is overly 
abstract making it difficult to interpret the standard in accordance with its ordinary 
meaning, a reference to object and purpose of the network of IIAs (Article 31(1) 
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VCLT) and to the legal principle that stems from it is justified and necessary for 
filling the standard with a particular content.  
In the process of going beyond the literal meaning of indirect expropriation, 
arbitrators enjoy a degree of flexibility for choosing their argumentation. Therefore, a 
reference to the object and purpose of a treaty and its general context is necessary to 
limit this interpretative discretion and ‘pushing and pulling’ of the boundaries of 
indirect expropriation standard in a way that is harmonious to the objectives of the 
regime.  
Second, it was previously concluded that the application of a particular IIA requires 
considering the wider context or background of the investment protection regime as 
existing independently from individual IIAs. This wider context is of particular 
importance for the interpretation of ‘old generation’ IIAs that mostly remain silent on 
their object and purpose or formulate it narrowly by focusing solely on foreign 
investment promotion and protection. It was established that this inherent context is 
the promotion of economic development that is a generic legal term, whose 
contemporary meaning is sustainable (economic) development.  
Third, even if sustainable development might be considered a term of ‘high level of 
generality and abstraction,’ it was demonstrated that sustainable development has 
precise enough normative content for guiding adjudicators towards a particular 
outcome (integration of economic, social and environmental concerns) and hence, it 
has a capacity to function as a legal principle of interpretation. Although it does not 
dictate the solution of the case exhaustively, sustainable development may bring out 
relevant arguments in support of one or another solution. Consequently, the 
integration aspect of sustainable development is precise enough for limiting the 
discretion of decision-makers in setting the content of the open-textured indirect 
expropriation standard. 
Legal positivists argue that legal principles are applicable only in ‘hard cases’, where 
an adjudicator needs to fill a lacunae in law, and thus they have subsidiary meaning in 
adjudication processes;
365
 however, since there is no hierarchy between the sources of 
international law,
366
 there is no reason to avoid an application of a legal principle in 
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case it may guide a decision-maker in finding a solution for the dispute.
367
 
Consequently, one may conclude that a reference to object and purpose of the network 
of IIAs and to a legal principle that stems from it is justified and necessary for filling 
the vague indirect expropriation standard with a content in specific cases.  
This conclusion has certain legal consequences. First, the necessity to use contextual 
interpretation through the prism of sustainable development requires adjudicators to 
avoid limiting themselves strictly to the focus on investment protection in the 
interpretation process of indirect expropriation and its sub-elements. Second, the 
context of sustainable development significantly affects the scope of the ‘background’ 
of adjudicators.    
1.7. IMPLICATIONS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT ON THE 
ROLE OF INVESTMENT TREATY TRIBUNALS 
The context of sustainable development significantly affects the scope of the 
‘background’ of adjudicators. Koskenniemi explains that the adjudicators’ 
‘background theory’ reflects the interaction of the postulated values and goals of the 
legal system and a reflection on them by adjudicators, who operate within that legal 
system.
368
  While solving a legal dispute, adjudicators identify and apply these 
principles because their ‘background’ sets it as their institutional function and as part 
of the expectations directed at them.
369
  
Thus, contextualization of the international investment protection regime through the 
principle of sustainable development requires adjudicators to act in a way that 
expresses the values and goals of the legal regime, namely the general commitment to 
promote sustainable development. 
However, the current application of indirect expropriation has caused fears of overly 
restricted policy space for host States to safeguard public interests that leads to 
blocking instead of promoting development. These fears stem from the 
unpredictability of the criteria that investment treaty tribunals are going to take into 
account when filling the vague indirect expropriation standard with content and 
whether States regulatory responsibilities will be duly considered. 
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More precisely, there is no predictability whether tribunals in their legal reasoning 
will focus narrowly on foreign investment protection as the main element for setting 
the content of indirect expropriation or will they consider the wider context that 
exceeds the allegedly affected interests of foreign investors.  
One way to explain this situation is through the analysis of the subjective awareness 
by arbitral tribunals of their proper role and powers.
370
 The diversity in approaches 
towards the role of investment treaty tribunals stems from the ‘hybrid foundations’ of 
investor-state arbitration.
371
 This form of dispute resolution is a mixture of public 
international law and private international law.
372
 Its procedure and enforcement is 
mainly taken from commercial arbitration
373
 but its content is mostly governed by 
public international law,
374
 since investor-state arbitration is meant to deal with 
alleged breaches of host State’s international obligations towards investors.375 
Thus, some arbitral tribunals have taken the ‘service providers’ approach as in private 
commercial arbitrations.
376
 As ‘service providers’, investment treaty tribunals are 
limited with addressing the arguments of pleading parties without considering the 
wider context and consequences of the award.
377
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Other arbitral tribunals that perceive foreign investment protection as ‘an emerging 
system of public law’378 have taken a ‘guardians of law’ approach recognized in 
public law.
379
 This public law approach requires taking into account not only the 
arguments of pleading parties but also wider circumstances of the case like third party 
interests and the effect that the case might have on the legal regime as a whole.
380
  
Taking into account that the investor-state arbitration mechanism is intended as an 
effective replacement of national and international courts in adjudicating the 
legitimacy of national legislative or administrative acts that are challenged by a 
foreign investor, there are grounds for dissatisfaction with the ‘service providers’ 
approach.
381
 Due to this function to review domestic legislative or administrative acts, 
investor-state arbitration may, and often does, involve public interests that 
considerably exceed the interests of pleading parties.
382
 Thus, for instance, in Glamis 
Gold v. United States, the Tribunal noted that ‘the decision in this proceeding has 
been awaited by private and public entities concerned with environmental regulation, 
the interests of indigenous peoples, and the tension sometimes seen between private 
rights in property and the need of the State to regulate the use of property’.383 
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Investment litigation may have a significant impact on the future behaviour of host 
states, their budgets and the welfare of their citizens.
384
 This aspect is not covered in a 
case where a tribunal reflects on itself as merely a ‘service provider’ between two 
litigating parties. 
For these reasons, a group of scholars already insist that the ‘service providers’ 
approach is outdated and replaced by the ‘guardians of law approach’. For instance, 
Petersmann correlates the need to adopt the ‘guardians of law’ approach with the 
customary law duty of adjudicators to decide cases in accordance with the principles 
of justice.
385
 The prism of sustainable development context allows one to reach 
exactly the same conclusion; nevertheless, sustainable development context allows 
filling the abstract term ‘justice’ with specific content requiring rather precise 
practical implications on the interpretative process of investment guarantees. 
To conclude, contextualizing investment protection regime through the prism of 
sustainable development affects not only investment treaty interpretation in terms of 
guiding inherent powers of arbitrators to choose and apply interpretative techniques in 
a way that actually promotes sustainable development. Sustainable development 
context also allows restructuring the role of investment treaty tribunals and places 
investment treaty claims in public law dimension, thus ensuring that commercial 
interests are not prioritized
386
 but balanced and reconciled with competing public 
interests.
387
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INTERIM CONCLUSIONS 
Schreuer and Kriebaum have posed the question on ‘whose interests are protected by 
international investment law?’388 The network of IIAs obviously provides for the 
protection of individual interests of investors at the international level. That is explicit 
from the title and structure of IIAs, providing rights for investors to enjoy protection 
from political risks and duties for host States to comply with international investment 
protection standards like fair and equitable treatment and protection against indirect 
expropriation. However, as mentioned earlier, foreign investment protection is not a 
goal in itself. It is rather a tool for achieving economic development in the host 
country.  
The conclusion that the promotion of economic development was intended to be the 
inherent objective of the foreign investment protection regime, irrespective of its 
explicit indication in individual treaties is justified by the analysis of arbitral 
jurisprudence interpreting the object and purpose of ‘old generation’ IIAs. Arbitral 
jurisprudence interpreting common-form ‘old generation’ BITs has led to the 
realization of the existence of two levels of object and purpose of investment 
protection regime, namely the ‘immediate’ one of investment protection and the 
‘overall’ one of economic development. For instance, the Charles Lemire award389 
not only established that economic development is the overall objective of investment 
protection but went further by indicating that the overall aim of foreign investment 
protection – economic development – must benefit all ‘primarily national citizens and 
national companies, and secondarily foreign investor’.390 A comparable idea has 
already been expressed more than twenty years ago by Amco v. Indonesia Tribunal, 
which held: 
To protect investments is to protect the general interest of development and of 
developing countries.
391
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Consequently, application of particular IIA necessitates taking into account the wider 
context or background of the investment protection regime existing independently 
from individual IIAs and notwithstanding differing preambular statements on the 
object and purpose in ‘old generation’ and ‘new generation’ IIAs,392 the former 
mostly remaining silent on the intentions of treaty parties. Both levels of objectives 
should participate in setting the proper context for the interpretation of investment 
guarantees. This wider and inherent context is the promotion of economic 
development
393
 indicating that international investment protection law does not stop 
short at protecting foreign investors but it is also meant to contribute to the 
development of host States. 
Furthermore, it was suggested that the legal term economic development is generic in 
nature under the criteria of generic terms set forth by international law and that its 
current meaning is sustainable development. This conclusion is supported not only by 
the reliance on the very nature of the term ‘economic development’, which is dynamic 
and not a static term, i.e., a term the meaning of which must be established in light of 
present day realities, but is also supported by the UN declarations and resolutions on 
the development aspects of the international community dating back to 1972, which 
created legitimate expectations that this commitment to promote sustainable 
development will be implemented in all development related fields of law including 
foreign investment protection. Finally, the evolutive nature of economic development 
is also approved by the current trends in drafting economic law treaties, which attempt 
to clarify explicitly the generic nature of economic development.   
Consequently, and since most ‘old generation’ IIAs remain silent on their formal 
objectives or focus narrowly on foreign investment protection as a necessary element 
of economic development, they are now subject to evolutive and effective treaty 
interpretation. Their interpretations in light of sustainable development should 
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exclude the rather typical prioritization of economic interests in the interpretation 
process of investment guarantees.  
Last but not least, sustainable development has a critical normative content for 
guiding adjudicators towards a particular outcome (integration instead of competition 
between economic, social and environmental concerns). In this capacity it is applied 
by various international courts and tribunals.  Thus, sustainable development is able to 
function as a legal principle having several legal impacts on the application and 
interpretation of indirect expropriation standard. It affects the ‘background theory’ of 
adjudicators in setting the content of the open-textured indirect expropriation 
standard. It explicitly requires that commercial interests are not prioritized but 
balanced and reconciled with competing public interests by choosing appropriate 
language and argumentation methods, which gives space for weighing conflicting 
factors such as investment protection and competing public interests. Hence, the 
sustainable development objective extends the criteria that should be deliberately 
taken into account in drawing the line between non-compensable bona fide 
regulations detrimentally affecting foreign investment from compensable regulatory 
expropriation and thus limiting the unpredictability of creative discretion of 
adjudicators. 
The sustainable development perspective adds to a realization that investor-state 
arbitration is not exclusively about the protection of foreign investor’s interests. It 
may considerably exceed the interests of pleading parties, adding to a public 
dimension of investment protection law, accordingly requiring arbitrators to adopt a 
role of ‘guardians of law’ instead of ‘service providers’. It is especially so because 
investment treaty arbitration as an impartial venue is meant to replace national and 
international courts so as to ensure a careful and objective balance between investor 
and host state’s interests. So, adjudicators are required to act in a manner that 
expresses the values and goals of the legal regime, namely the general commitment to 
promote sustainable (economic) development. 
Finally, the overarching goal of sustainable (economic) development adds certain 
dynamism to treaty provisions, especiallay in cases of the application of ‘old school’ 
BITs that do not contain explicit references to safeguarding wider societal interests 
other than foreign investment protection. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE IMPACT OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT 
ON JURISDICTION AND APPLICABLE LAW IN INVESTMENT TREATY 
ARBITRATION 
INTRODUCTION 
While being limited in their jurisdictional competence, investment tribunals have 
shown a tendency to look too narrowly at the applicable law when it comes to 
considering and applying non-investment international law in the context of indirect 
expropriation claims. Host States often invoke law originating from other sub-systems 
of international law as part of their defence arguments against alleged violations of 
investment protection guarantees (see Box 2 and Box 3 in the Appendix). The often 
narrow focus of the applicable law makes arbitral tribunals less likely to consider 
wider public policy considerations that are often grounded in external, non-investment 
international obligations by host States. It also makes the tribunals less likely to focus 
on the protection of third party stakeholders’ interests related to social or 
environmental considerations of host States, like ensuring the right to water. 
For that reason this chapter aims at examining the effect which the sustainable 
development context and its requirement of integrating investment and non-
investment interests have on the scope of applicable law in investment treaty 
arbitration. It is claimed that the sustainable development context guides the normal 
task of adjudicators to decide a case where two norms are in conflict with each other 
towards a specific outcome of integration. Thus, invocation of the sustainable 
development context exceeds the ordinary task of adjudicators to solve a case.
394
 It 
sets forth the integration as an outcome to be reached, necessitating ‘systemic’ instead 
of ‘self-contained’ thinking of investment law. It also necessitates a realization of the 
inter-dependence between areas of law that fall under the pillars of sustainable 
development and makes a strict separation between these fields of law artificial. 
Consequently, the sustainable development context establishes the necessary link 
between investment rules and prima facie external rules creating the necessity to 
realize and address potential normative conflicts between these rules. 
                                                 
394
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avoidance tools and treaty interpretation principles, see V. Lowe, ‘Sustainable Development and 
Unsustainable Arguments’ in Alan Boyle and David Freestone (eds) International Law and Sustainable 
Development. Past Achievements and Future Challenges (OUP 1999) 30 et seq. 
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This chapter is structured in the following way: first, it addresses the issue of the 
limited jurisdiction of investment treaty claims and its correlation with the notion of 
applicable law. The chapter proceeds with the analysis of the scope of applicable law 
in investment treaty arbitration. It deals with a role that the sustainable development 
context should play in applicable law and, thus, on interpretation (informing the 
content) of investment protection standards.
 395
 The study claims that irrespective of a 
limited jurisdiction of investment treaty tribunals to deal mainly with disputes arising 
out of breaches of investment protection standards contained in IIAs, the sustainable 
development context requires adjusting the understanding of the body of law that lies 
‘at the heart of the matter’ of a dispute. 
2.1. JURISDICTION OF INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 
There is an institutional fragmentation or ‘division of labour’ between international 
dispute settlement bodies.
396
 Each court or tribunal has its own field of competence.  
Investment tribunals are generally not able to decide claims based on non-investment 
law instruments. Usually the applicable IIA contains a jurisdictional limitation to 
disputes concerning the interpretation of that particular IIA, for instance Article 
1116(1) of the NAFTA and Article 26(1) of the ECT. Some IIAs provide for a wider 
formulation of a jurisdiction clause, for instance Article IX (1) of the Lithuania-
Norway BIT states that an investment tribunal has jurisdiction for ‘any dispute [...] in 
connection with the investment’.397 Schreuer and Kriebaum consider that consent 
clauses of this type go beyond the interpretation and application of the relevant IIA 
and give a leeway for dealing with such community interests as the environment, 
cultural and natural heritage protection, and human rights protection in case a dispute 
is closely connected to an investment.
398
 This approach has been supported in practice 
by the Tribunal in Roussalis v. Romania, where the Tribunal declared: 
                                                 
395
 Pauwelyn indicates the close interrelationship between applicable law and treaty interpretation, 
thus, these elements are addressed together, see Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: 
International Law as a Universe of Inter-Connected Islands’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of 
International Law at 903, 910. 
396
 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-
Connected Islands’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law at 903, 915- 916. 
397
 Parkerings-Comagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID, Award, Case No. ARB/05/8, 
September 11, 2007, [261]. 
398
 Christoph Schreuer, Ursula Kriebaum, ‘From Individual to Community Interest in International 
Investment Law’ in Ulrich Fastenrath  et al. (eds), From bilateralism to community interest: essays in 
honour of Bruno Simma  (OUP, 2011), 1092-1094. 
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The Tribunal does not exclude the possibility that the international obligations of 
the Contracting States mentioned at Article 10 of the BIT could include obligations 
deriving from multilateral instruments to which those states are parties, including, 
possibly, the European Convention of Human Rights and its Additional Protocol 
No.1.
399
 
Investment disputes under the ICSID Convention are limited by Article 25 (1) of the 
ICSID Convention which contains a jurisdictional limitation for disputes ‘arising 
directly out of an investment’. 
On the one hand, arbitral jurisprudence has interpreted measures by a host State that 
may give rise to a breach of an IIA as broadly arising ‘directly out of an 
investment’.400 On the other hand, a host state’s role as a claimant or even as a 
defendant to bring up issues arising out of investment is considerably limited by the 
procedural asymmetry of investor-state arbitration.
401
 The procedural asymmetry 
stems from the fact that BITs typically allow only investors to initiate claims in 
investor-state arbitration,
402
 even if the ICSID Convention does not exclude host state 
from commencing an arbitral procedure against an investor.
403
 Only a few BITs may 
be read in a way which also allows a host state to bring an action against a foreign 
investor.
404
 Even then, due to the particularity of IIAs by providing rights to an 
investor and duties to a host state, the host state is very limited in taking an action 
against an investor.
405
  
                                                 
399
 Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No.ARB/06/1, Award December 7, 2011, [312]. 
400
 Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No.ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, July 3, 2002, reprinted in 19 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 89 
(2004), [112]; Parkerings v.Lithuania [261], [265]. 
401
 P Juillard, ‘The Law of International Investment. Can the Imbalance Be Redressed?’ in KP 
Sauvant (ed) Yearbook on International Investment Law& Policy 2008-2009, (New York OUP, 2009), 
280; Vaughan Lowe, ‘Changing Dimensions of International Investment Law’, University of Oxford 
Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No 4/2007, March 2007 available 
at: http://papers.ssrn.com/Abstract=970727, 14-15, Waelde T W, ‘The Specific Nature of Investment 
Arbitration’ in Philippe Kahn, Thomas W Waelde (eds), New Aspects of International Investment Law 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2007).50-55. 
402
 For example, US Model BIT 2004, Article 24 and Article VI (2), Treaty Between The 
Government of the United States of America and The Government of the Republic of? Latvia 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 13.th January, 1995. 
403
 See Article 36(1) of the ICSID Convention; International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, Report of the Executive Directors on the ICSID Convention, March 18, 1965 (Report of 
the Executive Directors), [12], [14]. 
404
 For instance, Article 8(1) of the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments (11 December 1990). 
405
 P.Julliard, ‘The Law of International Investment. Can the Imbalance Be Redressed?’ 280. 
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The host state’s ability to initiate investor-state arbitration is not the only restriction, 
but also its ability to bring a counterclaim.
406
 Not all of consent clauses to arbitration 
in IIAs allow counter-claims. For instance, the Tribunal in Roussalis v. Romania held 
that the very existence of a counterclaim did not fall within the scope of the consent of 
the Parties under the Greece-Romania BIT.
407
 In case counterclaims are permitted, 
they may not exceed the scope of the consent and jurisdiction to arbitration (Article 
46 of the ICSID Convention, Article 21(3) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
(2010)); acceptance of counterclaims is interpreted rather narrowly.
408
 For instance, in 
Amco v. Indonesia, the Tribunal rejected Indonesia’s counterclaim on alleged tax 
fraud by the investor since it was beyond its competence ratione materiae: 
It was not specially contracted for in the investment agreement and does not arise 
directly out of the investment’. The Tribunal noted that ‘rights and obligations that 
are applicable to legal or natural persons who are within the reach of a host 
State’s jurisdiction, as a matter of general law [...] in principle fall to be decided by 
the appropriate procedures in the relevant jurisdiction.
409
   
It is suggested that the application of the integration principle of sustainable 
development and teleological and effective interpretation principles may allow the 
extension of the notion of the subject-matter of the dispute, providing a link between 
investment protection and prima facie non-investment issues, so as to also include 
counterclaims grounded in relevant domestic law.
410
 
To conclude, investment treaty tribunals are limited in their jurisdictional competence 
and cannot adjudicate over external international instruments, for instance in Biloune 
v. Ghana, the Tribunal did not consider alleged human rights violations by Ghana 
resulting from detention and expulsion of a foreign investor from the country.
411
   
                                                 
406
 See generally, Hege Veenstra-Kjos, ‘Counter-claims by Host State in Investment Dispute 
Arbitration „without privity”’in Philippe Kahn, Thomas W Waelde (eds), New Aspects of International 
Investment Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2007); Article 46 of the ICSID Convention. 
407
 Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No.ARB/06/1, Award December 7, 2011, [868], 
[869]. 
408
 For instance, Genin v. Estonia, Award, 25 June 2001, 6 ICSID Reports 241, 17 ICSID Reports 
240 [201, 235, 309, 314, 376-378]; SGS v. Philippines, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, 8 
ICSID Reports 518 [40].  
409
 Amco Asia Corp v Republic of Indonesia, Resubmitted. Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID, 10 May 
1988, 1 ICSID Reports 543, [125]-[127]. 
410
 On possibilities to extend the notion of the ‘same subject matter’, see Jorge E. Viñuales, Foreign 
Investment and the Environment in International Law (CUP 2012) 94. 
411
 Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd v. Ghana Investments Centre and the Government of 
Ghana, UNCITRAL, Award, 27 October 1989, 95 ILR 184, [199]-[205]. 
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2.1.1. Notion of ‘protected investment’ 
 
In order to establish jurisdiction, tribunals usually determine whether the investment 
from which the dispute emerges is covered by the consent to arbitration clause in the 
relevant BIT and whether it is covered by Article 25 of the ICSID Convention.
412
 The 
ICSID Convention notoriously provides no investment definition, and arbitral 
jurisprudence has developed certain elements of the investment definition. It has been 
suggested that the interpretation of the notion of a protected investment and, in 
particular, its sub-elements of ‘contribution to host state’s economic development’ 
and ‘compliance with host state’s laws’ may provide a sufficient ‘access-point’ for 
addressing tensions between investment protection and non-investment public policy 
issues, which are addressed below. 
2.1.1.1. ‘Contribution to host state’s economic development’ as an element of 
investment definition 
 
The Salini v. Morocco
413
 Tribunal famously introduced the element of ‘contribution to 
development of host state’ as part of the objective  investment definition under Article 
25(1) of the ICSID Convention. Subsequent arbitral jurisprudence has taken three 
spearate approaches with respect to the Salini test.  Several ICSID
414
 and non-ICSID 
tribunals
415
 have approved the Salini criteria and the existence of the objective 
investment definition under the ICSID Convention including its ‘contribution to 
development’ element.416 
                                                 
412
 David  A.R. Williams QC and Simone Foote, ‘Recent developments in the approach to 
identifying an “investment” pursuant to Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention’, in Chester Brown, 
Kate Miles (eds), Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration, CUP 2011, 44 – 45. 
413
 Salini Constuttori SPA and Italstrade v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 23 July 2001, [50]-[58]. 
414
 For example, Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. the Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 
April 15, 2009 [85], [96]. 
415
 Romak S.A. v. The Republic of Uzbekistan, PCA Case No. AA280, Award, November 26, 2009 
[193]-[207]; Societe Generale In respect of DR Energy Holdings Limited and Empresa Distribuidora 
de Electricidad del Este, S.A. v. the Dominican Republic, Award on Preliminary Objections to 
Jurisdiction, 19 September 2008, LCIA Case No. UN 7927, UNCITRAL [33]-[35]. See also Brigitte 
Stern, ‘The Scope of Investor’s Protection under the ICSID/BIT Mechanisms: Recent Trends’ in 
Arthur W Rovine (ed), Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham 
Papers 2010 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), 33; Christoph Schreuer, Ursula Kriebaum, ‘From 
Individual to Community Interest in International Investment Law’ in Ulrich Fastenrath  et al. (eds), 
From bilateralism to community interest: essays in honour of Bruno Simma  (OUP, 2011), 1083. 
416
 See also Abaclat et al v. Argentina, Dissenting Opinion, George Abi-Saab, 28 October 2011 [50]. 
Garcia –Bolivar argues that the element of ‘contribution to economic development’ in the definition of 
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Others have rejected the Salini test and have proposed instead a reliance solely on the 
investment definition as provided in the relevant IIA,
417
 which usually covers a non-
exhaustive list of ‘every kind of assets’ with a commercial value as a ‘protected 
investment’. 
The third and intermediate approach accepts the Salini test in part. For instance, the 
Saba Fakes v. Turkey award
418
 accepts the existence of the objective investment 
definition consisting of necessary elements of a contribution, certain duration and an 
element of risk.
419
 It rejects the element of ‘contribution to host state’s development’ 
as too loose and immeasurable to be ‘an independent criterion for the definition of an 
investment’, and thus, as a necessary requirement for jurisdiction ratione materiae.420  
Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that the ‘contribution to economic development of a 
host State’ stems from a proclaimed objective of the ICSID Convention.421 Thus, this 
element may be moved to the merits phase of disputes,
422
 where it requires ‘a careful 
balance between the interests of investors and those of host States’.
423
 
2.1.1.2. Compliance with the host state’s law at the establishment phase of an 
investment 
 
In situations where the applicable IIA provides that the investor has to comply with 
domestic legislation in order to be protected, some scholars see the possibility to 
integrate non-investment international obligations of a host State into investment 
                                                                                                                                            
investment is a measurable concept and the most important element in establishing the existence of 
‘protected investment’ under the ICSID Convention, see Omar E. Garcia –Bolivar, ‘Economic 
development at the core of the international investment regime’ in Chester Brown, Kate Miles (eds), 
Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (CUP 2011) 586. 
417
 For instance, Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No 
ARB/05/22, Award, 24 July 2008 [311]-[316]. Biwater Gauff approach to the investment definition is 
considered a ‘subjective approach’. For the criticism see Brigitte Stern, ‘The Scope of Investor’s 
Protection under the ICSID/BIT Mechanisms: Recent Trends’ in Arthur W Rovine (ed), Contemporary 
Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers 2010 (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2011), 40. See also Abaclat et al v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 4 August 2011, 
[364]. 
418
 Mr. Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No.ARB/07/20, Award July 14, 2010. See 
also Alps Finance and Trade AG v. Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, 5 March 2011, [231], [241]. 
419
 Saba Fakes v. Turkey [110]. 
420
 Ibid, [108]-[111]. 
421
 Ibid, [111]. 
422
 See also Christoph H. Schreuer with Loretta Malintoppi, August Reinsisch and Anthony Sinclair, 
The ICSID Convention. A Commentary (2
nd
 ed, Cambridge University Press, 2009), 128 [153]. 
423
 Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
March 18, 1965, part ΙΙΙ, [13].  
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law.
424
 It would be so in the case where international law requirements are 
incorporated in domestic law. Thus, Schreuer and Kriebaum suggests that 
‘compliance with host state’s law’ requirement may serve as an effective method for 
paying due respect to such community interests as the environment and human rights, 
in case their protection is incorporated in host state’s law’.425 Few ‘new generation’ 
IIAs specifically indicate that a host state must address such issues as corporate social 
responsibility in its domestic law
426
 but consider public international law limitations 
with respect to the imposition of responsibility on individuals.
427
  
In case an investor has commited grave violations of domestic law and, thus, has 
acted in bad faith, arbitral jurisprudence has ascertained that foreign investment was 
established in bad faith
428
 or in significant violation
429
 of the host state’s law will not 
benefit from substantive protection under the relevant IIA as lacking jurisdiction 
ratione materiae,
430
 ratione voluntatis,
431
 will lose its arbitrability
432
 or the protection 
will be rejected at the merits phase.
433
 This notion holds true irrespective of IIAs 
containing explicit clauses to that effect.
434
 
                                                 
424
 August Reinisch, ‘How Narrow are Narrow Dispute Settlement Clauses in Investment Treaties?’, 
(2011) 2 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 1, 115-174. 
425
 Christoph Schreuer, Ursula Kriebaum, ‘From Individual to Community Interest in International 
Investment Law’ in Ulrich Fastenrath  et al. (eds), From bilateralism to community interest: essays in 
honour of Bruno Simma  (OUP, 2011), 1095.  
426
 For instance, Article 72 CARIFORUM EPA delegates to the Contracting Parties a duty to enact 
necessary domestic laws for corporate social responsibility, such as subjecting foreign investors to anti-
corruption laws. See also Canada-Colombia FTA, Article 816. 
427
 Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (Ruggies Report), UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2006/97 (2006).  
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 Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, 
August 2, 2006, [230].   
429
 Minor violations of national law were not considered a substantial breach to deny jurisdiction in 
SwemBalt v. Latvia, UNCITRAL, Award, October 23, 2000, Latvia- Sweeden BIT 1992 [32], [35]. 
430
 Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. the Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, April 15, 2009 
[100]-[103]. See also Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L.v. Republic of El Salvador, [79]. 
431
 Mr. Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No.ARB/07/20, Award July 14, 2010 [111]-
[115]. 
432
 As in the case of investment contract, which was obtained by bribery, see World Duty Free 
Company Limited v. The Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, 4 October 2006. 
[143]-[157]. 
433
 Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 (Energy Charter Treaty), 
Award, August 27, 2008, [112], [126]-[130], [138]-[139], [146]; Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitian, 
Ellen Baca v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)97/2, Award, November 1, 1999, 
[122]-[124]. 
434
 Plama v. Bulgaria, [112, 126-130, 138-139, 146]. Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. the Czech Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, April 15, 2009 [100]-[103]. Andrew Newcombe, ‘Investor 
misconduct: Jurisdiction, admissibility or merits?’ in Chester Brown, Kate Miles (eds), Evolution in 
Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (CUP 2011) 189-193. 
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However, these propositions for integrating external international obligations within 
investment protection law are of limited value. The currently decisive aspect of the 
ability of a host state to raise these impediments to the jurisdiction or merits phase of 
the dispute is the existence of a violation of domestic law at the establishment phase 
of an investment.
435
 The same does not apply to alleged fraud or other misconduct by 
a foreign investor posterior to the establishment of an investment.
436 
For instance, 
Amco v. Indonesia and Saba Fakes v. Turkey Tribunals indicate that in such 
circumstances violation of a host state’s law does not affect the jurisdiction or 
arbitrability of a claim, and a host state is expected to use the framework of its 
domestic law to remedy the breach by the investor.
437
 In doing so, the host state may 
not invoke provisions of its internal law as a justification for its failure to perform its 
international obligations vis-ą-vis foreign investors438 (Article 27 of the VCLT). 
Hence, bearing in mind that most of the sustainable development related concerns 
regarding foreign investment may arise during its operation, the ‘compliance with 
host state’s law’ clause on its own is not a sufficient safeguard mechanism for 
balancing investment protection with external international and domestic obligations 
of a host State. Viñuales argues that it is an overly restrictive reading of the clause 
that only the illegality arising from a violation of the host State’s law relating to the 
admission of investment bars the claim from admissibility or jurisdiction.
439
 In case 
the applicable IIA does not explicitly indicate that the requirement to comply with 
domestic law relates to the time of the establishment of the investment (as it was in 
Saba Fakes v. Turkey
440
), the effective interpretation of the IIA in light of the 
sustainable development objective may require a less strict interpretation of this 
jurisdictional requirement.  
                                                 
435
 Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. the Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, April 15, 2009, 
[103]. A Carlevaris, ‘The Conformity of Investments with the Law of the Host State and the 
Jurisdiction of International Tribunals’ (2008) 9 J World Investment & Trade 35. 
436
 See Luke Eric Peterson, ‘A discussion of the Chevron-Ecuador dispute with Michael Goldhaber 
of the American Lawyer magazine’, Investment Arbitration Reporter, May 17, 2011 (accessed on 31 
March 2012).  
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 Saba Fakes v. Turkey [119]. See also Amco Asia Corp v Republic of Indonesia, Resubmitted. 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID, 10 May 1988, 1 ICSID Reports 543, [125]-[127]. 
438
 Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, [119].  
439
 Jorge E Viñuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law (CUP 2012) 98.  
440
 Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, [119]. 
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Interim Conclusions 
It has been acknowledged that investment treaty arbitration may imply a significant 
public law dimension which considerably exceeds the interests of pleading parties;
441
 
however, they are limited by the scope of jurisdiction of investment treaty tribunals of 
what they can take into account. In general, investment treaty tribunals are limited to 
deal with violations of investment protection standards, and not, for instance, with 
adjudication over human rights violations or breaches of environmental protection 
laws.
442
  
Further, a host state has a limited procedural ability to mention domestic or 
international public policy matters; firstly, these matters should ‘arise (directly) out of 
an investment’ but this clause is interpreted rather narrowly.  
Regarding defence against jurisdiction, the notion of protected investment gives a host 
state a limited leeway to put forward its public policy concerns so as to dismiss the 
claim. Arbitral jurisprudence has strongly determined that investment that is 
established in a host country through bad faith or in significant violation of a host 
state’s laws (e.g. corruption) does not enjoy protection under the network of IIAs. 
However, the same does not apply for violations of a host state’s laws after the 
establishment of the investment. 
Further, the notion of a protected investment and its aspects of ‘contribution to 
economic development of host state’ and ‘compliance with host State’s laws’ are 
considered by some to provide a sufficient access point to non-economic public policy 
issues in investment protection law. This proposition cannot be supported because a 
host State may not rely on its domestic law for alleged violations of its international 
investment obligations towards foreign investors because international law prevails in 
international disputes. Secondly, only some investment tribunals consider the 
‘contribution to economic development’ element as a necessary prerequisite for the 
                                                 
441
  Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. The United States of America, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Award, 8 June 2009 
[3]–[9]; Biwater Gauff v Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order of 2 February 2007 
[52], [64]; Methanex v. United States  (NAFTA), Decision on Amici Curiae, 15 January 2001 [47], 
[49]. Cf. J Werner, ‘Limits of Commercial Investor-State Arbitration: Need for Appellate Review’ in 
P.M. Dupuy, F. Francioni, E.U. Petersmann (eds.), Human Rights in International Investment Law and 
Arbitration, (Oxford University Press) 2009, 115-118. 
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 IIA may extend the jurisdiction to violations of investment protection standards contained in 
sources external to the IIA: see Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, [117], [312]. “The Tribunal does not 
exclude the possibility that the international obligations of the Contracting States mentioned at Article 
10 of the BIT could include obligations deriving from multilateral instruments to which those states are 
parties, including, possibly, the European Convention of Human Rights and its Additional Protocol 
No.1.” 
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existence of the protected investment. The currently prevailing view places the 
development aspect of foreign investment in the merits phase of the claim, where it 
may affect the interpretation and application process of investment protection 
standards under IIAs by raising relevant arguments. 
However, limited jurisdiction does not limit the applicable law, and extraneous 
international law obligations on environmental protection, cultural heritage and 
human rights may and should be taken into account in the interpretation of IIAs. 
2.2. APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERPRETATION OF INVESTMENT 
GUARANTEES 
The sustainable development context of the investment protection regime has a 
limited capacity to affect the interpretation of narrow jurisdiction clauses in IIAs. 
However, it has a capacity to affect the understanding of applicable law. 
It is a truism that limited jurisdiction does not imply limitations on applicable law as 
famously noted in the Fragmentation Report: 
The jurisdiction of most international tribunals is limited to particular types of 
disputes or disputes arising under particular treaties. A limited jurisdiction does 
not, however, imply a limitation of the scope of the law applicable in the 
interpretation and application of those treaties.
443
 
Invocation of non-investment law in an investment dispute largely depends on the 
disputing parties and the credibility of their argumentation,
444
 but its application is in 
the hands of a tribunal and its capacity to see the link between investment protection 
law and the external sources of law.  
The sustainable development objective illuminates the interaction of investmet 
protection law with other sub-systems of international law and it automatically 
extends the understanding on what issues might ‘lie at the heart’ of a potential 
investment claim, automatically requiring a ‘systemic’ thinking and unity of 
                                                 
443
 M. Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International 
Law Commission (Helsinki, 2007), 28 [45] (emphasis added). Cf. Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Bridging 
Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-Connected Islands’ (2004) 25 
Michigan Journal of International Law at 903, 915. 
444
 Newcombe A., Paradell L., Law and Practice of Investment Treaties, (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2009), 88-89. 
 101 
 
international law approach
445
 and  a careful examination of a possible interaction 
between these legal regimes. 
2.2.1.The scope of applicable law 
 
Law that arbitral tribunals may apply is usually mentioned in the relevant IIA and 
logically it implies the relevant IIA as a primary source. IIAs usually specify which 
arbitration rules parties can choose. They usually are ICSID, ICSID Additional 
Facility or UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules also containing applicable law clauses. For 
instance, Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention states: 
Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by 
the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply [...] such rules of 
international law as may be applicable.
446
 
Article 26(6) of the ECT and Article 1131 of the NAFTA indicates that arbitral 
tribunal has to decide the case based on the treaty itself and applicable rules and 
principles of international law.
447
 Thus, in principle, all international law which is 
binding on the claiming parties may be part of the applicable law that may exceed the 
relevant IIA,
448
 e.g. general principles of law
449
 and customary international law.
450
 
                                                 
445
 In general, unity of international law means the assumption that there is no legal regime outside 
of general international law and the completeness of international law means that ‘the most of the 
fundamental rules, principles, and institutions of pubic international law are already in place’ in order 
to deal with the tensions that may exist in values underlying different legal regimes.
 See V.Lowe, ‘The 
Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of Norm Creation Changing?’ in M Byers (ed), 
The Role of Law in International Politics. Essays in International Relations and International Law, 
(OUP, 2000.), 212. Fragmentation Report, [1], [13], [25]; M. Koskenniemi, The Politics of 
International Law (Hart Publishing 2011), 346-347; Sir A Watts KCMG QC, ‘The Importance of 
International Law’, in M Byers (ed), The Role of Law in International Politics. Essays in International 
Relations and International Law (OUP, 2000), 6-7; P-M Dupuy, “L’unité de l’ordre juridique 
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Delmas-Marty, Global Law: A Triple Challenge (2003), 74. , Pauwelyn J., ‘Fragmentation of 
International Law’, in The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, (Oxford University 
Press, 2006), online edition, available at www.mpepil.com, [41]. See also B Simma and D Pulkowski, 
‘Of Planets and Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law’ (2006) 17 EJIL 483, 506. 
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 Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States, Recital 40. As the Report explains ‘the term 
“international law” as used in this context should be understood in the sense given to it by Article 
38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ, allowance being made for the fact that Article 38 was designed to apply 
to inter-state disputes’.  
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 Chemtura v. Canada, NAFTA, UNCITRAL, Award August 2 2010 [107]; S.D.Myers, Inc. v 
Government of Canada, Partial Award, November 13, 2000, NAFTA, UNCITRAL [214] – [215].  
448
 A.Parra, ‘Applicable Substantive Law in ICSID Arbitration Initiated Under Investment Treaties’, 
(2001) ICSID Rev 20, p. 21; see also C.H.Schreuer, ‘Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty 
Interpretation in Investment Arbitration’, available at 
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For example, a necessity defence based on customary international law may be part of 
a self-standing claim on its own merits that is brought before the tribunal. Schreuer 
and Kriebaum extend this principle so as to suggest that ‘even if a primarily 
applicable treaty on investment treaty does not refer to human rights and other 
community interests, the governing law may include treaties and customary rules 
dealing with these matters’.451  
Nevertheless, the practice of arbitral tribunals is less welcoming for addressing issues 
based on such external sources to investment law as human rights treaties (see Box 2 
in the Appendix). Arbitral tribunals mostly fail to recognize the link in case external 
sub-fields of international law are invoked before the tribunal as part of a host State’s 
defence arguments. Thus, for instance, Argentina has pointed to a potential conflict 
between relevant BITs and Argentina’s human rights obligations in Azurix v. 
Argentina452 and Siemens v. Argentina;
453
 these arguments were not addressed by the 
Tribunals due to the alleged insufficient elaboration on the matter by Argentina. The 
potential conflict of norms argument was entirely skipped by Tribunals in Biwater 
Gauff v. Tanzania
454
 and Vivendi v. Argentina (Resubmitted).455 Thus, investment 
tribunals often prefer to ignore the question on compatibility of investment protection 
law with other sub-fields of international law.
456
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So, on the one hand, it is clear that investment protection law is not autonomous from 
other legal regimes or sub-systems of international law.
457
 On the other hand, it is less 
clear which sub-systems of international law stand ‘at the heart of the matter’ as being 
relevant for solving the case. In this respect, Judge Higgins indicates that ‘the 
widening and thickening of the context of international law’ makes it harder for the 
court or tribunal to choose the applicable law. Higgins refers to the Nuclear Weapons 
Advisory Opinion of 1996,
458
 where the International Court of Justice refused the 
application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and did not 
accept the principles of environmental law in assessing the legality of nuclear 
weapons since they were not ‘at the heart of the matter’.459 Thus, the establishment of 
relevance of the external sub-fields of international law to an investment treaty claim 
is not an easy task. This task necessarily depends on the boundaries of the dispute and 
the claims of the parties.
460
  Furthermore, it also depends on the subjective perception 
of arbitrators on what is the proper scope of foreign investment protection law. In this 
respect, it is argued that the sustainable development context, with its element of 
integration, necessarily clarifies international rules, which may be relevant for 
governing the solution of a case or, in other words, which rules may ‘lie at the heart of 
the matter’. Sustainable development extends the applicable law to its three pillars.  
2.2.2. Examples of unsuccessful attempts to invoke non-investment obligations as 
applicable law in investment treaty claims 
 
The Santa Elena v. Costa Rica
461
 Tribunal ignored Costa Rica’s request to take into 
account the 1972 UNCESO Convention, reliance on which served as a motivation and 
justification for expropriating investor’s property. The Tribunal entirely disregarded 
the possible legal impact of the UNESCO Convention on the content of investment 
                                                 
457
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protection standards,
462
 in particular on investor’s legitimate expectations for the 
amount of compensation. In contrast, in SPP v. Egypt, the Tribunal took the moment 
of coming into effect of the 1972 UNESCO Convention in Egypt into account, 
affecting the legitimacy of the investor’s project. As a result, the Tribunal limited the 
scope of the investor’s legitimate expectations for fair compensation of the 
expropriated property.
463
  
In Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania,
464
 Amici suggested that ‘human rights and sustainable 
development issues are factors that condition the nature and extent of the investor’s 
responsibilities, and the balance of rights and obligations as between the investor and 
the host State,’ and took into account that Biwater’s investment was done in the water 
and sewage systems ‘intimately related to human rights and the capacity to achieve 
sustainable development’ and also carrying with it ‘very serious risks to the 
population at large’. 465 Tanzania, for its part, maintained that its actions were done in 
order to safeguard its local population’s vital rights to water, since the investor was 
not performing its obligations and had created a real threat to public health and 
welfare.
466
 Tanzania argued that ‘[w]ater and sanitation services are vitally important, 
and the Republic has more than a right to protect such services in case of a crisis: it 
has a moral and perhaps even a legal obligation to do so’.467   
The Tribunal found Amici’s observations useful, but did not find it necessary to 
elaborate on Amici’s proposed issues on the investor’s responsibility, sustainable 
development and human rights, and decided the case strictly in accordance with the 
BITs terms,
468
 concluding that Tanzania had nevertheless acted in mala fide.
469
 
However, the novel outcome of the case, by not allocating any compensation for 
damages to the investor even if the FET standard was found to be breached by the 
State, indicates the indirect weight given to non-BIT considerations. 
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In Grand River v. USA,
470
 investors (indigenous communities) required an 
interpretation of NAFTA Article 1105 on the FET against the wider body of 
international law as the applicable rules of international law (NAFTA Article 
1131(1)) including US human rights obligations towards indigenous peoples and their 
practices in the tobacco industry. Investors invoked treaties between the United States 
and Canada affecting the Haudenosaunee tribe, customary international law affecting 
indigenous peoples and human rights norms as relevant applicable law. The Claimants 
maintained that the regulatory changes in the tobacco industry were arbitrary and 
discriminatory, violating international obligations towards indigenous communities, 
for instance there was no former consultations as required by these norms.  
The Tribunal relied on the authoritative 2001 statement by the NAFTA governments 
that the breach of some other international law obligations does not establish a breach 
of NAFTA Article 1105 and declined an importation of non-investment law 
obligations into NAFTA. 
However, the Tribunal did not elaborate on the importance the invoked non-NAFTA 
international obligations might have on the interpretation of Article 1105 through 
Article 31(3)(c) VCLT,
471
 effective treaty interpretation (like in the Shrimp/Turtles 
Report) or otherwise. Under Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, ‘any relevant rules’ may mean an 
‘other rule’ that may shed light on the meaning of the applicable provision.472 Taking 
into account that FET standard consists of several sub-elements, other relevant rules 
of international law could shape an arbitral tribunal’s interpretation of FET, for 
instance, ‘legitimate expectations’. Hence, the Grand Rivers v. US Tribunal applied 
methodology which was contrary to what prominent scholars have suggested as the 
expected action by tribunals, namely, integrating external rules in arbitration through 
the presumption of compliance or referring to Article 31(3)(c).
473
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To conclude, the above-mentioned cases cut short the possible application of non-
investment international law in investment treaty claims. However, the Suez v. 
Argentina Tribunal, by declaring (though unelaborated) a presumption of compliance 
between human rights to water and the BITs, acted more in compliance with the 
‘guardians of law’ approach474 than, for instance, the Tribunal in Santa Elena v. Costa 
Rica, which has taken the self-contained regime approach. Thus, it is outdated and 
contrary to the suggested sustainable development perspective. What sustainable 
development context influences is the necessity to realize that conflict of norms may 
arise in the first place. 
2.2.3.‘Conflict of norms’ in a broad sense 
 
The sustainable development context requires the very realization of the existence of a 
potential conflict in applicable law and the application of conflict avoidance 
techniques by tribunals, bearing in mind the difference between potential and genuine 
conflict of norms.
475
 Conflict of norms in a broad sense means situations where the 
application of a treaty may frustrate the goals of another treaty without there being 
any strict incompatibility between their provisions.
476
 This kind of conflict can be 
interpreted away.
477
 In contrast, a genuine conflict of norms means situations where 
the application of one norm excludes the application of the other.
478
  
In a case where external sources of law are invoked as a justification for the alleged 
breach of investment guarantees, it creates a potential conflict of law which one may 
attempt to solve by treaty interpretation. Resolution methods of ‘conflict of norms’ in 
the broadest sense implies an interpretation with reference to non-investment law so 
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as to inform the content of investment protection standards, presumption against 
conflict, and interpreting away the conflict through teleological, effective and 
evolutive treaty interpretation or through the systemic integration principle as 
established by Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT.
479 
In case these interpretative methods 
do not solve the potential conflict in applicable law, the conflict becomes genuine, 
and general international law methods of conflict resolution become applicable. 
2.2.4. The required interpretative relationship between external rules and 
investment protection law 
 
This section highlights the required methods of solving potential conflict in applicable 
law and offers examples of arbitral jurisprudence, devoting significant efforts and 
argumentation for solving potential conflicts of norms invoked by defending states 
(summarized in Box 3 in the Appendix). Here, the tribunals have carefully utilized 
customary conflict avoidance and treaty interpretation principles for addressing the 
relevance of non-investment law within the interpretation process of investment 
guarantees. 
‘Informing the content’ of investment guarantees  by reference to external fields 
of law  
 
The FET and indirect expropriation standard consists of various sub-elements such as 
‘legitimate investment-backed expectations’. Non-investment law may inform the 
content and scope of these sub-elements, consequently narrowing or extending their 
scope. For instance, in SPP v. Egypt, the Tribunal limited the content of ‘legitimate 
expectations’ for compensation by referring to the UNESCO Convention. Contrary to 
Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, the SPP v. Egypt Tribunal took the moment when the 1972 
UNESCO Convention became effective in Egypt into account, consequently affecting 
the investor’s legitimate expectations for fair compensation of the expropriated 
property. The Tribunal considered the effect of the application of the UNESCO 
Convention on the legality of the investment project and consequently decided not to 
                                                 
479
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award lucrum cessans from the date of the inclusion of the project area in the World 
Heritage List.
480
 From that date, the investment project became illegal and, thus, the 
investor had lost its legitimate expectations to gain profit from his business activity. 
Simma and Kill also emphasize the inherent flexibility of a legitimate expectations 
element as a tool for the integration of non-investment law in investment guarantees. 
They suggest that ‘whatever expectations investor may have had, these must have 
included an expectation that the State would honour its international human rights 
obligations’.481  
In Parkerings v. Lithuania, the UNESCO Convention was taken into account to 
determine the content of ‘like circumstances’ under the MFN standard. The Tribunal 
justified the differentiation between two similar foreign investment projects in 
Vilnius. One of the projects was meant to operate in the area that was protected under 
the UNESCO Convention, thus providing justifiable grounds for different 
treatment.
482
 
In Maffezini v. Spain, the investor challenged the requirement to undertake the costly 
environmental impact assessment as an arbitrary measure by Spain. The Tribunal took 
into account not only that Spanish law required an environment impact assessment of 
the investment project but also the EU Directives that buttressed the national law 
requirement.
483
  Hence, the Tribunal respected Spain’s obligations under EU law 
when applying the BIT provision on compliance with local laws.
484
 
Finally, in Chemtura v. Canada at issue was the gradual phase-out of the 
agrochemical lindane. The Tribunal took into account international treaties not 
explicitly addressed by NAFTA Article 104. The Chemtura Tribunal considered the 
1998 Aarhus Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants to the UNECE Convention on 
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution of 1979, which was adopted by both the 
United States and Canada, and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants, to which Canada was a member state
485
 but the US was merely a signatory 
state, to esnure a ‘broader factual context’ in assessing whether Canada had acted in 
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its mandate under its international commitment. The Tribunal found that Canada had 
not breached the FET and expropriation standards.
486
  
Principle of systemic integration 
 
  
Article 31 (3) (c) of the VCLT instructs that in interpreting a specific treaty ‘[t]here 
shall be taken into account, together with the context: (…) any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.’ However, the reach 
of the systemic integration principle is limited by the requirement to apply relevant 
applicable rules between the parties. Thus, only those international obligations which 
bind both parties of the relevant IIA may be used in the interpretation process. 
Furthermore, the scope of ‘any relevant rules’ is subject to various interpretations – 
from a narrow focus on the subject matter of the rules to the inclusion of any rules of 
international law.
487
 The sustainable development context of investment protection 
law allows setting the content of the ‘relevant’ rules linking investment and external 
international obligations, and it could imply the application of non-investment 
international sources of law through clarifying and informing the content of the 
applicable norm. For instance, the ICJ in Oil Platforms Judgement (2003) had limited 
jurisdiction to examine claims under the Treaty of Amity between the United States 
and Iran (1955). However, while interpreting the Treaty of Amity, the ICJ referred to 
external sources of law and read the term ‘protection of essential security interests’ 
under the Treaty with reference to general international law which prohibits the use of 
force, invoking Article 31(3)(c) VCLT.
488
 Consequently, the ICJ interpreted the scope 
of the ‘essential security interests’ exception restrictively, excluding the use of force 
form its scope.  
None of the investment arbitral awards known to this author has applied Article 
31(3)(c) of the VCLT.
489
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Teleological, effective and evolutionary treaty interpretation  
 
Potential conflicts in applicable law may be ‘interpreted away’ through the 
application of teleological, effective or evolutive treaty interpretation.
490
  For instance, 
the US-Shrimps Report dealt with the US import ban of shrimps harvested in an 
unfriendly manner towards sea turtles. Sea turtles as an endangered species were 
protected under the CITES Convention.
491
 While interpreting the meaning of the term 
‘exhaustible natural resources’ under GATT Article XX(g), the AB used various soft 
law documents
492
 and environmental treaties, not all of which were binding to all the 
disputing parties,
493
 as authoritative statements of the contemporary meaning of the 
term.
494
As a result, the AB extended the coverage of the GATT exception to living 
natural resources
495
 and qualified the US import ban on shrimps as a measure falling 
under the listed exceptions.
496
 It is important to note that the sustainable development 
objective mentioned in the preambular language of the WTO Agreement gave ‘colour, 
texture and shading’ to the AB interpretation of the generic term ‘exhaustible natural 
resources’.497  
A similar line of argumentation may be applicable in investment treaty arbitration. 
Sustainable development is a general context of investment protection law; thus, 
investment guarantees are to be interpreted in light of it through teleological and 
effective treaty interpretation principles. For instance, effective treaty interpretation 
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may require a restrictive interpretation of the legitimate expectations sub-element of 
indirect expropriation so as to give full effect to the objective of foreign investment 
protection (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, Simma and Kill observe that evolutive treaty 
interpretation is also applicable with respect to the content of FET and indirect 
expropriation standards which are inherently generic.
498
 Hence, the sustainable 
development objective should give ‘colour, texture and shading’ in setting their 
content, especillay in the case of an application of ‘old school’ BITs that do not 
contain explicit references to the safeguarding of wider societal interests other than 
foreign investment protection. 
Presumption against conflict in favour of coherence and interpreting away 
conflict 
In the case of a potential conflict of norms situation, the initial step is to presume 
against conflict
499
 or, if possible, to interpret away the conflict as it was done in the 
SPP v. Egypt and S.D. Myers v. Canada awards. 
In S.D. Myers v. Canada, the Tribunal took into account the Basel Convention as a 
legal context for the interpretation of the ‘like circumstances’ element under the 
national treatment standard (Article 1102 of the NAFTA).
500
 The Tribunal noted that 
the object and purpose of the NAFTA
501
 and its conflict resolution clause in Article 
104 required balancing both ‘its concern with the environment and the need to avoid 
trade distortions that are not justified by environmental concerns’ necessitating to 
‘take into account circumstances that would justify governmental regulations that treat 
them differently in order to protect the public interest’.502 
Furthermore, Article 104 necessitated Canada to use ‘the alternative that is least 
inconsistent with other provisions of this Agreement’ provided that the alternative is 
equally effective and reasonably available. Hence, the Tribunal analyzed the Basel 
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Convention in order to see if a real conflict of norms existed and whether the Basel 
Convention was a ‘real’ motivation for Canada’s export ban. Since Canada’s main 
motive for the export ban was protectionism, and there were alternative methods 
available to achieve the policy objectives of the Basel Convention not contravening 
Canada’s international commitments under the NAFTA, the Tribunal found a 
violation of the NAFTA Chapter 11.
503
 
In SPP v. Egypt, the Tribunal considered the UNESCO Convention, which served as a 
motivation and justification for expropriating investor’s property. Egypt invoked its 
obligations under the UNESCO Cultural Heritage Convention as grounds for the 
investment project termination, claiming that the expropriation did not take place. The 
Tribunal approved the legitimacy of the termination of the project by Egypt. The 
Tribunal maintained that, as a matter of international law, Egypt was entitled to cancel 
a tourist development project situated in its own territory for the purpose of protecting 
antiquities belonging to World Heritage.
504
 The Tribunal carefully examined whether 
the government actions that breached the investment agreement were genuinely 
motivated by the desire to comply with these non-investment obligations.
505
 The 
Tribunal found no real conflict between the norms of the UNESCO Convention and 
Egypt’s requirement to pay compensation for expropriation because ‘the choice of the 
sites to be protected is not imposed externally, but results instead from the State’s 
own voluntary nomination’.506   
In Suez v. Argentina, Argentina and amicus curiae invoked Argentina’s human rights 
obligations to water as a rationale and context for the assessment of the customary 
necessity defence. The necessity defence was invoked in order to avoid liability for 
the breach of the Concession Agreement by freezing tariffs during and after the crisis 
in 2001-2002.
507
 
The Suez v. Argentina Tribunal interpreted Argentina’s and amicus arguments as 
suggesting ‘that Argentina’s human rights obligations [...] somehow trumps its 
obligations under the BITs and [...] implicitly gives Argentina the authority to take 
                                                 
503
 Ibid, [287]. 
504
 Southern Pacific Properties (SPP) (Middle East) Limited v.Arab Republic of Egypt , ICSID 
ARB/84/3, May 20, 1992, Egypt’s National Law No.43, [158]. 
505
 Ibid, [153]-[154], [159]. 
506
 Ibid, [154], but see the Dissenting Opinion by Professr Khan. 
507
 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A.and The 
Argentine Republic, Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, France-
Argentina BIT, Spain – Argentina BIT, United Kigdom – Argentina BIT, UNCITRAL Rules [249], 
[252], [256]. 
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actions in disregard of its BIT obligations’. The Tribunal noted that the ‘trumping’ 
argument is unsound under the BIT and international law, and went on by stating that 
in the case at hand ‘Argentina’s human rights obligations and its investment treaty 
obligations are not inconsistent, contradictory, or mutually exclusive’ and ‘Argentina 
could have respected both types of obligations’.508 
The Tribunal’s approach to Argentina’s human rights arguments needs some 
attention. Although Argentina did not suggest that its human rights obligations 
trumped the BITs, there are indeed no grounds to consider in international law that 
human rights considerations automatically trump international investment 
guarantees.
509
 There is no hierarchy between the sources of international law,
510
 with 
the exception of Article 103 of the Charter of the UN, jus cogens and erga omnes 
obligations.
511
 IIAs rarely provide for ‘general exceptions’, as in the GATT 1994, 
which allows certain listed non-trade public policies to trump trade liberalization 
commitments.
512
  
It is more difficult, however, to agree with the easy dismissal by the Suez Tribunal of 
the importance of human rights argument. The Tribunal simply stated that 
‘Argentina’s human rights obligations and its investment treaty obligations are not 
inconsistent’, and Argentina could have respected both. On the one hand, the Tribunal 
presumed against conflict of norms that is one of the conflict avoidance techniques 
under international law.
513
 Nevertheless, presumption against conflict requires further 
consequences, i.e. it requires addressing the arguments raised by those who 
considered that the conflict existed, or an employment of such interpretation of the 
                                                 
508
 Suez v. Argentina, [262]. 
509
 Nikken is suggesting that a solution to meet incompatible investment commitments with human 
rights obligations is to give up the investment commitments by providing an adequate compensation to 
the affected investor. See P Nikken, ‘Balancing of Human Rights and Investment Law in the Inter-
American System of Human Rights’ in PM Dupuy, F Francioni, EU Petersmann (eds), Human Rights 
in International Investment Law and Arbitration, (OUP 2009), Chapter 12. 
510
 For criticism on trumping in general, see Thomas Waelde and Abba Kolo, ‘Environmental 
Regulations, Investment Protection and ‘Regulatory Taking’ in International Law’ (2001) 50 ICLQ 
811, 823 and Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Hart Publishing 2011) 346, 349. 
511
 Fragmentation Report, [47-49, 168, 85-87, 328]; J Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public 
International Law. How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of Internatioanl Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 94-109; M Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Hart Publishing 2011), 346-
349. 
512
 Petros C Mavroidis, George A Bermann, Mark Wu, The Law of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO): documents, cases & analysis (Thomson/West, 2010), 684. 
513
 J Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law. How WTO Law Relates to Other 
Rules of Internatioanl Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 240-244. 
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norm that harmonizes the meaning of the two norms under debate.
514
 This aspect was 
skipped entirely by the Suez Tribunal even if Argentina and amicus submissions put 
forward particular issues for a nuanced analysis by the Tribunal. Argentina 
maintained that its duty to comply with its human rights obligations needed to inform 
the interpretation and application of the customary necessity defence and the content 
of the vague FET and indirect expropriation standard.
515
 Namely, the intention to 
safeguard the human rights of its population served as a proof for the legitimacy of 
Argentina’s actions (it had a legitimate public purpose in mind). By avoiding these 
issues, the Tribunal ignored the real request by Argentina to apply its external 
international obligations so as to inform the content of indirect expropriation and 
other investment guarantees as it was done, for instance, in SPP v. Egypt and 
Parkerings v. Lithuania awards.  
In sum, the above-mentioned arbitral jurisprudence indicates that investment tribunals 
may be flexible enough to incorporate external international law arguments within the 
interpretation process of investment guarantees.  However, it requires a certain 
mindset of arbitrators in applying investment norms and the sustainable development 
context requires them to use their inherent powers in a way which incorporates the 
principle of integration and seeing the link between investment protection standards 
and prima facie external norms. Consequently, the Santa Elena v. Costa Rica 
avoiding approch to external sources of law is outdated and no longer in line with the 
general context of investment protection law.  
2.2.5. Genuine conflict of norms 
 
In the case of a real conflict of norms, some IIAs contain explicit conflict resolution 
rules for a genuine conflict of norms situation, for example, Article 104 of the 
NAFTA and Article 16 of the ECT.
516
 Otherwise, general international law provides 
several conflict resolution methods as lex specialis, lex posterior and limited 
hierarchy of norms as expressed in Article 103 UN Charter.
517
 For instance, the 
                                                 
514
 Ibid, 244. 
515
 Suez v. Argentina [252], [256]. 
516
 Mosche Hirsch, ‘Interactions between Investment and Non-Investment Obligations’ in Peter 
Muchlinski, Frederico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International 
Investment Law (OUP 2008) 159 – 160. 
517
 See J Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law. How WTO Law Relates to Other 
Rules of Internatioanl Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 164-200; Rüdiger Wolfrum, Nele 
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Tribunal in Roussalis v. Romania applied lex specialis, and denied the application of 
Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human 
Rights because BIT provided for a ‘higher and more specific level of protection’ (lex 
specialis) in line with the majority view.
518
  
Invocation of these conflict resolution mechanisms requires establishing again the link 
between the conflicting international rules. For instance, application of the lex 
posterior principle (Article 30 of the VCLT) involves the determination of whether 
the conflicting rules apply to the same subject matter. The integration principle of 
sustainable development may play a role in establishing this link on a case-by-case 
basis.  
INTERIM CONCLUSIONS  
Defendant states have often invoked non-investment international obligations as a 
possible excuse for an alleged breach of investment protection standard. The current 
arbitral jurisprudence does not have a clear and predictable attitude towards the 
necessity to elaborate on non-investment international law as applicable law in 
investment claims. There are two main trends among investment tribunals: ignorance 
towards non-investment sources (e.g. Santa Elena v. Costa Rica) and tolerance 
towards non-investment sources (e.g. SD.Myers v. Canada, SPP v. Egypt, Parkerings 
v. Lithuania).  
Although investment tribunals are limited by narrow jurisdiction clauses, the 
sustainable development objective provides the necessary doctrinal foundation for 
incorporating prima facie non-investment obligations in the investment context. 
Sustainable development affects the understanding of what is the ‘same subject 
matter’. In this respect, the Fragmentation Report suggests that the characterizations 
of specialized legal regimes such as ‘trade law’, ‘investment law’ or ‘international 
environmental law’ have no normative value per se, since various legal regimes under 
                                                                                                                                            
Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law (Springer, 2003), 1-12; OECD, Relatiosnhips 
between Internatioanl Investment Agreements (OECD, Paris, 2004). On the possibility of a host state to 
invoke peremptory norms as a defence see Mosche Hirsch, ‘Interactions between Investment and Non-
Investment Obligations’ in Peter Muchlinski, Frederico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds) The 
Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP 2008), 159-160. 
518
 Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No.ARB/06/1, Award, December 7, 2011 [117]. Cf. 
Ursula Kriebaum ‘Privatizing Human Rights. The Interface between International Investment 
Protection and Human Rights’ in A Reinisch, U Kriebaum, The Law of International Relations, Liber 
Amicorum Hanspeter Neuhold  (Utrecht : Eleven International Pub., 2007). 
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different ‘labels’ may, and often do, deal with the ‘same subject matter’.519 ‘New 
generation’ IIAs approve this inter-relationship by incorporating various mechanisms, 
such as no lowering of standards clauses or interpretative guidelines, and approving 
the emerging trend for ‘seeking relationships’ between various differently ‘labelled’ 
existing primary norms which  deal with the same subject matter. 
Sustainable development, thus, necessitates a ‘systemic’ thinking of international 
investment law implying that investment protection law is not autonomous from other 
legal regimes, functioning as a mechanism of ‘de-fragmentation’. Thus, arbitrators are 
required to recognize the existence of a conflict of norms in its widest sense and use 
appropriate tools for solving them in light of the integration requirement. 
Most importantly, the sustainable development objective clearly excludes the 
approach that the economic development aspect might in any way trump other pillars 
of sustainable development. Hence, methods for assessing the existence of indirect 
expropriation that exclusively focus on the investment protection as a necessary 
element of economic development are contrary to the sustainable development 
objective. Hence, the Santa Elena v. Costa Rica ‘self-containing’ approach is outdated 
and not serving the clarified object and purpose of the IIAs regime.   
                                                 
519
 Fragmentation Report, [21]. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE APPLICATION OF INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION 
STANDARD AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to assess the compatibility of the methodologies used for the 
interpretation of the indirect expropriation standard with the sustainable development 
objective/principle.  In essence, sustainable development requires an integrated 
approach between an economic development aspect, which is traditionally linked with 
foreign investment protection, and social and environmental elements of investment 
protection. Therefore, this section analyzes these methodologies in turn, focusing on 
the scope of interests they allow to take into account in examining the existence of 
indirect expropriation and whether these methodologies would now qualify as bona 
fide and effective reading of indirect expropriations standard guided by the principle 
of sustainable development. 
A broad spectrum of general legislative acts,
520
 administrative measures
521
 and 
compliance measures with non-economic international obligations of host States
522
 
aimed at the facilitation of non-economic public interests has been challenged as 
expropriatory (see Box 1 in the Appendix). Thus, the chapter deals with the 
assessment of which of the methodologies or doctrines guarantee that commercial 
interests are not prioritized but rather are balanced and reconciled with competing 
non-economic interests in the interpretation process of the indirect expropriation 
standard.  
                                                 
520
E.g., in Methanex v United States, UNCITRAL (NAFTA) Final Award, 3 August 2005, which 
involved a general legislation banning a toxic gas ingredient that polluted the environment. In Glamis 
Gold, Ltd. v The United States of America, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Award, 8 June 2009, California 
imposed new restrictions on gold mining. California invoked internationally protected rights of 
indigenous groups among the reasons for limiting rights to gold extraction in the area of cultural 
property of Indian tribes. 
521
E.g., Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v The United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. 
ARB (AF)/00/2), Award of 29 May 2003 that involved the revocation of the operation licence by the 
local Municipality for the alleged environmental protection purpose. 
522
E.g., Chemtura v Canada, NAFTA, UNCITRAL, Award August 2 2010, in which the gradual 
phase-out by Canada of the agrochemical lindane was supported by the 1998 Aarhus Protocol on 
Persistent Organic Pollutants and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. Lindane 
was gradually eliminated because it endangered public health and the environment. 
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At first, the chapter provides an insight in the general rule on indirect expropriation 
and its three-step assessment that arbitral jurisprudence has rather coherently 
employed (the first step deals with the indication of whether there is a protected 
investment capable of being expropriated; the second step deals with the assessment 
of the existence of expropriation; the third step consists of legitimacy assessment of 
the already found expropriation).  
It proceeds with examples of the host state’s regulatory measures that (allegedly) deal 
with sustainable development matters, which foreign investors have challenged as 
expropriatory (summarized in Box 1 in the Appendix) and which reflect the clash 
between investor’s claims for its property protection and legal stability, on the one 
hand, and the host State’s interest to retain and apply its regulatory flexibility, on the 
other hand. 
The chapter continues with a brief overview of the negative issues of the indirect 
expropriation standard, namely the confusion between legitimacy conditions of 
indirect expropriation and non-compensable regulation which causes ambiguity over 
the scope of the indirect expropriation standard. In particular, arbitral tribunals have 
interpreted the role and legal consequences of a ‘public purpose’ criterion 
discordantly, often perplexing criteria for legitimacy of a State’s customary right to 
regulate and/or indirect expropriation with the establishment of the existence of the 
latter.  This situation has lead to uncertainty within the scope of the indirect 
expropriation standard. 
Against this background, and taking into account the sustainable development 
context, the chapter proceeds with the analysis of three main doctrines used for 
distinguishing expropriatory measures from non-compensable regulations. The 
assessment of these methods or doctrines is done in light of the integration principle, 
outdating those approaches which allow arbitrators to limit themselves strictly to the 
narrow focus on foreign investment protection. 
3.1. EXPROPRIATION. GENERAL RULE 
The right to expropriate property is recognized in public international law. It is well 
established that: 
[I]f alien–owned property is subject to measures of expropriation which are not 
arbitrary or discriminatory, and which are adopted in furtherance of the public 
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interest and accompanied by genuine and realistic provisions for the payment of 
compensation, the state will be held not to have acted in breach of its customary 
international law obligations.
523
 
Expropriation may take place in direct and indirect forms. Direct expropriation means 
the taking of property by transferring its title and related property interests to the 
state
524
 (e.g., Santa Elena v. Costa Rica,
525
 where the expropriation was based on the 
formal decree issued by the State). In contrast, indirect expropriation, which is 
nowadays the dominant form of expropriation,
526
  ‘may occur when measures short of 
an actual taking result in the effective loss of management, use or control, or a 
significant depreciation of the value of the assets of a foreign investor’.527 In IIAs, 
indirect expropriations are mostly referred to as ‘measures having effect equivalent to 
nationalization or expropriation’ or ‘measures tantamount to nationalization or 
expropriation’.528 
Indirect expropriation may take place through a single measure (e.g., regulatory 
expropriation through a general regulation having an expropriatory effect on foreign 
investment) or it may result from a series of related or unrelated measures over a 
period of time (the so-called ‘creeping’ expropriation).529 Overall, elements of indirect 
expropriation include a permanent taking of an investment by a government-type 
authority acting in its sovereign capacity;
530
  transfer of ownership is not decisive.
531
  
3.1.1. Assessing An Indirect Expropriation Claim. Four-Steps Test 
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 Sir Robert Jennings, Sir Arthur Watts, Oppenheims’s International Law (9th ed Longman 1992) 
917-919, 926. 
524
 August Reinisch, ‘Expropriation’ in Peter Muchlinski, Frederico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP 2008) 408. 
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Political Risk (New York, Oceana Publications Inc Dobbs Ferry, 1997), 8. 
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(eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP 2008) 421- 422 (footnotes 
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 UNCTAD, Taking of Property, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/15 (UN 2000) 18. The Tribunal in Feldman 
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cases’, see Marvin Roy Feldman Kappa v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, 
Award, 16 December 2002 [98]. 
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 Fireman’s Fund v. Mexico, [176(i)]. 
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 In contrast to contractual capacity. Parkerings v.Lithuania [443]. Azurix. v. Argentina [314]. 
Waste Management II v.Mexico [175]. 
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 Fireman’s Fund v. Mexico [176(a)-(e)]. 
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In contrast to direct expropriation, where the focal point lies in the examination of its 
legitimacy conditions, the main problem with indirect expropriation is to establish 
whether a state action constitutes an expropriation of a protected investment. That is 
to say, its existence must be distinguished from a legitimate, non-compensable 
exercise of State power to regulate that nevertheless affects foreign investment,
532
 
‘and it is fair to say that no one has come up with a fully satisfactory means of 
drawing this line’.533 Tribunals have provided vague and incomprehensible guidelines 
for making this distinction, for example the S.D.Myers v. Canada Tribunal famously 
noted that ‘[e]xpropriations tend to involve the deprivation of ownership rights; 
regulations a lesser interference’.534  
Thus, arbitral jurisprudence has established a theoretical four-step approach in 
assessing an indirect expropriation claim focusing on, first, whether there is a 
protected investment capable of being expropriated, second, whether that investment 
has in fact been expropriated, and, third, whether the expropriation is lawful
535
 or 
whether it is covered by customary police power exceptions. If a tribunal finds the 
existence of expropriation, the fourth step deals with the amount of compensation 
which an affected investor is entitled to receive. 
However, there is no consistency and predictability with respect to the second step of 
establishing indirect expropriation. Arbitrators have often interchanged and perplexed 
the establishment of the existence of indirect expropriation with its legitimacy criteria 
or with the legitimacy assessment of a non-compensable exercise of a customary 
state’s right to regulate. Consequently, the scope of the indirect expropriation standard 
is unclear, and arbitral jurisprudence has used various methodologies or doctrines that 
emphasize differing criteria for establishing the existence of indirect expropriation, 
which now need to be assessed against the clarified sustainable development context.  
3.1.2. Element of ‘substantial deprivation’ of investment  
 
The dominant view states that for indirect expropriation to exist it is necessary to 
establish a substantial deprivation of the investment as a whole. Existence of a 
                                                 
532
 General, bona fide regulations are not per se exempt from becoming expropriatory, see Pope & 
Talbot v Canada [99]. 
533
 Feldman v. Mexico [100]. 
534
 S.D.Myers, Inc. v Government of Canada, Partial Award, November 13, 2000, NAFTA, 
UNCITRAL [282]. 
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 Rudolf Dolzer, Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP 2008) 90, 
91; Chemtura v. Canada [242]; Merrill v. Canada [139]. 
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substantial deprivation of the (economic) use and enjoyment of property rights
536
 was 
emphasized by the Pope & Talbot Tribunal,
537
 and it is widely followed by later 
arbitral awards.
538
  Investors often refer to the Metalclad v. Mexico award,
539
 where 
the Tribunal reasoned that expropriation is also constituted in cases where the owner 
is deprived of a ‘significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic 
benefit of property’540 but this definition is mostly considered as extremely broad.541 
The ‘substantial deprivation’ test consists of two main criteria, namely, the severity of 
the (economic) impact on property rights
542
 and the duration of that impact.
543
 In 
Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, the Tribunal declared that the ‘substantial interference’ 
does not even need to be economic in nature.
544
 
Substantial deprivation of property rights as the decisive element for the existence of 
expropriation is accepted also outside of foreign investment law. Thus, the 
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 Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania [463]; Y Fortier and SL Drymer, ‘Indirect Expropriation in the Law of 
International Investment: I know It When I See It, or Caveat Investor’ (2004) 19 ICSID Review-FILJ 
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jurisprudence by the ECtHR on de facto expropriations
545
 has constantly held that a 
property owner must be deprived of all uses of his/her property or, in other words, the 
property should disappear.
546
 Otherwise, the interference with property rights is 
merely a ‘control of the use of property’ not necessitating compensation.547 
As a result of the apparently high ‘substantial deprivation’ standard, many alleged 
expropriation claims fail under this provision
548
 and their substance is addressed 
under the FET standard justifying the interconnected analysis of both of these 
standards and their sub-elements. 
3.2. EXAMPLES OF CHALLENGED MEASURES DEALING WITH 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT RELATED MATTERS 
International investment protection law covers a wide array of tangible and intangible 
property interests,
549
 for example, the enjoyment of rights under a licence,
550
 
contractual rights,
551
 and access to markets.
552
 The State may affect and expropriate 
these rights through an infinite variety of measures.
553
 Accordingly, a vast array of a 
State’s measures directly or indirectly related to particular public interest, which goes 
under one of the three pillars of the term sustainable development, have been 
challenged as expropriatory (see Box 1 in the Appendix). Usually, respondent states 
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bring up the public interest aspects as its defence in the investment dispute. Rarely, 
claiming investors
554
 or amicus curiae
555
 appeal to these concerns. 
One may classify the challenged measures in four broad categories: (1) National 
legislation of general application suppressing or/and restricting certain economic 
activity (the so-called regulatory takings cases) usually for the environment or health 
protection reasons. Suppression of specific previously allowed activity was the central 
issue in Methanex v. US
556
 and Chemtura v. Canada
557
 claims. These claims 
originated from the bans of harmful chemicals, the production of which was the 
claimants’ investment. In Methanex v. US, the contested Californian ban of the toxic 
gasoline additive was motivated by environmental and health concerns approved by 
scientific research. Similarly, at the core of the Glamis Gold v. US
558
 claim was the 
ban and severe restrictions of the previously allowed gold mining methods. California 
justified its ban on the use of open-pit mining and the newly imposed back-filling 
requirement by the need to protect the religious and cultural property of Native 
American Indians. In Metalclad v. Mexico,
559
 the investor challenged the Cactus 
Protection Decree prohibiting any commercial activity on its property as an 
expropriation. In Ethyl v. Canada,
560
 the investor was complaining about the ban of 
inter-provincial trade in harmful chemicals, which Canada imposed for health and 
environmental protection reasons. In Merrill v. Canada,
561
 at issue was the new 
Canadian regulatory regime for log exports, requiring the sale of surplus logs from 
private land to the province before they could be exported. This requirement was 
believed to be directed at the sustainable use of natural resources and the promotion of 
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the local processing of timber. In Piero Foresti v. South Africa,
562
 investors 
complained about South Africa’s Black Economic Empowerment programme. The 
programme required the introduction of compulsory equity divestiture as an attempt 
to encourage greater ownership of mining industry assets by historically 
disadvantaged South Africans. Costa Rica’s measures establishing a preserve park for 
breeding sites of endangered leatherback turtles
563
 were also challenged as 
expropriatory measures.  
(2) Another category of challenged State acts involves administrative measures, in 
particular, non-issuance or termination of licence or other authorization. For instance, 
termination or non-issuance of an operation licence for allegedly social or 
environmental concerns was at issue in Tecmed v. Mexico,
564
 Metalclad v. Mexico and 
Vattenfall v. Germany.
565
 The State’s rejection of a proposed investment activity as a 
result of environmental and social impact assessment was at the core of Glamis Gold 
v. US,
566
 Pac Rim v. El Salvador,
567
 San Sebastian v. El Salvador
568
 and Maffezini v. 
Spain.
569
   For instance, in Pac Rim v. El Salvador and San Sebastian v. El Salvador, 
the indirect expropriation claims arose out of the Government’s revocations of 
investors’ environmental permits and non-renewal of their gold and silver exploration 
licenses. The State claimed these measures were necessary for the protection of 
drinking water resources.  
(3) Another group of challenged measures stems from the general treatment of 
investors, especially public utility companies, through legislative, executive and 
                                                 
562
  Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and ors v Republic of South Africa ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/07/1, 
Award, 4 August 2010. 
563
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564
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a modified water use permit for the project.; see Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall 
Europe Generation AG v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No.ARB/09/6, Award March 11, 
2011. 
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 The investor complained about a prohibition to use open-pit mining in an area of religious and 
cultural importance for Native American Indians. 
567
 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, CAFTA, ICSID Case No.ARB/09/12, 
Award on Merits Pending (Decision on the Respondent’s Preliminary Objections Under CAFTA 
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568
 The Government revoked the Claimants’ environmental permits and did not renew their 
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569
 The investor complained about the additional costs imposed by the environment impact 
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judiciary branches of the host State.  For instance, in Vivendi v. Argentina 
(Resubmitted),
570
 Argentina claimed that its treatment of the investor by terminating 
the concession agreement and supporting customers not to pay bills for contaminated 
water fell within its regulatory activity to provide vital water and sewage services. 
Similarly, in Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania,
571
 Tanzania argued that the termination of 
the concession contract in water and sanitation services and the occupation of the 
investor’s premises were measures aimed at safeguarding the local population’s vital 
rights to water, since the investor was not performing its obligations and had created a 
threat to public health and welfare.
572
 
(4) Last but not least, investors have challenged several measures relating to host 
State’s attempts to comply with its non-investment international obligations. For 
instance, in Chemtura v. Canada, the investor complained about the gradual phase-out 
of the agro-chemical lindane due to its effects on health. The phase-out was buttressed 
by the 1998 Aarhus Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants and the Stockholm 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. In S.D.Myers v. Canada, Canada 
justified its temporary export ban of the chemical waste PBC by its obligations under 
the Basel Convention, which, inter alia, required reducing to the minimum the 
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes.
573
 Finally, the UNESCO Cultural 
Heritage Convention was considered in SPP v. Egypt award
574
 dealing with the claim 
arising out of the termination of the previously approved project to develop a tourist 
complex at the Pyramids near Cairo. Egypt invoked its obligations under the 
UNESCO Cultural Heritage Convention as a justification of the termination of the 
project. 
                                                 
570
 COMPAÑÍA DE AGUAS DEL ACONQUIJA S.A. and VIVENDI UNIVERSAL S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID, Case No. ARB/97/3, Award 20 August 2007, Resubmitted.   
571
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572
 Ibid, [434], [436]. 
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574
 Southern Pacific Properties (SPP) (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID 
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3.3. LEGITIMACY CONDITIONS FOR NON-COMPENSABLE REGULATION 
AND REGULATORY EXPROPRIATION  
To begin with, the right to expropriate property is recognized in public international 
law, if it is subject to certain conditions and consequences,
575
 namely if it is non-
discriminatory and non-arbitrary, adopted in furtherance of the public purpose and 
against the payment of fair compensation.
576
 
Apart from the compensation requirement, the same legitimacy conditions apply 
equally to such non-compensable regulations affecting foreign investment as national 
legislations and administrative measures without expropriatory effect. Because of that 
there is frequently confusion between the second and third step of the assessment of 
an indirect expropriation claim, namely, the establishment of the very existence of 
indirect expropriation (proving the existence of substantial deprivation of property 
and thus, its separation from non-compensable regulations without such an effect on 
the property) and the legitimacy assessment of challenged regulatory measures or the 
already established expropriation. Therefore, these legitimacy criteria are addressed 
before the doctrines of establishing the very existence of expropriation.   
3.3.1. Non-discrimination and non-arbitrariness 
 
Any kind of host State’s measures that detrimentally affect investors lose their 
legitimacy if they are applied in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.
577
  
Existence of a genuine public purpose of the measure helps to prove that it is non-
discriminatory and non-arbitrary.
578
 Nonetheless, even non-discriminatory regulation 
                                                 
575
 Sir Robert Jennings, Sir Arthur Watts, Oppenheims’s International Law (9th ed Longman 1992) 
917-919; Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP 
2008) 89. 
576
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577
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183, where the government stopped the work, partially demolished the work in progress, and arbitrarily 
arrested, detained and deported Mr.Biloune. Similarly, in the Tecmed and Metalclad awards 
expropriation was found due to the arbitrary conduct by the governments, unjustifyingly interfering in 
previously approved investment projects. 
578
 Methanex v. US Part IV - Chapter D - Page 4, para.7. Cf. The American Law Institute, 
Restatement of the Law Third. The Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Vol 2, The American 
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for public interest might add up to indirect expropriation (regulatory taking)
579
 if it 
results in a ‘substantial deprivation’ of property rights and is not justified under police 
powers exceptions.
580
 Thus, the Tribunal in Pope & Talbots rejected Canada’s 
argument that non-discriminatory regulations for public good cannot be expropriatory, 
holding that ‘a blanket exception for regulatory measures would create a gaping 
loophole in international protections against expropriation’.581  
With regard to non-arbitrariness/due process requirement, indirect expropriation may 
be comprised of too-far-reaching regulatory measures (regulatory takings) and also by 
substantial interference with investment that takes place in breach of due process or 
regulatory mistreatment of investors (creeping or disguised takings)
582
 for instance, 
acting in breach of prior promises like it was done in Suez v. Argentina,583 where 
Argentina refused to revise tariffs in line with the legal framework established by the 
Concession Contract. Compliance with legitimate investment-backed expectations of 
investors as a substantial element of non-arbitrariness is dealt with in detail in the 
following chapters. 
Failure in obeying due process bars a State the possibility to rely on exercising 
otherwise legitimate regulatory powers. For instance, in Middle East Cement v. Egypt, 
Egypt took the investor’s ship, which was subject to an administrative seizure, 
without due notification contrary to the due process of law requirement.
584
 As a 
consequence, the State could not rely on its exercise of non-compensable police 
powers exceptions.
585
 Jennings and Watts consider non-arbitrariness as ‘[p]erhaps the 
                                                 
579
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most clearly established condition’ of the legitimacy of expropriation.586 In the ELSI 
case, the ICJ defined arbitrariness as ‘a wilful disregard of due process of law, an act 
which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of juridical propriety’,587 setting a rather 
high threshold for finding a violation of the due process requirement.  
Concerning regulatory takings claims, such elements as a reliance on a scientific 
research, a compliance with international guidelines and a response to overall trends 
in other legal systems will serve as arguments to prove the non-arbitrariness of the 
challenged regulatory measures.  
For instance, in Glamis Gold v. US, the Tribunal analysed reasonableness of the 
newly imposed legislative measure requiring a cultural review of the investment 
project. The measure was deemed to be reasonable since it was based on the 
guidelines and studies of qualified professional archaeologists and researchers.
588
 
Similarly, in Methanex v. US, the Tribunal found that the peer-reviewed University of 
California Report provided a serious, objective and scientific justification for the 
legislative ban of the chemical gasoline ingredient.
589
 Hence, bona fide scientific 
opinion serves as an important element in reasonability and non-arbitrariness 
assessment of governmental measures banning or restricting investor’s activity for 
public interest. Even more, in line with Glamis Gold and Methanex awards, the 
scientific opinion needs not to be the majority opinion, it is also not required that it is 
based on international standards, thus, there is a leeway for the exercise of 
precautionary actions by State. In comparison, under the WTO law, Article 5.7 of the 
SPS Agreement sets rather high standards for the exercise of precautionary actions – 
they need to be substantiated with well established scientific justification and risk 
assessment.
590
  
Compliance with international guidelines and the response to overall trends in other 
legal systems by the challenged regulatory measure leaves less room to manoeuvre for 
tribunals within the reasonableness assessment. For instance, in Chemtura v. Canada 
the gradual legislative phase-out of the agro-chemical lindane was buttressed by 
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international treaties (1998 Aarhus Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants and the 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants) and supported by the 
comparative analysis of lindane regulations in other countries. Lindane as a potential 
carcinogen was gradually banned in numerous countries.
591
 The Tribunal took into 
account these factors when asked to rule on the reasonableness and legitimacy of the 
lindane ban in Canada. As a result, the Tribunal concluded that Canada had acted 
bona fide within its police powers and in line with genuine concerns for the 
environment and health protection.
592
 
3.3.2. Compensation Requirement 
 
Expropriation is legal only if it is accompanied by prompt and just compensation. A 
standard of compensation established by the network of IIAs requires the payment of 
the full market value of the expropriated investment.  
In essence, indirect expropriations are per se illegal, since they are not compensated 
unless the affected investor undertakes litigation against a host state asserting the 
existence of expropriation and claiming compensation. Thus, in case where indirect 
expropriation is found, in addition to full market value compensation the investor may 
also rely on customary law requirement to get redress, which ‘as far as possible [will] 
wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which 
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed’.593  
The requirement to pay compensation has raised tensions between developed and 
developing States. During the decolonization process in the 1950s and 1960s, 
developing states insisted on expropriation without compensation of property 
belonging to nationals of former colonial powers.  In these countries extracting 
industries were in control of foreigners who operated on long-term concession 
agreements negotiated by the former colonial states.
594
 Developing countries saw 
those contracts as a threat to their sovereignty, economic self-determination and 
development, and, therefore, they attempted to push forward for a new system of 
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justice within the UN.
595
 However, developing states failed to establish a custom that 
expropriation of investment in the field of a state’s natural resources is not 
compensable.
596
 Compensation requirement was approved in the UN GA Resolution 
1803 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
597
 and now enjoys the status 
of customary international law, since the Resolution was accepted both by developed 
and developing States.
598
  
Moreover, even those BITs concluded between developed and developing states 
provide for fair market value in the case of expropriation, and, thus, excludes the 
proposition that ‘developing countries which might not be able to pay for large-scale 
expropriation following decolonization should be entitled to argue that just 
compensation would be less than full market value’.599 Likewise, the Explanatory 
note to Harvard Draft rejects the approach ‘that adverse economic circumstances or a 
strong national policy may in international law justify the taking of property without 
compensation’.600 
So, once the expropriation is established (irrespective of its direct or indirect nature), 
it needs to be accompanied by full market value compensation. 
3.3.3. Public Purpose and its perplexed understanding 
 
Last, but not least, in order to be legitimate the taking of property must serve a public 
purpose as must also a non-compensable regulatory measure by a State.
601
 The 
existence of a genuine ‘public’ purpose usually indicates non-discrimination and non-
arbitrariness of the challenged measure. 
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However, the term ‘public purpose’ is often used in various meanings, and arbitral 
tribunals dealing with indirect expropriation claims do not always keep in mind these 
various uses of the term ‘public purpose’ and their differing legal consequences.  
One may distinguish three main usages of the term ‘public purpose’, each of which 
may lead to different legal consequences that are often perplexed by arbitral tribunals. 
The first and logical meaning in which ‘public purpose’ is understood is a State’s 
motivation for expropriation (or regulation), which is required to serve a public good 
and not a private interest.
602
 In this sense, the existence of a public purpose serves as a 
legitimacy criterion for both non-compensable regulatory measures and expropriation.  
If a public purpose of a regulation is missing, the State may be found to act in mala 
fide
603
 resulting in international responsibility; however, if an expropriatory measure 
serves a real public purpose it does not exempt a state form the compensation 
requirement. For instance, the Tribunal in SPP v. Egypt concluded that ‘[t]he 
obligation to pay fair compensation in the event of expropriation applies equally 
where antiquities are involved’,604 previously accepting the cancellation of the 
investor’s tourism development project due to the inclusion of its territory in the 
World Heritage List as a clearly legitimate measure.
605
   
Very rarely do international tribunals deny the existence of a public purpose of the 
challenged regulation,
606
 thus respecting the wide discretion of States to consider what 
is necessary for the public good;
607
 international law is indifferent in this respect.
608
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For instance, the arbitral Tribunal in Saluka v. Czech Republic has pointed out that 
there is ‘the high measure of deference that international law generally extends to the 
right of domestic authorities to regulate matters within their own borders’609 leaving 
the margin of appreciation open for host States.
610
 Similarly, the ECtHR in James and 
Others v.UK noted that in its judicial review of a governmental act it ‘will respect the 
legislature's judgment as to what is “in the public interest” unless that judgment be 
manifestly without reasonable foundation’.611  
Secondly, in the case of indirect expropriation, ‘public purpose’ is often confused 
with the ‘intent to expropriate’, which is rarely present in indirect expropriation cases 
or even explicitly denied by a State, and it is indeed irrelevant in establishing indirect 
expropriation.
612
 
Thirdly, the existence of ‘public purpose’ as a legitimacy criterion of regulation or 
expropriation may also be confused with a defending State’s invocation of the 
customary police powers doctrine that is meant to exclude the application of the 
expropriation standard in case bona fide regulation for public purpose is taken. 
Nevertheless, application of this doctrine is still unclear as noted by the Tribunal in 
Saluka v. Czech Republic: 
[I]nternational law has yet to identify in a comprehensive and definitive fashion 
precisely what regulations are considered “permissible” and “commonly 
accepted” as falling within the police or regulatory power of States and, thus, 
noncompensable.613 
Application and interpretation of the indirect expropriation standard allows 
integrating customary doctrine of ‘police power’ in a case where no specific treaty 
provision addresses the limitations of the expropriation clause.
614
 This is so since the 
network of IIAs codifies the indirect expropriation standard that has its origins in the 
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customary law of expropriation.
615
  Some arbitral awards have explicitly followed this 
stance, e.g., the SD Myers v. Canada Tribunal noted that indirect expropriation clause 
in NAFTA Article 1110 ‘must be interpreted in light of the whole body of state 
practice, treaties and judicial interpretations of that term in international law cases’.616 
Similarly, the Saluka v. Czech Republic Tribunal employed Article 31(3)(c) of the 
VCLT for integrating the customary police powers in the interpretation of the 
expropriation clause under the Czech-Netherlands BIT
617
 and held that the State is 
‘not liable to pay compensation to a dispossessed alien investor when it adopts general 
regulations that is “commonly accepted as within the police power of States” ’.618   
One may understand the police powers doctrine in both a wider and narrower sense 
(police powers exceptions).
619
  
In a broad meaning, police powers of the State encompass non-discriminatory and 
reasonable regulations by a State that may constitute far-reaching interference with 
private property but without an expropriatory effect. Christie has formulated police 
powers regulations in the following way: 
The conclusion that a particular interference is an expropriation might also be 
avoided if the State whose actions are the subject of complaint had a purpose in 
mind which is recognized in international law as justifying even severe, although by 
no means complete, restrictions on the use of property.
620
  
For instance, shifts in taxation policy, public health regulations, and administration of 
public utilities and planning of urban and rural development are traditionally accepted 
as falling within the exercise of police powers in a wider sense.
621
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3.3.3.1. Police powers exceptions 
 
Under international law, a narrow meaning of customary police powers or police 
powers exceptions refers to a host State’s measures that justify a state’s substantial 
interference with property rights that would otherwise amount to a compensable 
deprivation of property (also subject to non-discrimination, due process and 
reasonableness criteria).
622
 However, application of this doctrine in practice is 
unclear; for example, the Pope & Talbots award held that the expropriation provision 
of NAFTA Article 1110 ‘does cover non-discriminatory regulation that might be said 
to fall within an exercise of a state’s so-called police powers’623 in case a ‘substantial 
deprivation’ is found.624  
Despite the fact that its application is unclear, state practice and arbitral 
jurisprudence
625
 have clarified certain categories of non-compensable exercise of 
state’s police powers in a narrower sense.  
The first category is a destruction of property in emergency cases to protect public 
safety, public health, morals and/or the environment.
626
  For instance, back in 1894, 
Brazil destroyed several lots of watermelons belonging to US citizens due to a cholera 
epidemic. The US did not take up a diplomatic challenge to that action since it held 
that the measure was justified and non-compensable under the police powers of 
Brazil.
627
  
A more recent attempt to invoke this police powers exception was undertaken by 
Tanzania in its defence in Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, where the investor contributed 
to the crisis by its poor performance of the water and sewage concession. Tanzania 
argued it had acted within its police powers by expropriating the concession without 
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compensation in order to respond to ‘a real threat to public health and welfare’.628 The 
Tribunal did not directly address this line of argumentation. Nevertheless, it 
concluded that Tanzania had acted in mala fide,
629
 thus the possible police powers 
defence lost its legitimacy. 
The next category of a well recognized police powers exception is a taking or 
deprivation of property which is ‘otherwise incidental to the normal operation of the 
laws of the State’ such as carrying out the judgement of a court in a civil case or a fine 
or penalty in criminal proceedings’.630  For instance, in Saluka v. Czech Republic, the 
investor was substantially deprived of its investment due to the forced administration 
of its bank by Czech authorities. The Tribunal justified this interference in the 
investor’s property as a permissible regulatory action under Czech law.631 In this 
respect the Tribunal stated that: 
It is now established in international law that States are not liable to pay 
compensation to a foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their regulatory 
powers, they adopt in a non-discriminatory manner bona fide regulations that are 
aimed at the general welfare.
632
 
Similarly, the ECtHR has classified normal operation of the laws of the State resulting 
in substantial interference with property rights as a non-compensable ‘control of use 
of property’. Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human 
Rights contains the ‘control of use of property’ principle, implying that enjoyment of 
property rights is necessarily limited ‘with the right of a State to enforce such laws as 
it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general 
interest’.633 Thus, in Agosi v United Kingdom, that involved a confiscation of illegally 
imported coins, the ECtHR held that: 
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 The forfeiture of the coins did, of course, involve a deprivation of property, but in 
the circumstances the deprivation formed a constituent element of the procedure for 
the control of the use in the United Kingdom of gold coins such as Kruegerrands. It 
is therefore the second paragraph of Article 1 (P1-1) which is applicable in the 
present case.
634
  
The third category of police powers exceptions relates to general taxation that is not 
intended to be confiscatory, devaluation of the currency and ‘other action of the kind 
that is commonly accepted as within the police power of states, if it is not 
discriminatory’.635 
Lastly, and most importantly for the topic of the thesis, scholars and a limited amount 
of international jurisprudence distinguish between a customary police powers 
exception and suppression of previously allowed activity like the prohibition of trade 
in harmful substances
636
 that results in driving an investor out of a business.
637
 For 
instance, no compensation was paid to those affected by the U.S. alcoholic liquor ban 
in 1926, since the prohibition was considered to be within ‘police powers’ of the 
State.
638
  
However, there is no such clarity of the application of this category of police powers 
for exempting a State from compensation in case substantial deprivation of an 
investment takes place. 
One of the proponents of this category of police powers is the Tribunal in Feldman v. 
Mexico. In Feldman, the investor was driven out of its tobacco resale business due to 
various changes in domestic law that were aimed at fighting the grey market 
economy. The Tribunal found these shifts in national laws were legitimate and stated: 
Governments in their exercise of regulatory power, frequently change their laws 
and regulations in response to changing economic circumstances or changing 
political, economic or social considerations. Those changes may well make certain 
activities less profitable or even uneconomic to continue.
639
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However, the Tribunal did not find a substantial deprivation of the investor’s property 
since other branches of the investor’s business were not affected, therefore the police 
powers exception was approved in a merely theoretical manner. 
On a national level, a similar police powers exception was raised by Australia with 
respect to its plain packaging law that was challenged by tobacco producers in the 
Australian High Court.
640
 Australia proposed that the law was aimed at public health 
protection and, therefore, it was not subject to takings clause in its Constitution. The 
Court remarked that it was a large proposition, but it was not necessary to consider it 
further since it found no expropriatory effect of the plain packaging law, and thus the 
expropriation case was dropped at an early stage.
641
 
In this study it is argued that the sustainable development objective has the capacity to 
bring a considerable clarity to the application of this category of police powers 
exceptions. Namely, in situations where regulatory change takes place after the 
investment was established in the host country, suppressing previously allowed 
activity, e.g., responding to changes in scientific knowledge or public expectations.
642
 
The necessity to balance economic and non-economic interests provides precise 
guidelines for filling the expropriation standard with content. In particular, sustainable 
development considerations have a role to play in establishing the content of the 
legitimate investment-backed expectations element, which participates in drawing the 
line between legitimate application of police powers and compensable indirect 
expropriation (analyzed in detail in Chapter 4). 
3.4. METHODOLOGIES DEVELOPED BY ARBITRAL JURISPRUDENCE TO 
ASSESS WHEN THE REGULATION BECOMES COMPENSATORY (SECOND 
STEP OF INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION ASSESSMENT) 
Using their wide discretion in filling the loose indirect expropriation standard with 
content in specific cases,
643
 arbitral tribunals have established several methodologies 
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on how to distinguish non-compensable regulation from indirect expropriation (see 
Box 1 in the Appendix). These methodologies frequently suffer from confusing the 
second step (whether there is an expropriation) and the third step (whether the 
expropriation is legitimate) of indirect expropriation analysis contributing to the 
obscurity on the content of indirect expropriation and, consequently, often 
overlooking the variations in the use of the term ‘public purpose’. Further, these 
methodologies either focus on the context and public interest of the interference in 
foreign investment or limit themselves to the exclusive focus of the protection of the 
property rights of foreign investors while disregarding other interests involved.
644
 
Thus, they raise uncertainty over the regulatory capacity left for host States. 
In essence, sustainable development requires an integrated approach between the 
economic development aspect, which is traditionally linked with foreign investment 
protection, and social and environmental elements of investment protection. 
Therefore, the aim of the section is to assess the compatibility of the methodologies 
used for the interpretation of the indirect expropriation standard with the sustainable 
development objective and principle. The analysis focuses on the scope of interests 
the methodologies allow to take into account in examining the existence of indirect 
expropriation and whether these methodologies would now qualify as bona fide and 
effective reading of the indirect expropriations standard guided by the principle of 
sustainable development. 
The section will analyse in turn the ‘sole effects’, ‘proportionality’ and ‘context’ 
doctrines. 
3.4.1. ‘Sole effects’ doctrine for the assessment of the existence of indirect 
expropriation 
 
‘Sole effect’ doctrine645 focuses exclusively on the degree to which the governmental 
measure deprives the investor of its investment in order to establish the existence of 
                                                 
644
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indirect expropriation
646 
and to distinguish non-compensable regulation from indirect 
expropriation.
647
 
As Paparinskis has remarkably mentioned, ‘if indirect expropriation is viewed 
through the lens of direct expropriation, it is natural to look at the effect of State’s 
conduct’,648 since ‘substantial deprivation’ of foreign investment by a regulation is an 
essential requirement to qualify a state’s act as expropriatory.649 However, the sole 
focus on the detrimental effect on a foreign investment an allows overly broad 
interpretation of the prohibition of indirect expropriation disproportionally limiting 
the State’s capacity to safeguard people and the environment.  
Thus, for instance, the textbook example of ‘sole effects’ award is Metalclad v. 
Mexico.
650
 The dispute emerged from the rejection by Mexico to grant an operation 
permit for the previously approved hazardous waste landfill project, which met severe 
local resistance. The Tribunal evaluated, inter alia, the Ecological Decree issued by 
the local municipality establishing a rare cactus protection area on the investor’s 
property.  The Tribunal held that the analysis of the Ecological Decree was not strictly 
necessary or essential but it served ‘as a further ground for a finding of expropriation’.  
In this respect, the Tribunal found expropriatory effect of the Decree since it 
prohibited any commercial activity on the investor’s property and pronounced that it 
need ‘not decide or consider the motivation or intent of the adoption of the Ecological 
Decree’651 in order to establish indirect expropriation. 
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The Tribunal did not reflect on any qualifying elements for finding indirect 
expropriation. It did not consider the possible application of customary police powers 
exceptions, albeit the facts of the case suggest the Decree would not be justified as a 
police powers exception due to the lack of bona fide. The Tribunal also did not 
analyze the scope of the legitimate expectations of the investor, e.g., whether it was 
reasonably foreseeable that such a measure might be issued by the Municipality.  
Coupled with the unlimited indirect expropriation definition established earlier in the 
award,
652
 which was criticized as overly broad by the judge of the Supreme Court of 
British Columbia,
653
 and the later Fireman Funds v. Mexico award,
654
 the reasoning of 
the Metalclad Tribunal allows classifying as expropriatory almost every 
environmental and social regulation detrimentally affecting foreign investors. Such an 
interpretation of the indirect expropriation standard generates room for a conflict 
between the State’s investment protection obligations and the State’ regulatory 
responsibilities by permitting a suggestion that the interest of protecting foreign 
investment might trump the interest of protecting competing non-economic public 
interest.  
Another exemplary ‘sole effects’ award is Vivendi v. Argentina (Resubmitted).655 In 
Vivendi, the claim arose out of the troubled relationship between the parties to a 
concession agreement that privatized the water and sewage services of the Province of 
Tucumán in Argentina. The problems arose out of complex factual issues such as the 
increase of the tariffs by the investor and two incidents of water turbidity. Argentina 
claimed that its treatment of the investor, i.e. terminating the concession and 
supporting the customers not to pay the bills for contaminated water, fell within its 
regulatory activity ‘and that this is even more so the case when the service provided is 
as vital as the provision of water and sewage services’.656  
                                                 
652
 Ibid [103], where the Tribunal declared that ‘expropriation under NAFTA includes [...] also 
covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, 
in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property 
even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State’. 
653
 The Supreme Court of Columbia, judgment of 2 May 2001, United Mexican States v. Metalclad 
Corporation,  2001 BCSC 664 [99], available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/ documents/Metaclad-
BCSCReview.pdf).  
654
 Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. Mexico, Award, NAFTA, ICSID Case 
No.ARB(AF)/02/01, 17 July 2006 [177] footnote 164. 
655
 Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A and Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No.ARB/97/3, Award 20 August 2007, Resubmitted. 
656
  Ibid [3.3.3]- [3.3.5]. 
 141 
 
The Tribunal took a different approach and focused merely on the effects of the 
governmental measures, stating: 
There is extensive authority for the proposition that the state’s intent, or its subjective 
motives are at most a secondary consideration (...) While intent will weigh in favour of 
showing a measure to be expropriatory, it is not a requirement, because the effect of the 
measure on the investor, not the state’s intent, is the critical factor.657 
Even if it is true that there is no need to establish the intent to expropriate, which is 
rarely present in indirect expropriation cases or even explicitly denied by a State,
658
 
the Metalclad and Vivendi awards have unduly diminished the public purpose element 
and the general context of the interference in foreign investment to the intent to 
expropriate. In addition, the Vivendi award went on by stating that ‘[i]f public purpose 
automatically immunises the measure from being found to be expropriatory, then 
there would never be a compensable taking for a public purpose’.659  
This reasoning is problematic for the following reasons. Even if it is true that 
‘substantial deprivation’ of foreign investment is an essential requirement to qualify a 
state’s act as expropriatory, there are certain limitations to this stance. These 
limitations are the customary police powers exceptions (‘exceptions’ in this case is 
meant understanding not a legal instrument that allows to shift a burden of proof from 
one party to another but a commonly accepted subset of State measures that despite 
their deprivatory effect are non-compensable
660
) and the inner flexibility of the sub-
elements of the indirect expropriation standard like legitimate investment-backed 
expectations, allowing a limit to the scope of indirect expropriation. These are 
essential elements for taking into account the sustainable development objective of 
investment protection law. 
Within the limits of the particular cases, both the Metalclad and Vivendi awards 
overlook the application of the possible customary police powers exceptions and 
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seemingly confuse legitimacy criteria for the already established expropriation with 
the very establishment of the existence of indirect expropriation.
661
  
Defending States (like Mexico and Argentina in the above-mentioned awards) usually 
emphasize the existence of ‘public purpose’ as an indicative element of the 
application of customary police powers
662
 that is subject to a legitimacy assessment 
by tribunals and may exempt the governmental measure from being classified as 
expropriation. 
Notwithstanding uncertainty as to its application, it is a general principle that a State 
bears no responsibility for economic injury done to an alien within the commonly 
accepted police powers of the State.
663
 In a general or wider sense, police powers 
encompass all non-discriminatory and reasonable regulations for public purpose under 
the State’s sovereign powers without the effect of substantial deprivation of foreign 
investment.
664
 A narrower formulation of police powers (police powers exceptions) 
covers those internationally recognized measures that justify a state’s substantial 
interference with property rights, which would otherwise amount to a compensable 
deprivation of property,
665
 as far as these measures are non-discriminatory, reasonable 
and follow the due process of law.
666
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Thus, the exclusive focus on the detrimental effect permits an overly broad 
interpretation of the indirect expropriation standard, disproportionally limiting the 
State’s capacity to safeguard non-economic public interests, or it can even suggest 
that the interest of protecting foreign investment trumps the responsibilities of the host 
State to safeguard non-economic public interests. Consequently, some ‘new 
generation’ IIAs clearly integrate the need to move away from the ‘sole effects’ 
approach.
667
 Thus, some new generation IIAs declare that ‘although the fact that an 
action or series of actions by a Member State has an adverse effect on the economic 
values of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that such an expropriation 
has occurred’,668 requiring a determination of other relevant factors like the character 
of the governmental action and legitimate expectations. 
Similarly, several ‘new generation’ IIAs supplement the indirect expropriation clause 
with an explanation that ‘non-discriminatory regulatory measures of a Member State 
that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as 
public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect 
expropriations’.669 One may consider these explanatory sentences as a codification of 
customary police powers in ‘new generation’ IIAs. However, some IIAs supplement 
this kind of clause with a phrase that ‘except in rare circumstances’ these measures 
will not be considered as expropriatory,
670
 adding some confusion to the clarity of 
drawing the line between non-compensable regulation and indirect expropriation.
671
 
Only Canada Model BIT contains an explanation that ‘except in rare circumstances’ 
relates to the existence of an ‘individual and excessive burden’ on foreign investor’.672 
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Few other ‘new generation’ IIAs explicitly indicate that a public purpose as a legitimacy 
criterion of indirect expropriation refers to a concept in customary international law and 
shall be interpreted in accordance with international law.
673
  
There is not yet an interpretation of these kinds of clauses in arbitral jurisprudence; 
however, they are apparently aimed at codifying customary police powers doctrine 
and indicating the necessity to move away from the sole effect approach.  
To conclude, the pure ‘sole effects doctrine’ leaves no room for non-economic public 
interest concerns entering into the legal process of deciding whether or not the taking 
of an investment has occurred. Thus, without disagreeing with the outcome of the 
awards, the sole effects approach that the Metalclad and Vivendi Tribunals applied in 
reaching their conclusions contradicts the sustainable development principle requiring 
integration of economic, social and environmental matters.  
Instead of a careful balance between the contradicting interests of States and 
investors, the sole effects doctrine leaves the impression that foreign investment 
protection might trump the protection of other societal interests,
674
 contributing to the 
concerns of fragmentation of international investment law and regulatory chill in the 
host countries.
675
  These tensions in their turn have contributed to the hostility against 
investment treaty arbitration being made material by, for instance, Bolivia, Venezuela, 
Ecuador and Australia.
676
  
Therefore, the ‘sole effects’ approach is no longer a suitable methodology for 
establishing the existence of indirect expropriation. In its place, sustainable 
development context of investment protection necessitates methodologies that 
integrate the surrounding circumstances of the interference in the investor’s property 
and other qualifying elements, like the exercise of customary police powers, the 
                                                 
673
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character of the governmental action and the scope of investor’s legitimate 
expectations,
677
 in the assessment of the existence of indirect expropriation. 
3.4.2. Proportionality doctrine 
 
One may call the second method that is developed by arbitral jurisprudence for 
establishing the existence of indirect expropriation a proportionality doctrine since it 
argues for proportionality (or balancing) between the importance of the public 
purpose and the effects on the investor by the measure.  
In investor-state arbitration, the proportionality approach in the assessment of indirect 
expropriation was first developed by the Tribunal in Tecmed v. Mexico.
678
 The 
Tecmed case dealt with the non-renewal of the investor’s operation licence of a 
hazardous waste facility. Mexico classified the non-renewal as a legitimate regulatory 
measure within the highly regulated and extremely sensitive framework of 
environmental protection and public health.
679
   
Similar to Metalclad v. Mexico, the Tribunal stressed the paramount importance of the 
effect of the state’s regulation to decide whether indirect expropriation took place.680 
The Tribunal found a significant deprivation of the investment by the Municipality’s 
non-renewal of the licence, since it made the investor’s assets and rights impossible to 
exploit, depriving them of any economic value.  
However, in contrast to Metalclad v. Mexico, the Tribunal proceeded with the analysis 
of the alleged expropriatory character of the governmental action (as it was required 
under the applicable BIT between Spain and Mexico
681
) and analyzed the 
Municipality’s motives for the non-renewal of the licence that Mexico claimed to be 
an environment protection and social emergency.
682
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 US-Colombia FET, Annex 10-B, paragraph 3(a). See also Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de 
Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. and The Argentine Republic, Decision on Liability, 30 
July 2010, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, UNCITRAL Rules [134]. 
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 Ibid [115]. The Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments signed by 
the Kingdom of Spain and the United Mexican States (December 18, 1996) Section 5(1): ‘any other 
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Tecmed’s argumentation on the character of the non-renewal of the licence may be 
divided into two parts.  
First, in the context of the social emergency argument, the Tribunal approved as 
undisputable the principle that ‘the State’s exercise of its sovereign powers within the 
framework of its police power may cause economic damage to those subject to its powers 
as administrator without entitling them to any compensation’.683  Since the Tribunal found 
no evidence supporting allegations by Mexico that the claimant’s actions had raised a real 
social crisis in the municipality, the application of the non-compensable police powers 
exception was rejected,684 as noted in the paragraph 147 of the Award:  
The actions undertaken by the authorities to face these socio-political difficulties, 
where these difficulties do not have serious emergency or public hardship 
connotations, or wide-ranging and serious consequences, may not be considered 
from the standpoint of the Agreement or international law to be sufficient 
justification to deprive the foreign investor of its investment with no compensation 
[..].  
So, the Tecmed Tribunal approved the existence of police powers in the narrower 
sense, namely, the conditions under which even the substantial deprivation of the 
investor’s property is non-compensable. However, the Tecmed Tribunal did not 
consider the alleged environmental emergency as falling under the exercise of police 
powers in a narrower sense.  
Second, as regards the environmental protection motivation for the termination of the 
licence, the Tribunal stated that the exercise of the State’s regulatory powers is subject to 
legitimacy review under international law,685 since:  
[W]e find no principle stating that regulatory administrative actions are per se 
excluded from the scope of the Agreement, even if they are beneficial to society as a 
whole —such as environmental protection—, particularly if the negative economic 
impact of such actions on the financial position of the investor is sufficient to 
neutralize in full the value, or economic or commercial use of its investment without 
receiving any compensation whatsoever.
686
 
                                                 
683 
ibid [119]. In paragraph 139, the Tribunal explained that under international law expropriation 
would not be found in a case where the substantial interference in property was done because of a 
serious urgent situation, crisis, need or social emergency. 
684
 Tecmed v Mexico [144], 146], referring to Case Elettronica Sicula S.p.A (ELSI) (United States 
of America v. Italy), July 20, 1989, ICJ Reports, 1989 and [147]. 
685
 ibid [120]. 
686 
ibid [121] referring to Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v Republic of Costa Rica, 
ICSID case No. ARB/96/1 [72], which represents the ‘sole effects’ approach. 
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As a next step, the Tribunal famously held that for a domestic measure to be 
legitimate under international law ‘[t]here must be a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor and the 
aim sought to be realized by any expropriatory measure’.687 The Tribunal continued:  
To value such charge or weight, it is very important to measure the size of the 
ownership deprivation caused by the actions of the state and whether such 
deprivation was compensated or not.
688
 
For this reason, the Tribunal examined whether the investor had to bear ‘an individual 
and excessive burden’689 holding that it actually had since the termination of the 
licence did not serve the stated environmental protection purpose but was rather a 
politically motivated action,
690
 the investor was deprived of its property and no 
compensation was received by the investor.
691
 Even more, the Tribunal took into 
account that previously, when the investor was found to violate the licence, the 
responsible authorities applied a fine that was deemed to be reasonable and appropriate to 
the importance of the violation.692 Therefore, the investor was found to bear ‘an 
individual and excessive burden’ and the expropriation was considered to be illegal. 
In essence, the Tecmed Tribunal used proportionality analysis as a legitimacy criterion 
of the exercise of the State’s regulatory powers, suggesting that in case there is a 
substantial deprivation of foreign investment, payment of compensation is a necessary 
element of the achievement of proportionality. Thus, the Tribunal linked 
proportionality balancing with the level of interference in foreign investment and 
whether the interference is compensated or not. 
It is argued here that there is a methodological problem with the Tecmed’s 
employment of the proportionality analysis. First of all, the Tecmed Tribunal provided 
no argumentation as to why the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to refer to the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR and its proportionality analysis, and why such a reference 
                                                 
687 
Tecmed v Mexico [122]. 
688
 ibid. 
689
 ibid [122], footnote 143. 
690 
ibid [127]. To compare, the Tribunal in AES Summit Generation Limited AES-TISZA ERӧmü 
KFT v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award, September 23, 2010 [10.3.24], 
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ibid [149]. 
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was justified under the applicable BIT.
693
 Thus, for instance, the Tribunal in 
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. Mexico has referred to the Tecmed award and 
has challenged the applicability of proportionality analysis under NAFTA in 
interpreting the indirect expropriation standard:  
The factor [proportionality analysis] is used by the European Court of Human 
Rights [...] and it may be questioned whether it is a viable source of interpreting 
Article 1110 of the NAFTA.
 694 
Hence, one may suggest the Tecmed proportionality analysis was an autonomous 
interpretation of the applicable treaty provision. Nevertheless, the Tecmed approach of 
introducing the language of proportionality in the indirect expropriation standard has 
been adopted by several later arbitral awards.
695
   
Thus, the Tribunal in Azurix v. Argentina case,
696
 which developed from various 
governmental activities related to the concession agreement of water and sewage 
systems, addressed the question of whether a measure that is legitimate and serving a 
public purpose can amount to a compensation claim under the expropriation 
standard.
697
 The Azurix Tribunal was confused with the principle that states ‘are not 
liable for economic injury that is the consequence of bona fide regulation within the 
accepted police powers of the State’.698 The Tribunal did not see the difference 
between the second and the third step of indirect expropriation assessment, as one 
may see in the following quote: 
                                                 
693
 S R Ratner, ‘Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of Fragmented 
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The argument made by the S.D. Myers tribunal is somehow contradictory. 
According to it, the BIT would require that investments not be expropriated except 
for a public purpose and that there be compensation if such expropriation takes 
place and, at the same time, regulatory measures that may be tantamount to 
expropriation would not give rise to a claim for compensation if taken for a public 
purpose.
699
 
Since the Tribunal did not see the difference between the establishment of the very 
existence of indirect expropriation and the assessment of legitimacy of regulatory 
measures or expropriation, it decided to complement the public purpose criterion with 
the proportionality test requiring to ‘bear a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized’.700 The Tribunal 
stated that ‘these additional elements provide useful guidance for purposes of 
determining whether regulatory actions would be expropriatory and give rise to 
compensation’.701 The expropriation claim was rejected because the investor did not 
lose the attributes of ownership
702
 and, thus, there was no expropriatory effect. 
Therefore, the Tribunal did not apply the proportionality analysis in practice. 
In LG&E Energy v. Argentina, which developed from Argentina’s crisis management 
measures that affected the privatized natural-gas transport and distribution service, the 
Tribunal stated ‘that there must be a balance in the analysis both of the causes and the 
effects of a measure in order that one may qualify a measure as being of an 
expropriatory nature’.703  The Tribunal referred to the Tecmed balancing requirement 
between two competing interests – ‘the degree of the measure’s interference with the 
right of ownership and the power of the State to adopt its policies’704 – in order to 
draw the line between expropriation and legitimate regulation. The LG&E Tribunal 
noted: 
With respect to the power of the State to adopt its policies, it can generally be said 
that the State has the right to adopt measures having a social or general welfare 
purpose. In such a case, the measure must be accepted without any imposition of 
                                                 
699
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700
 Ibid [311] footnote 257 referring to James and Others, sentence of February 21, 1986 [50], [63], 
and Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. 
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liability, except in cases where the State’s action is obviously disproportionate to 
the need being addressed.
 705
 
It continued by reference to paragraph 122 of the Tecmed v. Mexico award and stated 
that the degree of interference in the foreign investment ‘has a key role upon deciding 
the proportionality’.706 
Since the Tribunal did not find a substantial deprivation of LG&E’s investment,707 it 
did not elaborate more on the characteristics of Argentina’s measures, namely, the 
context and the host State’s purpose and their proportionality to the interference in 
foreign investment. 
Similarly, in Continental Casualty v. Argentina, which arose out of the pesification of 
financial assets and devaluation of the peso as tools for fighting the social and 
economic crisis in Argentina in 2001-2002, the Tribunal proposed proportionality 
analysis as a legitimacy criterion of the exercise of the State’s regulatory powers. 
The Continental Tribunal considered doctrinal approaches for drawing the line 
between expropriation and non-compensable legitimate regulatory interference in 
property rights.
708
 The Tribunal stated that governmental regulations do not rise to 
State liability provided that they do not affect property in an intolerable, 
discriminatory or disproportionate manner,
709
 namely, in cases where ‘these 
restrictions do not impede the basic, typical use of a given asset and do not impose an 
unreasonable burden on the owner as compared with other similarly situated property 
owners’.710  
As a result, and since these governmental actions did not amount to expropriatory 
effect,
711
 the Tribunal held that the pesification of the investor’s deposits fell under 
the monetary sovereignity of Argentina as ‘typical government regulations of property 
entailing mostly inevitable limitations imposed in order to ensure the rights of others 
or of the general public’.712 
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In EDF v. Romania,
713
 which dealt with the anti-corruption regulation abolishing 
duty-free activities within airports, the Tribunal admitted that the measure was falling 
within police powers of the State taken in the legitimate public interest since the 
measure was directed at fighting corruption.
714
 Nevertheless, for the exercise of police 
powers to be legitimate, the Tribunal added: 
[I]n addition to a legitimate aim in the public interest there must be “a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to 
be realized”; that proportionality would be lacking if the person involved “bears 
an individual and excessive burden.”715  
The Tribunal held that the proportionality requirement was met and there was no 
individual and excessive burden on the investor because the prohibition of the duty-
free operations affected only a limited part of the investor’s business activity. 716 
Finally, the very recent Occidental v. Ecuador award,
717
 dealing with Ecuador’s 
termination of a participation contract because of the investor’s improper transfer of a 
share without governmental authorization for the transfer of rights, required that: 
[A]ny such administrative goal must be balanced against the Claimants’ own 
interests and against the true nature and effect of the conduct being censured. The 
Tribunal finds that the price paid by the Claimants – total loss of an investment 
worth many hundreds of millions of dollars – was out of proportion to the 
wrongdoing alleged against OEPC, and similarly out of proportion to the 
importance and effectiveness of the “deterrence message” which the Respondent 
might have wished to send to the wider oil and gas community.718  
 
Accordingly, the Tribunal found violations of both the FET standard and the indirect 
expropriation standard.
719
 
3.4.2.1.Critical Assessment of the Tecmed’s proportionality analysis 
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On the whole, the Tecmed award can be praised for introducing the language of 
balancing between the interests of the State and those of the investor within the 
indirect expropriation standard
720
 that was adopted in several later arbitral awards.  
Nevertheless, the practical application of the Tecmed proportionality analysis does not 
help to bring clarity for distinguishing between a non-compensable regulation and a 
compensable expropriation, by taking into account a broader context other than the 
economic one, in order to avoid regulatory chill detrimentally affecting local and 
international community.  
This is so since the Tribunal had established that the key aspect of its proportionality 
assessment and its ‘individual and excessive burden’ element is the level of 
interference in the foreign investment and whether the interference was compensated 
or not.  
To be exact, the way the ‘individual and excessive burden’ test was applied by 
Tecmed (and its approving awards) indicates that the proportionality criterion would 
not be met in the case of an investor who did not receive compensation for a 
substantial deprivation of its investment. Even if the compliance with the public 
interest requirement was met (which was not the case at hand), the failure to pay 
compensation for the substantial interference with property rights would render the 
deprivation non-proportional.
721
 Thus, the Tecmed Tribunal had used proportionality 
analysis as a legitimacy criterion of expropriation, suggesting that in case there is a 
substantial deprivation of foreign investment, the payment of compensation is a 
necessary element for the achievement of proportionality and, thus, legitimacy. 
That is a circular argument going back to the ‘sole effects’ approach: the 
proportionality assessment is minimized to the legitimacy evaluation of the 
governmental action, which is set as a supplementary element to the paramount 
effects criterion, namely, in case there is a substantial deprivation of a foreign 
investment that is not compensated, the Tecmed approach suggests the measure is 
disproportional and hence, illegal.  Therefore, Tecmed proportionality assessment also 
                                                 
720 
However, the Tribunal did not justify the employment of proportionality assessment inspired by 
international human rights law, see Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v Mexico, Award, NAFTA, 
ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/02/01, 17 July 2006, [174(j)] footnote 161. 
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mixes the second and third step of the assessment of an indirect expropriation 
claim.
722
  
Form the methodological point of view, Tecmed v. Mexico did not justify its 
employment of the ECtHR inspired proportionality assessment, unlike what was done 
by the arbitral tribunal in Continental v. Argentina, where the reference to the 
weighing and balancing method in WTO law was justified by the textual similarities 
between the norms. 
Although the similarities between investment protection against uncompensated 
expropriation and property rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European 
Convention on Human Rights are undeniable,
723
 there is a sharp difference between 
the two legal regimes which lies in the influence of the proportionality analysis on the 
compensation of expropriated property (see infra
724
). Under European human rights 
law proportionality analysis and its element of ‘individual and excessive burden’ is 
allowed to influence the amount of compensation due to the affected individual. It is 
not possible under the network of IIAs, since they explicitly provide for full market 
value compensation in cases where the existence of expropriation is found. 
Tecmed’s application of the proportionality analysis within the evaluation of the 
expropriatory effect is also against the logic of the balancing of interests as it is used 
in constitutional courts with respect to property rights. Thus, for instance, tobacco 
producers asked the Australian High Court to assess whether the recently enacted 
plain packaging law is expropriatory in its character as it goes against the Constitution 
of Australia.
725
 In this matter, the Court started its assessment with the base question – 
whether the plain packaging law is to be characterized as one for the acquisition of 
trade marks of tobacco companies, and noted that this question ‘is not answered by a 
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test of proportionality’.726 The Court found that the law did not have an effect of 
acquiring trade marks; they remained with the plaintiffs, albeit subject to severe 
restrictions on use. Therefore, the proportionality assessment was not necessary. 
Finally, the Tecmed’s proportionality assessment does not integrate non-economic 
interests in the judgement of whether expropriation has taken place. That judgement is 
exclusively dependant on the detrimental effect on foreign investment, which in the 
Tecmed case was found to be non proportional because it was uncompensated.  
Moreover, Tecmed’s proportionality assessment has no influence on the amount of 
compensation for expropriation which is in contrast to the proportionality assessment 
under the European human rights system.
727
 Tecmed’s proportionality analysis does 
not propose an application of weighing and balancing in case an effect of substantial 
deprivation is found so as to possibly exempt the compensation requirement or to 
minimize the compensation for the interference in the investor’s investment.  
Argentina has proposed this stance inspired by human rights law
728
 in Vivendi v. 
Argentina (Resubmitted),
729
 and Siemens v. Argentina
730
 but this approach has not 
been taken up by the investment tribunals (dealt infra
731
). 
Nevertheless, Tecmed’s proportionality assessment has inspired the drafting of ‘new 
generation’ IIAs that reflect the necessity to shift away from the narrow focus on 
economic interests in foreign investment protection. Thus, for instance, ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement (CIA) states that the determination of whether 
                                                 
726
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an indirect expropriation has taken place (second step of the assessment of an indirect 
expropriation claim) requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among 
other factors, the economic impact of the challenged governmental measure, prior 
commitments given by a host State towards a foreign investor and ‘the character of 
the government action, including, its objective and whether the action is 
disproportionate to the public purpose’.732 In contrast to the Tecmed v. Mexico 
proportionality assessment, ASEAN CIA approach is welcome from the sustainable 
development perspective because it separates proportionality assessment from the 
economic impact assessment and indicates that the proportionality assessment must be 
taken in light of the public purpose, and not in light of the economic impact of the 
measure. Consequently, it means paying attention to more than the economic context 
in the establishment of indirect expropriation. 
To conclude, the Tecmed v. Mexico and its approving awards have linked the 
individual and excessive burden test with the level of interference in the foreign 
investment generally holding that non-compensated substantial deprivation of foreign 
investment is unproportional. This logic unjustifyingly limits the criteria that could be 
taken into account in assessing whether an individual investor suffers an excessive 
burden that needs to be redressed.  
The option discussed later in the thesis is to provide balancing analysis within the 
legitimate expectations sub-element of the FET or indirect expropriation standards as a 
more appropriate place for balancing between the private interests of the investor and the 
interests of the state that are covered by the sustainable development objective of the 
network of IIAs. 
3.4.3. Context doctrine 
 
A string of arbitral rulings take a much more cautious approach with regard to the 
paramount ‘effects’ requirement than the sole effects doctrine and complements it 
with other equally important considerations. In contrast to the ‘sole effects’ awards, 
‘context doctrine’ awards lay particular stress on the circumstances in which the 
indirect expropriation claim arises and they have referred to a ‘public purpose’ as an 
                                                 
732 
Annex 2, paragraph 3 of the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, available at 
<http://www.aseansec.org/documents/ASEAN%20Comprehensive%20Investment%20Agreement%20(
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indication of the exercise of a state’s non-compensable customary rights to 
regulate.
733 
Thus, in a moderate version of ‘context doctrine, the Tribunal in S.D.Myers v. 
Canada
734
 acknowledged ‘that international law makes it appropriate for tribunals to 
examine the purpose and effect of governmental measures’ and that ‘[i]t must look at 
the real interests involved and the purpose and effect of the government measure’.735 
In Total v. Argentina, the Tribunal shared a similar approach and took into account 
the purpose and the causes of the measures taken by the State together with their 
adverse effects on the foreign investment.
736
 In this particular case, the Total Tribunal 
justified the Argentina crisis management measures under the indirect expropriation 
standard and declared: 
The Tribunal shares the dominant approach followed by international tribunals, 
that is to take into account also the purpose and the causes of the measures taken 
by a State (together with their adverse effects on the foreign investment).
737
 
The same method is represented in another Argentina crisis award – Suez v. 
Argentina,
738
 which arose out of the treatment by Argentina of the water services 
concession during and after the crisis.
739
In its assessment of the existence of indirect 
expropriation, the Tribunal characterized the effects criterion ‘as an important element 
in determining if the measure constitutes an expropriation requiring compensation’740 
but not as the sole element. In contrast to Metalclad v. Mexico and Vivendi v. 
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Argentina (Resubmitted), the Suez v. Argentina Tribunal commenced its 
argumentation with ‘general considerations’ and indicated that the Concession was 
meant to balance two interests, namely, to attract foreign capital and know how 
assuring private investors the opportunity to earn a reasonable profit, on the one hand, 
and to assure the efficient provision of water and sewage service at low costs 
preserving a certain degree of regulatory discretion for the authorities on the other.
741
 
Against this initial deliberation on the balancing of interests, the Tribunal 
acknowledged the necessity to distinguish between regulatory measures having an 
effect of expropriation
742
 and a valid exercise of a customary non-compensable 
State’s regulatory powers743 concluding that Argentina’s crisis management measures 
were within the general police powers and did not constitute a permanent and 
substantial deprivation of the investment. As regards the termination of the 
Concession, the Tribunal noted it was contractual in nature, thus, the investor’s claim 
under the indirect expropriation standard failed.
744
 
As regards investment claims that involve restrictions of previously allowed activity 
or a termination of a foreign investor’s business, ‘context doctrine’ awards start their 
analysis of an indirect expropriation claim by paying due respect to ‘the principle that 
a State does not commit an expropriation and is thus not liable to pay compensation to 
a dispossessed alien investor when it adopts general regulations that are “commonly 
accepted as within the police power of States”’,745 even if ‘that makes it uneconomical 
to continue a particular business’.746 
This emphasis of the exercise of a State’s regulatory powers has sometimes been 
mistakenly understood as supporting an automatic and general exemption from 
compensation to all bona fide, reasonable and non-discriminatory general 
regulations.
747
 Therefore, ‘context doctrine’ is often criticized as an extreme pro state 
approach unnecessarily limiting a foreign investor’s rights.748  
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One may reject this criticism as ungrounded by paying scrupulous attention to the 
leading awards representing the ‘context doctrine’ – they have not found substantial 
deprivation of foreign investments.
749
  
For instance, the Tribunal in Feldman v Mexico started its analysis on indirect 
expropriation by emphasizing the general rule providing that such traditional types of 
property rights restrictions as reasonable regulation for public purpose, could be 
harmful but do not carry consequences under international law.
750
 
The tribunal stated: 
[G]overnments must be free to act in the broader public interest through protection 
of the environment (...), imposition of zoning restrictions and the like. Reasonable 
governmental regulation of this type cannot be achieved if any business that is 
adversely affected may seek compensation, and it is safe to say that customary 
international law recognizes this (...).
751
 
Further, the Tribunal concluded that ‘not all government regulatory activity that 
makes it difficult or impossible for an investor to carry out a particular business, 
change in the law or change in the application of existing laws that makes it 
uneconomical to continue a particular business, is an expropriation under Article 
1110’.752 However, the Tribunal checked whether there is an expropriatory effect of 
the investor’s property and found that the investment was not substantially 
deprived.
753
 
Similarly to Feldman, and in sharp contrast to the Metalclad v. Mexico award, the 
Methanex v.US Tribunal famously declared: 
[A]s a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a 
public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which 
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affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory 
and compensable unless specific commitments had been given by the regulating 
government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the 
government would refrain from such regulation.
754
   
This dictum has been criticized as too ‘radical’, exaggerating the importance of a 
state’s exercise of its regulatory powers. Critics insist that the Methanex Tribunal 
failed to consider the economic impact of the Californian regulation on the investor in 
deciding whether expropriation took place. Critics also maintain that the decision did 
not pay attention to the burden of costs – whether the investor should have to bear the 
full costs of these regulations or whether it would be more appropriate to shift these 
costs, at least in part, to society.
755
  
This view cannot be supported, since the Methanex Tribunal did consider the 
economic impact of the regulation and whether that effect could be reasonably 
foreseen by the investor. 
In a largely overlooked paragraph of the Methanex award, the Tribunal found no 
substantial deprivation of the investor’s property by the Californian ban.756 
Accordingly, the Methanex award does not propose a general exemption from 
compensation of all reasonable, non-discriminatory general regulations. It merely 
approves the application of police powers in a wider sense where there is no 
substantial deprivation of foreign investment.
757
  
Another arbitral award dealing with a restriction of a previously allowed commercial 
activity is Glamis Gold v. US,
758
 where California imposed new measures for gold 
mining, demanding a complex environmental and cultural impact assessment, and 
requiring complete backfilling and restoration of the mining site in order to protect the 
Quechan Indians religious and cultural heritage and historic sites in the investment 
area. These measures resulted in greater operation costs of the goldmine and thereby 
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diminished the amount of the expected profits. For these reasons, Glamis alleged 
indirect expropriation of its mining rights but the Tribunal noted that ‘a State is not 
responsible, however, for loss of property or for other economic disadvantage 
resulting from bona fide […] regulation […] if it is not discriminatory’.759 As in 
Methanex v. US, there was no existence of ‘substantial deprivation’ of the investor’s 
property, since the investor’s losses were not significant enough to establish 
expropriation.
760
 
In sum, the above-mentioned arbitral jurisprudence reflects the application of non-
compensable police powers in a wider sense, namely, without substantial deprivation 
of the investor’s investment.  
With regard to a suppression of a previously legal activity as an action covered by 
police powers exceptions, there are two important aspects. First, the Restatement 
Third suggests that comparison of practices of major legal systems and international 
guidelines may serve as a justification of the challenged regulation
761
 which because 
of its harshness would not otherwise be justifiable.
762
 Applying similar logic and 
comparing legal systems, the Tribunal in Telenor v. Hungary, the case which involved 
the reorganization of the Hungarian public telephone service, dismissed the 
expropriation claim, inter alia, because ‘the type of arrangement set up by the 
Hungarian Government for universal service provision was not dissimilar to those 
established in a number of other jurisdictions, both within and outside Europe’.763 
Secondly, one may argue police powers exception for the suppression of activity was 
theoretically approved in the Chemtura v. Canada award dealing with Canada’s 
regulatory phase-out of the controversial agro-chemical lindane.  
Even if the Tribunal did not find a substantial deprivation of the investor’s 
investment, since ‘the sales from lindane products were a relatively small part of the 
overall sales of Chemtura’,764 it did pay particular attention to the general 
circumstances of the interference in foreign investment.
765
 The Tribunal took into 
account the fact that the ban was non-discriminatory, in compliance with due process 
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and based on widely accepted scientific data recognizing lindane as a dangerous 
chemical that over the years many countries had taken steps to ban the use of lindane, 
and that the ban was necessitated by Canada’s international environmental 
obligations.
766
  
For these reasons the Tribunal stated that ‘[i]rrespective of the existence of a 
contractual deprivation, [...] a measure adopted under such circumstances is a valid 
exercise of the State’s police powers and, as a result, does not constitute an 
expropriation’.767  
Thus, the Chemtura award supports the position that legitimate suppression of 
previously legal activity which destroy an investor’s business may exempt a host state 
from the obligation to pay compensation.
768
 Nevertheless, the Tribunal recognized a 
limitation to this stance – compliance with the investor’s legitimate expectations. The 
Tribunal held that the exercise of a state’s police powers would be non-compensable 
‘unless specific commitments had been given by the regulating government to the 
then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the government would 
refrain from such regulation’.769  
To conclude, the ‘context doctrine’ (unlike the ‘sole effects’ doctrine) explicitly 
recognizes customary limitations on the indirect expropriation standard, namely, the 
application of police powers in both a broader and narrower sense, thus respecting a 
host State’s responsibilities to safeguarding non-economic public interests. Hence, the 
‘context doctrine’ is the most compatible with sustainable development as a 
‘conceptual framework’ of investment law because it allows the incorporation of 
wider societal concerns other than merely the investor’s protection to the application 
and interpretation of the indirect expropriation standard.   
It also needs to be kept in mind that the application of the ‘context doctrine’ on its 
own does not provide a clear answer on the legal consequences in case substantial 
deprivation is found. Nevertheless, the doctrine lays particular emphasis on the 
investor’s legitimate expectations element, which functions as a limitation or 
extension to which the State may exercise its non-compensable regulatory powers. It 
is argued later in the thesis that exactly this element has the inherent flexibility that 
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not only has a potential to embrace the balancing between investor’s and State’s 
interests, but it also has a capacity to a make more scrupulous adjustment of the legal 
consequences in cases where an expropriatory effect is found, e.g., whether lost 
profits are available.
770
 
3.4.4. Interim conclusions on the methods for assessing an indirect expropriation 
claim 
 
Arbitral jurisprudence has developed various methodologies for the assessment of the 
existence of indirect expropriation. A common problem that these methodologies 
have is that they often perplex legitimacy criteria for already established 
expropriation, the very establishment of indirect expropriation and legitimacy 
assessment of non-compensable state’s powers to regulate in the public interest. 
Consequently, this situation has created uncertainty with respect to the scope of the 
indirect expropriation standard and has minimized the trust in these methodologies to 
address the existing tension between investment protection standards and regulatory 
space left for the host States to regulate in the public interest. Nevertheless, the 
sustainable development objective provides guidelines for screening these 
methodologies with regard to their compatibility with the clarified object and purpose 
of the investment protection regime.  
Thus, the ‘sole effects’ doctrine appears to be the least compatible methodology for 
the achievement of the overall sustainable (economic) development objective. 
Sustainable development as the objective of investment protection regime implies that 
the regime ‘must benefit all’771  not merely foreign investors, especially in case of 
application of ‘old school’ BITs that do not contain explicit references to safeguarding 
wider societal interests other than foreign investment protection. Consequently, the 
sustainable development objective extends the scope of the criteria to be taken into 
account for the assessment of the content of an indirect expropriation standard and its 
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sub-elements. For instance, public purpose as a legitimacy criterion of expropriation, 
legitimate expectations, non-investment obligations of the host state, a comparative 
approach of other states experience and investor’s own conduct together are the 
criteria that must be taken into account when deciding on the existence of 
expropriation or, in case of its existence, for the causation of the necessary 
compensation (SPP v. Egypt and Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania approach).  
In sharp contrast, some notable ‘sole effects’ doctrine awards attempt to limit the 
scope of the above-mentioned criteria by focusing solely on the ‘substantial 
deprivation’ element. Thus, the Metalclad v. Mexico, Santa Elena v. Costa Rica and 
Vivendi v. Argentina (Resubmitted) interpretations of ‘public purpose’ are overly 
restrictive. They ignore the theoretical existence of customary police powers 
exceptions, i.e., non-compensable regulations, despite their deprivatory effect, which 
is in sharp contrast to the ‘context doctrine’ awards like Methanex v. US, Saluka v. 
Czech Republic and Chemtura v. Canada, awards that have referred to a ‘public 
purpose’ as an indication of the exercise of a state’s non-compensable customary 
rights to regulate. 
Secondly, the ‘sole effect’ doctrine overlooks the role the existence of ‘public 
purpose’ can have on the scope of legitimate expectations of the affected investor, 
quite the opposite to the SPP v. Egypt Tribunal which has referred to the existence of 
a ‘public purpose’ as part of the legitimacy assessment of expropriation as having a 
consequential impact on the expectations of the compensation due for the 
expropriated property.  
Finally, from the broader perspective, ‘sole effects’ doctrine appears to ignore the 
public dimension of investment arbitration that implies a necessity to provide a 
process that gives space for weighing competing factors, such as investment 
protection and public interests, which cannot be achieved by an exclusive focus on the 
property interests of foreign investors. Thus, the sole effects doctrine is outdated and 
not serving the clarified object and purpose of the IIAs regime. 
Further, Tecmed’s inspired proportionality doctrine in its current way of application 
does not integrate non-economic interests in the judgement of whether expropriation 
has taken place. That judgement is exclusively dependant upon the detrimental effect 
on foreign investment as the key aspect of Tecmed’s ‘individual and excessive 
burden’ element. This logic limits, without a justification, the criteria that could be 
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taken into account in assessing whether an individual investor suffers an excessive 
burden that needs to be redressed.  
Finally, the ‘context doctrine’ is the most open method for integrating various 
conflicting considerations in the assessment of the very existence of indirect 
expropriation that integrates the balance between the host State’s responsibilities to 
safeguard non-economic public interests and its limiting element – investor’s 
legitimate expectations. 
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CHAPTER 4. INHERENT FLEXIBILITY OF THE INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION 
STANDARD - LEGITIMATE INVESTMENT-BACKED EXPECTATIONS 
INTRODUCTION  
The ‘conceptual framework’ of sustainable development promotion within the 
interpretation of investment protection guarantees requires the incorporation of wider 
societal concerns than purely economic ones. Arbitral jurisprudence is diverse 
regarding the incorporation of wider societal concern. Therefore, it is argued that 
sustainable development perspective allows excluding as inappropriate that line of 
arbitral jurisprudence which concentrates narrowly on foreign investment protection. 
The chapter is designed to prove that methodologically the most appropriate way to 
incorporate wider societal concerns in setting the scope of the indirect expropriation 
standard is through the effective interpretation of its legitimate expectations element.  
Similarly, it is argued that the effective treaty interpretation principle, implying 
interpretation of a treaty as a whole whilst paying particular respect to its context,
772
 
requires deliberate consideration of sustainable development as an aim to be achieved.  
The sustainable development objective entails certain guidelines and a direction to be 
followed – the integration of economic interests and non-economic interests.  
Consequently, it implies certain ‘pushing and pulling’ of the scope of substantive 
provisions of the treaty, for instance, allowing an argument for a broader or narrower 
interpretation of a treaty term
773
 in order to fulfil the objective of sustainable 
development.  
Legitimate expectations for legal stability element embeds the conflict between the 
host state’s regulatory autonomy and investor interests for a predictable and stable 
legal framework. While filling legitimate expectations with content in specific cases, 
numerous arbitral awards have seen it as containing an inherent flexibility that allows 
integrating nuanced factual circumstances in the decision of whether the host State 
has violated investment protection guarantees.  
This chapter is structured in the following way: it begins with establishing the link 
between legitimate expectations and the indirect expropriation standard. The 
following section explains the particular focus on legitimate expectations for legal 
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stability and indicates the two prerequisites for the existence of legitimate 
expectations – specific assurances towards the investor to induce an investment and 
the existence of a protected right. Then it proceeds to analyze sub-elements of 
legitimate expectations for legal stability, which have been gradually identified by 
arbitral jurisprudence. These elements are factual circumstances surrounding 
investment (general knowledge about business and the legal framework in the host 
State), competent businessman criterion and the investor’s own conduct. Further, the 
chapter analyzes the ways in which a handful of arbitral tribunals have used these sub-
elements for integrating a certain balancing analysis between the rights of investors 
and the duties of States in the assessment of the existence of the investor’s legitimate 
expectations for legal stability. Finally, special attention will be paid to the balancing 
exercise that tribunals have used in order to justify substantial regulatory changes that 
are in formal violation of prior commitments. The chapter concludes that filling the 
legitimate expectations for stability element contains an intrinsic balancing 
mechanism, which may and must be used for bringing the indirect expropriation 
standard in line with the objective of sustainable development. 
4.1.Link between legitimate expectations and indirect expropriation 
 
Several investment treaty tribunals, analyzed in turn below, use legitimate 
expectations as an important tool for drawing the line between commercial risk that 
has to be borne by a foreign investor and political risk which should be shifted to the 
host State.
774
  
The instrument of legitimate expectations forms part of the FET standard. The 
landmark Waste Mangement II award
775
 notes that FET standard is expressed through 
the evaluation of its elements – arbitrariness, unfairness, unjustness, discrimination, 
lack of due process, complete lack of transparency
776
 and whether a State has acted ‘in 
breach of representations made by the host State which were reasonably relied on by the 
claimant’.777 
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The legitimate expectations element may play a significant role in the determination 
of whether indirect expropriation has taken place; its importance for this purpose is 
indicated by the National Grid v. Argentina award:
778
 
[T]he prohibition against indirect expropriation should protect legitimate 
expectations of the investor based on specific undertakings or representations by 
the Host State upon which the investor has reasonably relied. This is by no means 
an exclusive test to be applied to all types of alleged indirect expropriations in 
isolation of other relevant factors. It is, nonetheless, a useful guiding principle that 
appears to cover many of the situations that have come before the modern 
investment treaty tribunals.
779
 
In line with Methanex v. US
780
 and Merrill v. Canada,
781
 the content of legitimate 
expectations is interchangeable for both indirect expropriation and FET standards; 
hence, it is analyzed under both investment protection guarantees. 
The respect for investor’s legitimate investment-backed expectations also participates 
in the appraisal of whether an application of the host State’s police powers in a broad 
and narrow sense is done in a legitimate manner – in good faith782 and in a non-
arbitrary way.
783 
 
Last but not least, the legitimate expectations standard has a capacity to serve for the 
adjustment of the amount of compensation in a case of indirect expropriation or a 
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violation of the FET standard,
784
 for instance, whether lost profits are available. Thus, 
an investor’s legitimate expectations introduce some flexibility with respect to 
compensation despite the full market value compensation requirement in the current 
network of IIAs.  
Because of these multiple functions, the content of legitimate expectations has an 
influence on various stages of an assessment of whether potential violation of a 
foreign investor’s rights has occurred. All the more important, several arbitral 
tribunals have used legitimate expectations element in a way that allows for a nuanced 
analysis and integration of non-investment considerations into investment protection 
law by balancing the interests of the investor and those of the State.
785
 Thus, it will be 
analyzed further in the chapter with an insistance that balancing has become a 
requirement that is justified by, and stems from, the sustainable development 
objective and principle and, hence, its application needs to be deliberate and effective 
with respect to the integration of economic and non-economic concerns. The most 
popular frame of balancing between competing public and private interests is the 
proportionality principle; however, there is no agreement on the justification of the 
application of proportionality analysis within investment treaty law. That said, it is 
argued here that the sustainable development objective provides for a clear and 
predictable justification of balancing analysis within the indirect expropriation 
standard that is missing from those who are proponents of adopting variations of 
proportionality analysis in investment arbitration which is dealt with in detail in the 
following chapter.  
4.2. Stability and predictability of a business and legal regime as part of 
legitimate expectations 
 
For the present study the most important aspect of legitimate investment-backed 
expectations relates to an investor’s legitimate expectations for stability of a legal and 
business framework in a host country. On the one hand, expectations for a legal 
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stability element reflects the underlying clash between an investor’s interest in a 
predictable legal framework of its long-term business activity in a State.
786
 On the 
other hand, it encompasses respect for a host State’s interest to retain its regulatory 
flexibility.
787
 
Arbitral tribunals have varied significantly in their interpretation of this element. On 
one end of the spectrum there is the Tecmed Tribunal. Through its interpretation it 
limited most the scope of manoeuvre of the host State to regulate matters in public 
interests. The Tribunal has stated: 
[T]he foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free 
from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, 
so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern 
its investments.
788
 
In other words, the Tecmed dictum requires a regulatory and administrative perfection 
from the host State; the legal effect of such a stringent interpretation might amount to 
de facto freezing of a legal regime at status quo when the investment was made. 
Therefore, this pronouncement is much criticized and not supported in most of the 
subsequent awards. Already in the Oscar Chinn case the PCIJ noted: 
[f]avourable business conditions and good-will are transient circumstances, 
subject to inevitable changes; [...] No enterprise [...] can escape from the chances 
and hazards resulting from general economic conditions.
789
 
In contrast to the Tecmed approach, some other tribunals have emphasized that the 
expectations for legal stability embrace the idea that the State will use its regulatory 
powers when needed.
790
 For instance, the Tribunal in Impregillo v. Argentina award 
noted that the FET standard and its legitimate expectations criterion ‘cannot be 
designed to ensure the immutability of the legal order, the economic world and the 
social universe’.791 This idea is supplemented by the AES v. Hungary award, which 
established that any reasonably informed business person or investor should recognize 
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that ‘laws can evolve in accordance with the perceived political or policy dictates of 
the times’.792 
Thus, one may consider the Tecmed dictum to be an autonomous interpretation of the 
FET standard in the particular BIT. The more traditional interpretations of legitimate 
expectations state that ‘[n]o investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances 
prevailing at the time the investment is made remain totally unchanged’,793 and ‘any 
businessman or investor knows that laws will evolve over time,’794 and they might 
detrimentally affect the investor.
795 
Even more, in AES v. Hungary, arbitrators ruled 
that the Energy Charter Treaty, which unlike most of the IIAs contains a reference to 
legal stability in its preamble, did not require regulatory and administrative 
‘perfection’ by the host State. Quite the contrary, the Tribunal established that the 
State’s acts or omissions need to be ‘manifestly unfair or unreasonable’ in order to 
violate the FET standard and its legitimate expectations for the legal stability 
element.
796
 
In view of the above, one may conclude that the Tecmed stringent approach to the 
content of legitimate expectations is rejected by the later arbitral jurisprudence as not 
reflecting lex lata. Even more, the post–Tecmed Tribunals appear to support even 
dramatic changes in the regulatory environment affecting a foreign investor in case no 
specific assurances to the contrary effects are given to the investor and if a regulation 
is bona fide and non-discriminatory. 
To conclude, legitimate expectations of legal stability do not function as a 
stabilization clause and reliance on them intrinsically entails the probability that the 
host State will adopt measures within its sovereign powers. 
4.3. Prerequisites: specific assurances and existence of a protected right 
 
The standard of legitimate expectations does not cover ‘every hope’ by an investor.797 
There are two prerequisites of the existence of legitimate expectations: the existence 
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of specific assurances by a State towards an investor to induce an investment and the 
existence of a protected right. 
The dominant base for an investor’s expectations is specific assurances given to an 
investor by a State. Arbitral jurisprudence has constantly emphasized the existence of 
specific representations or ‘promises’ given to an investor in order to induce an 
investment that are later violated by the State.
798
 Thus, in its assessment of the 
suppression of the investor’s business, the Methanex Tribunal stated, ‘it is relevant 
that the treatment is in breach of representations made by the host State which were 
reasonably relied upon by the claimant’.799  
If a foreign investor acquires specific rights to pursue investment activity like a 
concession contract (contractual commitments),
800
 licence (authorizations) or other 
specific assurances by a host State,
801
 these assurances create the strongest evidence 
on what the investor could reasonably rely upon. Their unilateral violation by the host 
State will lead to the conclusion of a violation of the investor’s legitimate 
expectations and, accordingly, to a violation of the FET and/or indirect expropriation 
standard. 
In exceptional circumstances, a host State may also create limited expectations for 
legal stability through laws or regulations of a general character that are not 
specifically addressed to a particular investor.
802
  In the same vein, the Total v. 
Argentina Tribunal specified that this could occur in case of regimes, which are 
applicable to long-term investments, and the protection of legitimate expectations 
would stem from ‘legitimate fairness’ and ‘regulatory certainty’ principles.803 
Otherwise legitimate expectations for legal stability are not protected if general 
legislation is modified, unless there is an individual and excessive burden on the 
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individual (‘unusual damage’) that goes beyond the inherent risk of a given economic 
activity.
804
  
In arbitral jurisprudence it is further clarified that if regulatory fairness is not 
compromised, an investor’s sole reliance on general domestic regulations at the time 
of making its investment is not enough to establish legitimate expectations for legal 
stability.
805
 In this respect, the Tribunal in Continental Casualty v. Argentina has held 
that ‘general legislative statements engender reduced expectations, especially with 
competent major international investors in a context where the political risk is high’, 
since ‘[t]heir enactment is by nature subject to subsequent modification’.806 In 
Continental, the claim arose out of the investor’s complaint about the freezing of bank 
deposits and their pesification during the crisis
807
 as a breach of the investor’s 
legitimate expectations for ‘a stable legal and business environment’.808 The investor 
founded its claim on a series of acts and pronouncements by Argentina’s officials that 
the convertibility regime of Argentina would not change. The Tribunal rejected this 
part of the claim
809
 and also added that ‘political statements have the least legal value, 
regrettably but notoriously so’.810 
Other criterion that an investor must establish in order to reasonably rely on the 
expectations for legal stability is the existence of a protected right. Legitimate 
expectations may only exist to protect a certain right that an investor has acquired.
811
 
For instance, in Suez v. Argentina,
812
 the investor had a legitimate right to expect tariff 
adjustments; this right was established in the Concession agreement, namely ‘a 
document which certainly embodies the Claimants’ legitimate expectations, as well as 
those of Argentina’.813 Since Argentina did not attempt to adjust tariffs during and 
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after the financial and social crisis in 2001-2002, the majority Tribunal found a breach 
of FET through the violation of the investor’s legitimate expectations814 (rejecting 
Argentina’s necessity defence under customary international law815). 
In contrast, in Feldman v. Mexico, the investor was driven out of his business as a 
result of the elimination of a tax rebate on the export resale of cigarettes. The Tribunal 
held that: 
[T[he facts [...] appear to support a finding of an indirect or creeping 
expropriation. The Claimant [...] is no longer able to engage in his business [...] 
and has thus been deprived completely and permanently of any potential economic 
benefits from that particular activity.
816
  
Nonetheless, the Tribunal did not find expropriation in the present case since the 
export of cigarettes was not a right of the investor protected by law for which the 
investor could have legitimate expectations.
817
 Consequently, the Tribunal classified 
the situation merely as a business problem and not as a compensable expropriation.
818
  
To conclude, initial criteria that must be fulfilled for establishing the existence of 
legitimate expectations are the following: the existence of specific assurances towards 
the investor to induce investment, like licences or concession agreements, and the 
existence of a protected right.
819
 If a host State induces investment by promising a 
stable legal regime, State limits its regulatory powers in case of changing 
circumstances,
820
 and unilateral violation of these expectations creates legal 
consequences under international law. Therefore, a host State takes responsibility for 
the extent to which it contracts away its police powers.  
4.4. Balancing an investor’s expectations for legal stability and a State’s right to 
regulate 
 
Arbitral jurisprudence has rather clearly established that investor’s legitimate 
expectations for legal stability do not imply freezing of the regulatory environment in 
the host State, however, they function as a limitation of the State’s discretion to change 
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the regulatory environment of an investor’s business area.821 Thus, in Continental 
Casualty v. Argentina, the Tribunal was asked to evaluate if abrupt and fundamental 
changes made by Argentina to the exchange and currency regime, because of the 
2001-2002 economic crisis, by blocking bank accounts, pesifying deposits and 
restructuring financial instruments resulted in the breach of the investor’s legitimate 
expectations for legal stability under the FET standard.
822
 The Tribunal ruled that 
even though the preamble of the BIT contained the reference to the respect for legal 
stability, it would be against the effective treaty interpretation principle to interpret 
that clause in a way that would bar Argentina from changing domestic regulations in 
case of a crisis.
823
  
Customary international law grants a right to States to issue regulations for public 
purpose. In this respect a State enjoys a significant margin of appreciation. The 
existence of a margin of appreciation, in essence, means that national authorities due 
to their democratic legitimacy, institutional competence and expertise are better 
placed than international ones in judging what is in the public interest.
824
 Thus, the 
S.D. Myers v. Canada Tribunal has famously established that the determination of the 
breach of FET standard under the NAFTA ‘must be made in the light of the high 
measure of deference that international law generally extends to the right of domestic 
authorities to regulate matters within their own borders’.825  
This right of the State to regulate for public interest is, therefore, a necessary element 
to be taken into account and weighed for the assessment of whether an investor’s 
expectations for legal stability are reasonable and legitimate.  The Suez v. Argentina
826
 
Tribunal has remarkably noted that this weighing means the inclusion within the 
investor’s expectations that also ‘the expectation that the Argentine government 
would exercise its legitimate regulatory interests with respect to the AASA 
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Concession (of water distribution) throughout the period of thirty years and in 
response to unpredictable circumstances that might arise during that time’.827  
To conclude, the existence and scope of an investor’s legitimate expectations does not 
exclude a State’s customary right to regulate – it merely limits it. The tools for 
determining the fair and balanced extent of the limitations imposed by legitimate 
expectations is analyzed in the following section. 
4.5. Inherent flexibility of legitimate expectations for legal stability through its 
sub-elements  
 
The aim of this section is to indicate those sub-elements of legitimate expectations, 
the interpretation of which, in light of the sustainable development context, allows 
room for the integration of economic and non-economic aspects and through which 
‘pushing and pulling’ of the scope of the indirect expropriation standard may take 
place. 
It is true that arbitral tribunals have interpreted the legitimate expectations element 
discordantly with respect to its strictness on the ability of host States to change 
regulations or to adapt to changing factual circumstances, with a detrimental effect on 
foreign investors.
828
 At the same time, they have gradually clarified and necessitated 
several key qualifying sub-elements of the content of legitimate expectations. 
Understanding what the content of these sub-elements is helps to assess if future 
changes in fact and law which diminish the value of foreign investment become 
compensable.  
The section starts by indicating the mentioned elements claiming they contain the 
inherent flexibility for taking into account wider interests than merely economic ones. 
The following elements will be addressed here in turn: general knowledge about the 
business and legal framework in the host State
829
 including the State’s level of 
development,
830
 the fact that investment is made in a previouslyhighly regulated area, 
and the investor’s own conduct and competence.831  
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The chapter proceeds with the analysis of the methods of balancing between the 
interests of the investors and the States, as applied by various arbitral tribunals within 
consideration of these sub-elements of legitimate expectations.   
4.5.1. Factual circumstances surrounding investment: general knowledge about 
business and the legal framework in the host State as the investor’s risk 
 
The first of the sub-elements – general knowledge about business and the legal 
environment in the country at the time the investment was made, allows for 
distinguishing between the commercial risk, that is on the investor, from the 
compensable political risk.   
For instance, in Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine, the Tribunal took into account that 
Ukraine was a developing country and, thus, rejected the indirect expropriation claim 
based on the bureaucrat conduct of the Ukraine authorities.  It emphasized that: 
The Claimant was attracted to the Ukraine because of the possibility of earning a 
rate of return on its capital in significant excess to the other investment 
opportunities in more developed economies. The Claimant thus invested in the 
Ukraine on notice of both the prospects and the potential pitfalls. Its investment 
was speculative.
832
  
In Parkerings v. Lithuania, the Tribunal focused on Lithuania’s transition from the 
Soviet regime to European Union membership, implying the probability of legal 
change of which the investor was supposed to know,
833
 hence rejecting the investor’s 
legal stability claim.  
Similarly, in Genin v. Estonia, the Tribunal set the context in which the dispute arose: 
[N]amely, that of a renascent independent state, coming rapidly to grips with the 
reality of modern financial, commercial and banking practices and the emergence 
of state institutions responsible for overseeing and regulating areas of activity 
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perhaps previously unknown. This is the context in which Claimants knowingly 
chose to invest in an Estonian financial institution.
834
  
In general, the assessment of the reasonableness of an investor’s legitimate 
expectations for legal stability is not isolated from the country’s prevailing political, 
socio-economic, cultural and historical conditions.
835
  
As regards the sustainable development context, it is suggested that the knowledge of 
the pre-existing regulatory environment is not necessarily limited by the national 
regulatory environment; it may also extend to the international regulatory 
environment of the investor’s business activity. In this respect the Chemtura v. 
Canada award sheds some light on how the comparative approach may be taken into 
account. The Chemtura award took into account the practice of other states and the 
existence of various international conventions on banning lindane, even if it did not 
analyze the scope of the legitimate expectations of the investor, namely, the effect of 
various national and international restrictions or bans of lindane going back to the 
1970.s and alerting investors of the risk to pursue lindane business. This served as 
proof for widely accepted scientific data on the harmful effect on health of lindane, 
and hence, it was a part of the legitimacy assessment of Canada’s regulatory measure.  
Thus, in cases where the investor’s business activity has been highly regulated 
internationally or in other legal systems but not yet in a host State, and if the host 
State changes its regulatory environment in line with the international values, a 
‘competent’ investor should not consider it as a sudden and unexpected change836 
unless the host State has given specific assurances for that kind of legal stability. 
What results from the above-mentioned arbitral jurisprudence imposes a significant 
burden on the investor as a ‘competent businessman’ to know the environment in 
which the investor chooses to invest, and realize and face the inherent risks of the 
investor’s intended investment. Therefore, one may conclude that the ‘competent 
businessman’ criterion requires an investor to embrace not only domestic but also 
international regulation of the relevant investment area. 
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4.5.2. Competent businessman criterion and an investor’s own conduct 
 
IIAs ‘are not insurance policies against bad business judgements’.837 Hence, 
arbitrators often focus on the investor’s own conduct and on what may be reasonably 
expected from a competent investor in order to determine the reasonability of the 
investor’s legitimate expectations for stability. 
Thus, for example, in the above-mentioned Genin v. Estonia, the crux of the claim 
was the revocation of the investor’s banking licence. The revocation was fuelled by 
the credibility gap, which the investor had created by not disclosing to the relevant 
authorities the necessary information about the ownership of its investment.
838
 The 
Tribunal took this aspect into account when denying a violation of the FET standard.  
Other tribunals have focused on what a ‘competent businessman’ is supposed to do in 
order to transfer a business risk into a compensable political risk. Thus, in Continental 
Casualty v. Argentina, the Tribunal rejected the investor’s reliance on political and 
general legislative statements as non-reasonable. The Tribunal emphasized that the 
investor was a ‘competent major international investor’, implying it was assumed to 
know that its investment involved a probability of political risk.
839
 Therefore, the 
investor’s reliance merely on a general regulation without securing any specific 
assurances by the State was not reasonable. 
Likewise, the Tribunal in Total v. Argentina focused on the timing of Total’s 
investment as a barring factor for reasonable legal stability expectations for regular 
tariffs adjustments in the gas sector.
840
 The investor invested in Argentina at the 
beginning of the crisis in 2001, when various limitations to tariff adjustments were 
already in place.
841
 This aspect, coupled with the existence of no specific promises for 
legal stability,
842
  led the Tribunal to conclude that Argentina did not violate the 
investor’s legitimate expectations and acted reasonably within its police powers 
during the peak of the crisis by pesifying and freezing the gas tariffs.
843
 
In comparison, under the European human rights law, legitimate expectations of the 
affected individual play a significant role in the ‘excessive and individual burden’ 
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assessment, and the ECtHR will not find an individual and excessive burden if the 
applicant could expect an element of commercial risk that has materialized. For 
instance, in Pine Valley Developments Ltd and Others v. Ireland, the claim originated 
from the invalidation of the planning permission for the development of the 
applicant’s property by the State’s Supreme Court. The ECHR considered that: 
The applicants were engaged on a commercial venture which, by its very nature, 
involved an element of risk [...] and they were aware not only of the zoning plan but 
also of the opposition of the local authority... to any departure from it. This being 
so, the Court does not consider that the annulment of the permission without any 
remedial action being taken in their favour can be regarded as a disproportionate 
measure.
844
 
Similarly, the general knowledge of the legal framework of a particular business area 
was taken into account in rejecting the expropriation claim in Fredin v. Sweden. The 
ECtHR held that the amendments to the laws regulating revocation of gravel 
exploitation permits that had been in force for more than ten years were a justified 
non-compensable control of use of property. The ECtHR gave emphasis to the fact 
that it was general knowledge that over the years, the exploitation of gravel had 
become more and more restricted.
845
  
Several investment tribunals have applied a similar analysis of legitimate expectations 
even though not within the framework of proportionality analysis and its ‘individual 
and excessive burden’ element. Thus, the Methanex v.US and Glamis Gold v. US 
Tribunals rejected the investors’ expectations for legal stability due to the well known 
fact that environmental regulations in California were gradually becoming more 
stringent, as analysed below. 
In sum, one may conclude that the foreign investor as a ‘competent businessman’ 
bears a significant burden to show that the alleged legitimate expectations for legal 
stability are actually legitimate, and that the investor’s own conduct does not deter it 
from  relying on the expectations.  
In this respect the clarified sustainable development objective allows shaping the 
content of the ‘competent investor’ criterion and arguably permits the extension of the 
meaning of what actions may be considered as bad business judgements. 
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Firstly, a ‘competent businessman’ would not expect that a host State would act 
contrary to the object and purpose of the investment protection regime, including its 
sustainable development objective. Since attention is also paid to the investor’s own 
conduct, the investor is supposed to act in compliance with the objective of 
sustainable development, for which the very investment protection is granted. Thus, 
‘competent investors’ are required to know and rely on their expectations not only on 
the economic aspects of their business activity but also on its social and 
environmental context. This context may be domestic or international, taking into 
account general tendencies with regard to the particular investment activity. For 
instance, extensive administrative procedures and impact assessments might be 
necessary as an inherent element of the particular investment activity in cases where 
the investment relates to the extraction or use of natural resources or affects other 
significant public interests. 
Secondly, the ‘competent businessman’ test must allow the internalizing of risks of a 
particular investment activity. This means that if post-investment changes of the legal 
environment deals with inherent risks of the particular investment activity, then the 
changes should not bear any consequences on the host State, unless specific 
assurances to the contrary effect are given by the State. For instance, in cases where 
the international best practice standard or a common practice of many states requires 
social or environmental impact assessments that is later adopted in a host State 
affecting the performance of foreign investment or even prohibiting it, such changes 
may qualify as something a competent investor could and should predict and take into 
account. For instance and hypothetically, the compensation for expropriation in the 
Santa Elena v Costa Rica
846
 award might have been adjusted differently if the 
Tribunal had taken into account the general knowledge about the factual 
circumstances, namely the fact that Costa Rica had longstanding commitments and 
efforts to expand an international reserve park by including the investment area.
847
  
4.5.3. Investment in a previously highly regulated area 
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Several arbitral awards have emphasized that there is no ground for an investor’s 
expectations for legal stability in cases where the investor has invested in a highly 
regulated business area without securing any stability assurances by the host State.  
For instance, in Methanex v. US, dealing with California’s suppression of trade in a 
controversial gasoline additive, production of which was a foreign investor’s 
investment, the Tribunal accentuated that Methanex ‘entered a political economy in 
which it was widely known, if not notorious, that governmental environmental and 
health protection institutions (...) continuously monitored the use and impact of 
chemical compounds and commonly prohibited or restricted the use of some of those 
compounds for environmental and/or health reasons’.848 
Since there were no commitments for legal stability given by California to induce the 
Methanex investment, the Tribunal denied the existence of legitimate expectations for 
legal stability in its assessment of the indirect expropriation claim.
849
  
Similarly, the Tribunal in Glamis Gold v. US rejected the investor’s legal 
predictability claim under the FET standard because of the lack of any specific 
assurances for legal stability, and furthermore, because of the general knowledge that 
‘California is a particularly highly regulated environment with respect to 
environmental  measures in general, and mineral exploration in particular’.850 
4.5.4. Interim conclusions 
 
Arbitrators have extracted several sub-elements of the legitimate expectations 
principle focusing on general knowledge about the business and the legal framework 
in the host State, a pre-existing knowledge of the regulatory environment of the 
investment area and the investor’s own conduct and competence. Some legal 
commentators have suggested that a progressive interpretation of some of these sub-
elements may function as an effective tool for incorporating the interests of all those 
who are affected by the foreign investment in the scope of the relevant investment 
guarantees.
851
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Extending the idea of a progressive interpretation of these elements, the study 
suggests that effective treaty interpretation principle, namely the principle which 
requires such an interpretation of a treaty term that secures the effectiveness of the 
aim of the treaty,
852
 is now specifically guided by the integration element of 
sustainable development. This proposition has two main consequences. Firstly, it is 
now an obligation and not a choice to integrate in the interpretation process of 
investment guarantees the interests of both the local and international communities in 
the field of human rights, the environment, cultural heritage and health protection. 
Secondly, since the sustainable development objective rejects the ‘self-contained’ 
approach to investment law, considerations of international and comparative law 
elements are justified and even necessary in setting the scope of legitimate 
expectations for legal stability. 
4.6. Use of various methods of balancing  in the assessment of whether legitimate 
expectations for legal stability are protected 
 
Legitimate expectations for the legal stability element do not contract away a host 
State’s right to exercise its police powers (unless specific commitment to that 
particular effect is given to the investor); however, it functions as a limitation of the 
State’s discretion to change the regulatory environment of the investor’s business 
area.
853
 Therefore, filling the legitimate expectations element with content in a 
specific case necessarily leads to a certain balancing exercise between these two 
interests. 
As a logical consequence, within the assessment of the potential violation of the FET 
standard some arbitral tribunals have noted that there needs to be ‘a weighing of the 
Claimant’s legitimate and reasonable expectations on the one hand and the 
Respondent’s legitimate regulatory interests on the other’.854 This balancing has taken 
place in determining whether an exercise of a right of a State to regulate the general 
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welfare through enacting, modifying or cancelling a law at its own discretion
855
 is 
limited by the need to safeguard the investor’s reliance that nothing will change in the 
regulatory regime of its investment. Thus, it has played the key role for drawing the 
line between the commercial risk that has to be borne by a foreign investor and the 
political risk which should be shifted to the host State.  
In view of the above, the aim of this particular section is to analyse possibilities of the 
integration of economic and non-economic interests through the balancing techniques 
that are applied by some arbitral tribunals in relation to legitimate expectations for the 
legal stability element under FET and indirect expropriation standards. Even more, it 
is claimed that these balancing techniques should be applied intentionally in other 
similar factual situations, and their application must be guided by the integration 
principle of economic and non-economic interests. 
The section is structured in the following way – it starts with an overview of 
balancing analysis and proceeds with the analysis of the application of various 
methods of balancing within the legitimate expectations element by investment treaty 
tribunals. The section concludes with a claim that the integration element of 
sustainable development requires and justifies a balancing of interests of the state and 
the investor in setting the scope of indirect expropriation as an inherent element, 
instead of being an outside methodology that needs to be justified as a custom or 
general principle of law in order to be applicable in investment arbitration. 
4.6.1. Overview: prerequisites and variations of balancing analysis 
 
The most accurate mode of balancing is proportionality analysis as developed by 
national constitutional courts. In a modified way it is adopted by several international 
courts and tribunals. The proportionality test is generally understood as a best-practice 
method or framework of legal interpretation and decision-making in case of a conflict 
of two principles or public policy objectives of equal normative value.
856
 It functions 
as a judicial review mechanism of governmental measures. 
Robert Alexy, who has constituted the basic conceptual foundations of proportionality 
analysis, defines it as an optimization requirement instead of ‘all-or-nothing’ way of 
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solving normative conflicts. That is to say, in cases of a collision or a competition of 
principles it is required that both of them are realized to the greatest extent possible 
given the legal and factual possibilities.
857
 Traditionally, proportionality consists of 
three sub-principles – suitability, necessity or the requirement not to go further than is 
needed for achieving the stated aim, and proportionality in the narrower sense. In 
cases where all of these three elements are applied in the proportionality analysis, it is 
called a three-tier proportionality test. Within the ‘proportionality in the narrower 
sense’, Alexy distinguishes the ‘law of balancing’ or in other words, the principle that 
‘[t]he greater the degree of nonsatisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the 
greater must be the importance of satisfying the other.’858 ‘Law of balancing’, thus, 
implies taking into account several relevant aspects like the importance of the right 
affected and the right protected, the degree and length of interference and the 
availability of alternative measures that might achieve the same end with less 
restrictive means.
859
 
In practice, international courts and tribunals have applied various modifications of 
proportionality analysis in comparison to the one analyzed by Alexy and which have 
traditionally been employed by domestic constitutional courts. For instance, the 
ECtHR applies proportionality analysis within the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine to 
determine whether a State has abused its scope of discretion when imposing 
limitations on human right guarantees.
860
 The WTO Dispute settlement bodies apply 
modified proportionality analysis in relation to general exceptions from trade rules 
under GATT Article XX, focusing on two-tiers – suitability and necessity, and in 
particular on the ‘available less restrictive alternative’ element within the necessity 
analysis.
861
 The ECJ applies proportionality analysis for analysing the legitimacy of 
limitations that EU Member States impose on EU fundamental freedoms
862
 and the 
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ICJ uses proportionality analysis for the assessment of the legitimacy of use of force 
and countermeasures.
863
 
4.6.2.Proportionality analysis in investment law: pros and cons 
 
A number of investment arbitral tribunals have incorporated the idea of balancing or 
even referred to the proportionality test as a method of reasoning in the application of 
various investment protection standards.
864
 
With respect to proportionality analysis in international investment protection law, 
there are two basic lines of thought dividing the investment expert circles. There are 
those who are against proportionality analysis and those who see the proportionality 
test as a rational argumentation method employable in investment arbitration. 
Those who are against proportionality balancing in investment treaty arbitration see 
proportionality analysis as a legal tool that is appropriate only for legal systems of 
high judicialization, and thus not available for institutionally different ad hoc 
arbitrators limited by the consent of the disputing parties.
865
 They disagree in 
particular with the application of the ‘law of balancing’ in Alexy’s sense, since 
arbitral tribunals are too far removed from the reality of host States in order to 
undertake an assessment of proportionality stricto sensu that necessarily implies 
making policy choices;
866
 it is the function for which investment arbitrators do not 
have a democratic legitimacy. Further, it is noted that there are significant differences 
in the treaty texts that are subject to proportionality assessment; therefore it is not 
appropriate to directly transfer argumentation methods used by one dispute settlement 
body under a specific treaty to another.
867
 Nevertheless, some scholars see limited use 
of proportionality analysis consisting of first two tiers of suitability and necessity fit 
for investment arbitrations, since it would provide a predictable framework of 
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legitimacy assessment of state’s measures and, by not going into the proportionality 
stricto sensu, the principle of deference would be tolerated.
868
 
Those who argue for adopting proportionality analysis in investment treaty arbitration 
insist that the role of arbitrators has changed from merely serving the claiming parties 
to serving as agents of the community of States participating in the network of 
IIAs.
869
 It is indicated that a gradual judicialization process of investment treaty 
arbitration has taken place,
870
 allowing and even requiring adopting legal 
argumentation methods that are usually used in legal systems of high 
judicialization.
871
 Furthermore, investment treaty arbitrators are already 
accommodating variations of balancing analysis in the interpretation process of some 
investment guarantees, what Stone Sweet calls ‘flirtation with proportionality 
balancing’.872 For instance, arbitrators in Tecmed v. Mexico got inspiration from the 
ECtHR proportionality and applied it in the indirect expropriation analysis; the 
National Grid v. Argentina and Total v. Argentina awards used proportionality 
language for determining the scope of legitimate investment backed expectations 
under FET, and Continental Casualty v. Argentina referred to the two-tiered 
                                                 
868
 Schill Stephan W, ‘Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Reconceptualizing the Standard 
of Review through Comparative Public Law’, SIEL, Working Paper No. 2012/33, available 
<http://www.ssrn.com/link/SIEL-2012-Singapore-Conference.html> (accessed on 15 August 2012). 
869
 Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’ s New Frontier’, Law & Ethics of 
Human Rights, Volume 4, Issue 1, 2010, Article 4; Andreas Kulick, Global Public Interest in 
International Investment Law, (CUP 2012); Caroline Henckels, ‘Proportionality and the Standard of 
Review in Fair and Equitable Treatment Claims: Balancing Stability and Consistency with the Public 
Interest”, SIEL Working Paper No.2012/27, available at http://www.ssrn.com/link/SIEL-2012-
Singapore-Conference.html , accessed on 31 March 2013. For instance, Henckels argues that 
proportionality analysis may be the most appropriate methodological approach for determining disputes 
that engage the competing interests of investors and host states in the context of fair and equitable 
treatment claims arising from a host states’ exercise of regulatory or administrative power. She argues 
that the employement of proportionality analysis that would be inspired by the ECJ, EctHR or WTO 
approaches would provide greater autonomy to host states to take measures in the public interest, yet 
would provide sufficient scrutiny to control misuse of public power through the identification of a host 
state’s actions taken with impermissible purposes or by ineffective or overboard measures. 
870
 Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’ s New Frontier’, Law & Ethics of 
Human Rights, Volume 4, Issue 1, 2010, Article 4, 54-59; Stone Sweet conceptualizes judicialization 
in investment treaty adjudication on four criteria: precedent system, the adoption of balancing 
techniques, admission of amicus briefs as an indicator of diffusion of interests affected by investment 
treaty arbitration and indicating the public law aspect, and the push for appellate supervision. See also 
E-U. Petersmann, ‘Multilevel Trade Governance Requires Multilevel Constitutionalism’, in 
Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulations, C.Joerges, E-U.Petersmann 
(eds.), 2006, 5; E-U. Petersmann, ‘Future of International Economic Law: A Research Agenda’, EUI 
Working Papers, Law 2010/06, available at http://ssrn.com, 19-28. 
871
 A.Stone Sweet, J.Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (2008-
2009) 47 Colum.J.Transnat’l L, 72, 162, A Stone Sweet, ‘Investor State Arbitration: Proportionality’s 
New Frontier’, 67-76. 
872
 Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’ s New Frontier’, Law & Ethics of 
Human Rights, Volume 4, Issue 1, 2010, Article 4. 
 187 
 
proportionality as it is applied by the WTO AB in the assessment of application of 
‘non-precluded measures’ clauses. Finally, advocates of proportionality analysis note 
that the proportionality test as a rational legal argumentation method provides 
structure and more predictability in the application of the vague investment standards, 
and it allows minimising ‘losses to looser’ in balancing the conflicting rights.873 
Therefore, it is suggested that its employment in investment treaty arbitration would 
improve the legitimacy of the international investment protection regime, which has 
suffered from such arbitral awards as Santa Elena v. Costa Rica and Metalclad v. 
Mexico, and would allow more careful analysis of the content of abstract investment 
guarantees.  
Notwithstanding the above, there is no agreement on the justification of the 
application of proportionality or other balancing analysis within the investment 
guarantees – those investment arbitral tribunals that employ balancing are often 
challenged as lacking a clear justification of the employment of balancing from the 
sources of law point of view, e.g., whether balancing is introduced as an outer method 
stemming from  customary law or general principles of law or it is an intrinsic part of 
investment treaty standards.
874
 
It is argued that balancing between the interests of an investor and those of a host 
State is induced by the sustainable development objective that requires a process by 
which economic and non-economic aspects of investment protection are mitigated 
and, thus, private-property oriented interests of foreign investors and other public 
interests are put into balance. It is argued here that the sustainable development 
objective has implications for justifying the balancing analysis within the indirect 
expropriation standard that is missing from those who are proponents of adopting 
variations of proportionality analysis in investment arbitration. Let us take an 
illustrative example, the earlier cited award highlighted by Stone Sweet with reference 
to proportionality analysis that is now applicable in investment arbitration is 
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Continental v. Argentina.
875
 Here, ‘flirtation with proportionality’ was justified, since 
Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT under consideration resembled Article XX of the 
GATT. Hence, the imitation of the two-tiered weighing and balancing under GATT 
Article XX was justified but it cannot be directly transmitted in the indirect 
expropriation standard.  
As regards the interpretation of the indirect expropriation standard, none of the pro-
proportionality proponents go beyond the criticized Tecmed proportionality analysis 
and its approving awards. Therefore, doubts remain whether it is an appropriate tool 
to be employed for this particular standard,
876
 and at which stage of indirect 
expropriation analysis it would be appropriate. That said, it needs to be kept in mind 
that the indirect expropriation standard functions as a rule and not as a principle. It is 
so because the determination of whether expropriation has taken place implies an ‘all 
or nothing’ approach, namely, whether the property is taken away or not, considerably 
limiting the space for a balancing analysis. Therefore, in case expropriation is found, 
there is no explicit place for proportionality balancing with respect to the amount of 
compensation unlike in the European human rights system under the right of 
property.
877
  
Therefore, the next section is designed to demonstrate the approach to balancing that 
is claimed to be appropriate for the indirect expropriation standard and that is 
inherently justified by the effective interpretation of the standard in light of the 
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sustainable development objective. It is argued that the balancing element is suitable 
and necessary within the interpretation process of the content of the investor’s 
legitimate investment-backed expectations that allows for the most nuanced way of 
integrating economic and non-economic considerations in the indirect expropriation 
standard. 
4.6.3. Case studies: balancing within the legitimate expectations for legal stability  
 
Balancing as an inherent constituent of legitimate expectations for legal stability is 
mainly brought to attention by several arbitral awards dealing with the crisis of 
Argentina in 2001-2002 and the consequent dramatic and unexpected changes in the 
business and legal environment. Investment tribunals have exercised a balancing 
analysis for setting the scope of legitimate expectations for legal stability in two 
situations – in the first scenario, significant changes to the legal framework of the 
investment were done without violating specific commitments given to an investor (as 
in Total v. Argentina,
878
 Continental v. Argentina
879
). In the other scenario, the State’s 
legal environment was changed in violation of prior commitments to the foreign 
investor (National Grid v. Argentina,
880
 Suez v. Argentina
881
). 
These Tribunals have employed various modifications of (proportionality) balancing 
between the investor’s expectations for legal stability and the State’s reasonable right 
to regulate for public interest in order to arrive at their conclusions about the scope of 
this standard. These balancing methods are analyzed in the subsequent sections, 
suggesting that one may adopt similar logic and methodology to integrate not only the 
context of an extreme financial crisis but also elements covered by the concept of 
sustainable development within the scope of legitimate expectations. 
4.6.3.1. Balancing in a case of no violation of prior commitments 
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In the recent Total v. Argentina award,
882
 the Tribunal used (proportionality) analysis 
as a general principle of law
883
 in assessing the scope of legitimate expectations and, 
thus, alleged violations of the FET and the indirect expropriation standard.  
The investor challenged the pesification of the gas tariffs based on the Emergency 
Law and the freezing of the gas tariffs during and after the social and economic crisis 
in Argentina in 2001-2002 as acts tantamount to expropriation and in violation of the 
FET standard. 
The Tribunal highlighted several legal principles that it applied to the facts of the case 
so as to evaluate Total’s claims. 
Firstly, the Tribunal engaged in the balancing exercise in order to assess whether the 
FET standard (legitimate expectations for legal stability) was breached by the changes 
to the Gas Regulatory Framework in the context of the severe economic emergency. 
The Tribunal noted that balancing ‘requires an assessment of the existence of a breach 
of the fair and equitable treatment standard taking into account the purposes, nature 
and objectives of the measures challenged, and an evaluation of whether they are 
proportional, reasonable and not discriminatory’.884  
As to the nature of the challenged measures, the Tribunal paid due respect to the 
importance of the context of regulatory change and the public interest pursued by the 
regulatory measure, which, in the case at hand, was Argentina’s unique social and 
economic crisis.
885
 The Tribunal took into account that the pesification of the tariffs 
was a non-discriminatory measure of general application to all sectors of the economy 
and justified it as being taken in good faith within the monetary sovereignty of the 
State ‘in a situation of recognized economic emergency of an exceptional, even 
catastrophic, nature’.886  Therefore, The Tribunal justified pesification and the 
freezing of tariffs during the peak of the crisis as a non-discriminatory, good faith 
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exercise of the State’s regulatory power887 which did not violate the investor’s 
legitimate expectations for legal stability,
888
 albeit these measures changed 
dramatically the regulatory environment of the investor’s business activity.  
Beforehand, the Tribunal analyzed the existence of Total’s legitimate expectations for 
legal stability, indicating that for legitimate expectations to exist, governmental 
‘promises’ made to a foreign investor need to be specific.889 In the case at hand, no 
promises were given to the investor not to pesify the gas tariffs,
890
 and even though 
the Convertibility Law was in force at the time of making the investment, there were 
no specific assurances sought by Total for its stability.
891
 
Secondly, and most importantly for the present study, the Tribunal noted that in the 
assessment of the fairness of the governmental action, the overall context and ‘the 
host State’s right to regulate domestic matters in the public interest has to be taken 
into consideration as well’,892  especially when a fundamental change of factual 
circumstances takes place. In this particular respect, the Tribunal invoked 
reasonableness and proportionality as relevant applicable standards
893
 that require ‘a 
weighing of the Claimant’s reasonable and legitimate expectations on the one hand 
and the Respondent’s legitimate regulatory interest on the other’,894 also taking into 
account the conduct of the investor. Here, the Tribunal declared that: 
Besides such an objective comparison of the competing interests in context, the 
conduct of the investor in relation to any undertaking of stability is also, so to 
speak “subjectively”, relevant. Tribunals have evaluated the investor’s conduct in 
this respect, highlighting that BITs “are not insurance policies against bad 
business judgements”.895  
In the end, the investor’s conduct barred it from the legitimate reliance on legal 
stability because at the time of the making of Total’s investment in Argentina, there 
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were several restrictions on the convertibility regime already in place.
896
 Therefore, 
the Tribunal held that the investor’s conduct was not reasonable: 
From a business point of view, an experienced international investor such as Total 
could not have considered these developments as irrelevant to the future stability of 
the PPI-adjusted US dollar gas tariffs. An objective risk analysis of the situation 
should have alerted Total that the stability of the gas regime was being undermined 
in practice from various directions.
897
 
Since there were no ‘specific stabilization promises to the foreign investor’ and the 
investor’s own conduct barred it from relying on any stability expectations through 
laws or regulations of a general character, the Tribunal concluded that the pesification 
of tariffs was fair ‘in the circumstances’ and ‘considering the inherent flexibility’ of 
the FET standard.
898
 
The same measures that Total challenged under the FET standard were also 
challenged under the indirect expropriation standard. Although Total failed to prove 
the substantial deprivation of its investment by pesification and Argentina’s failure to 
readjust gas tariffs after the peak of the crisis,
899
 the Tribunal once again noted that ‘in 
the absence of specific stabilization promises’ to the investor pesification was ‘a bona 
fide regulatory measure of general application, which was reasonable in light of 
Argentina’s economic and monetary emergency and proportionate to the aim of 
facing such an emergency’900 and, thus, it did not amount to a measure equivalent to 
expropriation.
901 
  
The Tribunal did not apply the three tier-proportionality assessment in Alexy’s sense, 
the balancing was less precise. Nevertheless, it established a link between the 
relevance of the context and nature (e.g., non-discrimination) of the measure and 
exemption of State liability. The Total Tribunal allocated balancing in the place where 
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real balancing of interests may take place, considering wider interests and 
circumstances than the private property interests of the investor. 
The same measures were also considered to be proportional and justified by the 
Continental v. Argentina award. Even if most of Argentina’s crisis management 
measures were covered by the ‘non-precluded measures’ clause under the applicable 
BIT,
902
 the Tribunal proceeded to distinguish those measures adopted by Argentina 
that were legitimate under the BIT, from those which were carved out because of the 
application of exceptions clause.
903
 Eventually the Tribunal concluded that the fixing 
of an exchange rate was a legitimate limitation to the use of property in the public 
interest not imposing ‘an unreasonable burden on the owner as compared with other 
similarly situated property owners’.904 The measure was not imposing an 
unreasonable burden on the investor because it was non-discriminatory, it was not in 
violation of prior commitments – the investor had no legitimate expectations for 
freezing the convertibility law in US dollars
905
 – and there was no substantial 
deprivation of the investor’s property.906  
In sum, the Total and Continental Tribunals noted that balancing requires taking into 
account the nature and objectives of the measures challenged. Argentina’s measures 
were justified since they were taken in the context of severe economic crisis and no 
stabilization promises were ever given to the investors. As a result, both Tribunals 
have indicated that in cases of a dramatic change in the regulatory environment the 
existence of specific prior commitments, non-discrimination and the general context 
of the measure are elements participating in the balancing process in order to see if 
the investor’s expectations for legal stability are violated (within the context of FET 
and the indirect expropriation standards). 
A comparable approach is adopted in the ‘new generation’ ASEAN Comprehensive 
Investment Agreement (ASEAN CIA
907
). It states that the determination of whether 
an indirect expropriation has taken place requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry 
that considers, among other factors, the economic impact of the challenged 
governmental measure, prior commitments given by a host State towards a foreign 
                                                 
902
 Continental v. Argentina [262], [266] [275]. 
903
 Continental v. Argentina [276]. 
904
 Continental v. Casualty [276]-[278]. 
905
 Ibid [279]. 
906
 Ibid [284]. 
907
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement 2009, available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/22218.htm (accessed on 31 March 2011), Annex 2, paragraph 3. 
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investor, and, ‘the character of the government action, including, its objective and 
whether the action is disproportionate to the public purpose’.  
These elements are supplemented by the high standard of behaviour and awareness of 
the surrounding circumstances that is expected from a competent investor. Competent 
investor’s criterion also implies an investor’s proactive conduct so as to secure its 
interests by specific commitments from the host State. 
It is argued that these balancing elements leave room for the potential integration of 
sustainable development related aspects within the scope of legitimate expectations 
and, thus, the indirect expropriation standard extending the scope of non-compensable 
commercial risk. Thus, the sustainable development objective and its integration 
element may effectively function as an interpretative tool to distinguish between 
compensable political and non-compensable commercial risk by ‘pushing and pulling’ 
the boundaries of these elements. 
For instance, it is already acknowledged that ‘the political, socioeconomic, cultural 
and historical conditions prevailing in the host State’ are important for the 
determination of the business context that the investor needs to be aware of.
908
 The 
integration element of sustainable development arguably allows interpreting the 
necessary knowledge of the relevant context also in light of domestic or international 
social and environmental aspects of the particular investment activity, e.g., the 
knowledge that it is restricted or prohibited in some countries or global best practice 
standards requires impact assessments of it. 
4.6.3.2.  Balancing of the investor’s and the State’s interests in the case where a 
formal violation of prior commitments has happened 
 
Generally, there would be a presumption of compensable ‘individual and excessive 
burden’ (using the terminology of the ECtHR909), ‘unusual damage’ (using the phrase 
from Total v. Argentina
910) or ‘unreasonable burden’ (as mentioned in Continental v. 
                                                 
908
 Duke Energy v. Ecuador [340]. 
909
 Under European human rights law, legitimate expectations of the affected individual play a 
significant role in the ‘excessive and individual burden’ assessment, and the ECtHR will not find an 
individual and excessive burden if the applicant could expect an element of commercial risk, which has 
materialised. 
910
 Total S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on liability, December 27, 2010 
[130] footnote 142. 
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Argentina
911
) on the part of the investor in case amendments in regulatory 
environment contradict the State’s prior commitments towards the investor. In other 
words, the above-mentioned balance between the interests of the investor and those of 
the State would not be reached if the State would deviate from its specific 
commitments, on which the investor had relied for making the investment in the 
country. 
Deviation from prior commitments may be excused by invoking general exception 
clauses in a case where the applicable IIA contains one. However, recent arbitral 
jurisprudence confirms that even without an invocation of a general exceptions clause, 
balancing between the relevance of the circumstances, the investor’s own conduct and 
the importance of the public interest pursued by the regulatory change may allow for a 
deviation from the prior commitments (National Grid v. Argentina, analyzed below).  
Balancing within a general exceptions clause  
 
Certain IIAs contains various general exceptions or ‘non-precluded measures’ clauses, 
allowing measures of safeguarding certain pressing public interest to trump the 
investor’s private interests and leading to a non-applicability of various substantive 
obligations of IIAs.  
These clauses came to attention in particular after the Argentina crisis in 2001-2002. 
In several investment arbitrations, Argentina has invoked a customary necessity 
defence and treaty specific ‘non-precluded measures’ clause as its defence for 
justifying its crisis management measures. 
The Continental v. Argentina award, which is one of many awards interpreting the 
‘non-precluded measures’ clause under Article XI of the Argentina–US BIT,912 has 
become popular among proportionality proponents in investment arbitration. The 
Continental award drew the attention of legal commentators by linking the scope of 
the treaty-specific ‘non-precluded measures’ clause with the balancing under GATT 
                                                 
911
 Continental v. Casualty [276]-[278]. As regards the expropriation claim, the Continental Tribunal 
decided that fixing of an exchange rate as a crisis management measure was not imposing an 
unreasonable burden on the investor because it was non-discriminatory, not in violation of prior 
commitments and there was no substantial deprivation of the investor’s property. 
912
 It states: ‘This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either party of measures necessary for 
the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.’ 
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Article XX.
913
 It was possible because the ‘non-precluded measures’ clause reflected 
the formulation of Article XX GATT.
914
 This comparative law approach was upheld 
by the ad hoc Annulment Committee as a welcome trend.
915
  
Although there were no violations of prior commitments given to the investor, the 
Tribunal agreed with Argentina that most of the crisis management measures (the 
freezing of bank deposits, devaluation of the peso, pesification of dollar-denominated 
deposits, suspension of payments) where covered by the necessity defence under 
Article XI, and the investor’s claims of breach of FET and indirect expropriation were 
rejected save for the restructuring of certain financial instruments.
916
  
However, Continental’s balancing approach may be used as an inspiration only for 
comparable norms, namely, necessity exceptions and future application of 
autonomous interpretation of Article XI of the Argentina–US BIT.  It is not directly 
transferrable to the indirect expropriation standard, which bears no similarity with 
GATT Article XX and has a different structure.  
Balancing as part of the inner flexibility of the legitimate expectations element 
 
The balancing exercise that may bear direct consequences for the indirect 
expropriation standard through its legitimate expectations element is represented by 
another Argentina crisis award – National Grid v. Argentina.917 
Traditionally, violation of prior commitments given to an investor would lead to a 
conclusion that the host State has acted in bad faith, arbitrarily or unfairly like in Suez 
v. Argentina.
918
 There, the Tribunal found violation of FET by Argentina because the 
State was not cooperating with the investors in the crisis management
919
 and rigidly 
and persistently refused to revise the tariffs for water distribution, thus acting contrary 
                                                 
913
 In contrast to earlier CMS v. Argentina, Enron v. Argentina, and Sempra v. Argentina awards, 
LG&E v. Argentina and Continental v. Argentina treated Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT as an 
autonomous norm, separate from customary necessity defence. 
914
 Ibid [192]. 
915
 Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic, Annulment Proceeding, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/9, September 16, 2011, [132]-[133].  
916
 Continental v. Argentina [262], [266] [275]. 
917
 National Grid P.L.C. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, November 3, 2008, the UK, 
North Ireland –Argentine BIT 1990. 
918
 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. and The 
Argentine Republic, Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, UNCITRAL 
Rules. 
919
 Suez v. Argentina [233], [244]. 
 197 
 
to Argentina’s prior commitments expressed in the Concession Agreement.920 The 
Tribunal used the proportionality-like language and noted that Argentina could have 
employed a ‘less restrictive alternative’ in dealing with the crisis,921 namely, the 
alternative that would imply prior consultations with the investors as required by the 
Concession Agreement
922
 in order to ensure the interests of both the State and the 
investors are protected.  
Nevertheless, in line with National Grid v. Argentina, protection of the investor’s 
reliance on prior commitments may also be subject to balancing between the general 
interests of the host State’s population and the investor’s private interests, and, 
exceptionally, violation of legitimate expectations induced by prior commitments may 
be justified under the relevant IIA, even without an invocation of general exceptions.   
In National Grid v. Argentina923 the investor complained about the devaluation of the 
Argentine Peso and the abolishment of the calculation of utility tariffs in US Dollars. 
These measures dramatically affected its investment in a privatized electric power 
company. In contrast to the situation of Total v. Argentina, here the crisis 
management measures dismantled the former regulatory framework that the State had 
promised to the investor at the time of the privatization and on which National Grid 
had relied in making its investment.924 
Nevertheless, the Tribunal held that Argentina did not violate the FET standard and 
the investor’s legitimate expectations for legal stability by the adoption of the 
emergency measures for several months at the peak of the crisis, although they 
formally violated prior commitments given to the investor.
925
  The Tribunal came to 
                                                 
920
 Ibid [237]. 
921
 Arbitrator Nikken, in his separate opinion, disagreed on the employment of the ‘less restrictive 
alternative’ test by stating that it was unreasonable for the majority Tribunal ‘to determine the 
alternative measures that could have been adopted, because it cannot ex post facto substitute itself for 
the Argentine Government when it had to address the serious crisis that hit the country.’ See Arbitrator 
Nikken, Separate Opinion in Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi 
Universal S.A.and The Argentine Republic, Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/19, [37]. 
922
 Suez v. Argentina [235]. Since the Tribunal did not propose a particular outcome of the 
alternative solution, but merely indicated that Argentina needed to cooperate with investors in order not 
to breach FET (leaving the potential outcome in the hands of the Parties), the Tribunal did not 
participate in an actual balancing of conflicting interests; it merely came to the conclusion that 
Argentina’s actions were arbitrary and inequitable. 
923
 National Grid P.L.C. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, November 3, 2008, the UK, 
North Ireland –Argentine BIT 1990. 
924
 Ibid, [178]. 
925
 Ibid [179]. The Tribunal found a violation of the FET standard for other governmental actions - 
Argentina’s unfair conditions for renegotiating the terms of operation of the Concession after the peak 
of the crisis. 
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this conclusion by ‘qualifying in time’ the determination of the violation of the FET 
standard.
926
  Arbitrators ruled that they could not ‘ignore the context in which the 
Measures were taken’: 
The determination of the Tribunal must take into account all the circumstances and 
in so doing cannot be oblivious to the crisis that the Argentine Republic endured at 
that time.
927
  
In this regard the Tribunal noted that ‘[w]hat is fair and equitable is not an absolute 
parameter’: 
What would be unfair and inequitable in normal circumstances may not be so in a 
situation of an economic and social crisis. The investor may not be totally insulated 
from situations such as the ones the Argentine Republic underwent in December 
2001 and the months that followed.
928
 
The Tribunal rejected Argentina’s necessity defence under customary international 
law (in this case, the applicable BIT did not contain a comparable article to the non-
precluded measures clause in Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT).
929
 Therefore, the 
above determination fell clearly within the inner flexibility and limits of the legitimate 
expectations element.  
In sum, the Tribunal noted that Argentina’s attempts to cope with an exceptionally 
severe crisis affected the scope of the legitimate expectations element and permitted a 
formal violation of prior commitments during the peak of the crisis due to the more 
pressing public interest. Although the Tribunal did not use the proportionality 
language, it was a balancing exercise between the investor’s legitimate expectations 
and the state’s duty to cope with an exceptionally severe situation, requiring a certain 
level of solidarity from foreign investors, bearing in mind that international 
investment protection regime is not ‘designed to ensure the immutability of the legal 
order, the economic world and the social universe’.930  
Thus, on the one hand, legitimate expectations of legal stability are to be honoured, on 
the other hand, their scope does not go as far as to exempt a foreign investor from the 
                                                 
926
 See also Total v. Argentina [123]: ‘[A]n evaluation of the fairness of the conduct of the host 
country towards an investor cannot be made in isolation, considering only their bilateral relations. The 
context of the evolution of the host economy, the reasonableness of the normative changes challenged 
and their appropriateness in the light of a criterion of proportionality also have to be taken into 
account.’ 
927
 Ibid [180]. 
928
 Ibid [180]. 
929
 Ibid [250]-[262]. 
930
 Impregillo v. Argentina [290]. See also EDF v. Romania [217]. 
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real situation in the host country, providing a place for balancing the investor’s 
legitimate expectations for legal stability and the context of the interference in foreign 
investment. 
Comparing the balancing analysis applied in Tecmed v. Mexico, that linked the 
‘individual and excessive’ burden to the effect of the measure on the foreign 
investment and whether it was compensated or not, Total/National Grid balancing 
allows integrating within the second step of the assessment of an indirect 
expropriation claim several elements that imply the integration of the investor’s 
interests with wider non-economic interests. These elements are as follows: (1) the 
importance of the public purpose, for which the challenged regulatory measure is 
taken. Although the National Grid award dealt with a unique social and economic 
crisis in Argentina, one may suggest a similar logic should be employed beyond crisis 
situations
931
 and its content may be determined by the integration principle of 
sustainable development. For instance, in case new scientific information of a 
particular business activity is available finding it harmful to human or animal health, a 
departure from the principles of stability and predictability could be justified. (2) The 
integration element of sustainable development requires such an interpretation of 
legitimate expectations for legal stability, induced by specific commitments, that does 
not allow them to prevail over legitimate non-economic interests of the local and 
international communities. 
4.6.4. Interim conclusions of ‘inherent flexibility’ of legitimate expectations sub-
element  
 
Sustainable development context prohibits modes of reasoning that would allow 
economic interests to trump other public interests. It requires an incorporation of 
wider societal concerns other than an investor’s private interests when interpreting 
such investment guarantees as the indirect expropriation standard. 
It can be effectively done through the legitimate expectations sub-element of the 
indirect expropriation standard. Legitimate expectations for legal stability inherently 
                                                 
931
 See Caroline Henckels, ‘Proportionality and the Standard of Review in Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Claims: Balancing Stability and Consistency with the Public Interest”, SIEL Working paper 
No. 2012/27, available at <http://www.ssrn.com/link/SIEL-2012-Singapore-Conference.html>, 
accessed on 20 November 2012, p.6.  
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imply balancing between the investor’s interest in predictability and the state’s 
interest in retaining its regulatory flexibility. 
First of all, legitimate expectations for legal stability element is rather consistently 
interpreted in a way that tolerates the host State’s customary right in a non-
discriminatory and bona fide manner to enact, modify or cancel laws at its own 
discretion.  The host State principally enjoys wide discretion to change the regulatory 
environment of the investor’s business area in cases where there no specific 
commitments were given to the investor to the contrary effect. So, the dynamism that 
the sustainable development objective brings in the interpretation process of this 
element is an integration of the State’s response to the evolutionary character of 
economic and social life, so as to pursue broader societal values like the protection of 
the environment, health and cultural heritage, to the arbitration process. 
This study alleges that the deliberate application of sub-elements of the legitimate 
expectations element and expanding their scope may ensure compliance with the 
clarified context of investment protection law. Thus, the knowledge of the pre-
existing regulatory environment is not necessarily limited by the national regulatory 
environment, but also extends to the international regulatory environment. For 
instance, in the case where the investor’s activity has been highly regulated 
internationally or in other legal systems but not yet in a host State, and if the host 
State changes its regulatory environment in line with international values, a 
‘competent’ investor may not consider it as a sudden and unexpected change. Thus, 
one may conclude that a ‘competent businessman’ criterion requires an investor to 
embrace not only the domestic but also the international regulatory environment, and 
it allows internalizing the risks of a particular investment activity, namely, if the later 
changes of the legal environment address the inherent risks of the particular 
investment activity, then the changes will bear no consequences on the host State. 
In addition, since the sustainable development context of the investment protection 
regime requires the rejection of the ‘self-contained’ regime approach, considerations 
of international and comparative law elements are justified and even necessary in 
setting the scope of legitimate expectations for legal stability. 
4.7. Compensation requirement in cases where expropriation is found: the role of 
legitimate expectations 
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The final (the fourth) step of assessing an indirect expropriation claim is to allocate 
compensation due in cases where the fact of expropriation is established. If there is a 
‘substantial interference’ with an investor’s property rights, and if the interference is 
not justified under customary police powers exception or a specific treaty exemption 
like ‘non-precluded measures’ under Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT, then 
investment protection law imposes a duty of the expropriating state to pay ‘full 
compensation of the fair market value for the expropriated property, i.e., what a 
willing buyer would pay to a willing seller’932 calculated by reference to the ‘highest 
and best use’ of the property.933 
Sometimes it is suggested that certain breaches of investment guarantees based on 
environmental or human rights reasons should not be subject to the requirement of 
compensation.  This stance is supported by reference to such ‘context doctrine’ 
awards as Saluka v.Czech Republic and Chemtura v. Canada.
934
 This opinion is not 
entirely correct since the ‘context doctrine’ awards refer to the application of police 
powers that may exempt the governmental measure from being classified as 
expropriatory.  ‘Context doctrine’ awards do not propose a hierarchy of public 
purposes claiming that certain purposes may prevail over foreign investment 
protection, and that their invocation would automatically exempt certain substantial 
deprivations as non-compensable. Instead, the existence of expropriation may be 
rebutted by the application of recognized police powers of States. Hence, in case of a 
substantial interference in the investor’s property, even if it is done for human rights 
protection, cultural heritage or environmental protection reasons, an expropriating 
State is not per se exempt from the duty to compensate.
935
  
The aim of the section is not to study thoroughly the methods for allocating the full 
market value, like the discounted cash flow method, but rather to indicate those 
                                                 
932
 Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID case No. 
ARB/96/1 [73]. The Tribunal in para [69] indicates: ‘The vocabulary describing the amount of 
compensation properly payable in respect of a lawful taking has varied considerably from time to time. 
It comprises such words as “full”, “adequate”, “appropriate”, “fair” and “reasonable”. Sometimes, the 
descriptive adjective is elaborated by the additional mention of “market value”.’ See also Occidental 
Petroleum Corporation Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, 5 October 2012, US-Ecuador BIT (1997) [458]. 
933 
Ibid, Santa Elena v Costa Rica [70]. 
934
 For three different approaches in this respect among investment lawyers, see Jorge E. Viñuales, 
Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law (CUP 2012) 123-128. 
935
 Contra: L Liberti, ‘The Relevance of Non-Investment Treaty Obligations in the Assessment of 
Compensation’ in PM Dupuy, F Francioni, EU Petersmann (eds), Human Rights in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration, (OUP 2009), Chapter 23. 
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factors that, despite the rigid full fair market value compensation requirement, have 
the capacity to serve as adjustments of the appropriate compensation taking into 
account broader interests and circumstances than the narrow focus on the integrity of 
property rights.  
In order to do that, the section is structured into three parts. The first part deals with 
the unsuccessful attempts to adopt a human rights approach to the compensation 
requirement of an expropriated property. The second part addresses the investor’s 
own conduct (contributory negligence) that is a factor relevant for quantifying losses.  
The third part analyzes the role of non-investment or external legal considerations in 
informing the content of the investor’s expectations for appropriate compensation.  It 
is claimed that the legally relevant wider context in the allocation of compensation is 
determined by the sustainable development objective and its integration element. 
4.7.1. Proposed human rights approach in assessing compensation for 
expropriation 
Argentina has put forward an argument in some investment treaty arbitrations that a 
State’s human rights obligations and a country’s economic conditions allow excluding 
or significantly diminishing the amount of compensation due for expropriation. 
In Vivendi v. Argentina (Resubmitted)
936
 and Siemens v. Argentina,
937
 Argentina has 
argued that in cases of expropriation for social or economic reasons, fair market value 
compensation is too burdensome on the expropriating State, limiting its sovereignty 
and, in general, disadvantaging poor states.  
In Siemens v. Argentina, Argentina substantiated its argument
938
 by reference to the 
Tecmed balancing analysis and the ECtHR case James v.UK. There, the ECtHR held 
that Article 1 of the First Protocol does not ‘guarantee a right to full compensation in 
all circumstances’ because ‘[l]egitimate objectives of “public interest” such as 
pursued in measures of economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater 
social justice, may call for less than reimbursement of full market value,’939 and what 
                                                 
936
 Vivendi v. Argentina, Resubmitted, [8.4.1]. Argentina objected to the full compensation 
requirement of the breach of the BIT, relying on its economic conditions to the fact that Argentina 
acted in the public interest.  
937
 Siemens A.G. v.The Argentine Republic, ICSID case No.ARB/02/8, Award, February 6, 2007, 
[348]-[357]. The Siemens Tribunal decided that neither the Germany- Argentina BIT nor customary 
international law permitted a margin of appreciation as found in Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR. 
938
 Siemens v. Argentina, [346]. 
939
 Ibid, [346] referring to James v. UK, European Court of Human Rights, 1986, 8, EHRR 123, 
[48]. 
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is needed is proportionality analysis with respect to the amount of compensation. In 
Siemens v. Argentina, the Tribunal found these contentions incompatible with the 
customary international law on foreign investment protection and the applicable 
German-Argentina BIT requiring full market value compensation.
940
 Thus, it rejected 
the request for balancing conflicting interests when setting the amount of 
compensation. 
On the one hand, the Tribunal was correct in rejecting Argentina’s proposal for less 
than full market value since the direct transfer of human rights methodology in 
assessing compensation in investment law would go contrary to the full market value 
requirement explicitly established by the current network of IIAs.  
In European human rights law, the compensation requirement is not explicitly 
included in Article 1 Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights on 
property rights; nevertheless, it is a ‘material consideration’ of Article 1 which 
implicitly requires compensation in case of a deprivation of property.
941
 In contrast to 
the current network of IIAs, the ECtHR treats the compensation requirement as an 
element of the fair balance test.
942
 Determination of the appropriate amount of 
compensation is part of the proportionality assessment;
943
 it contributes to the 
assessment of whether there is a disproportionate burden on the individual.
944
 Thus, in 
exceptional circumstances, the ECtHR may find it proportional not to award 
compensation or to reimburse less than the full market value due to the legitimate 
objectives of public interest like a country’s economic reform or measures designed to 
achieve greater social justice that does not impose an individual and excessive burden 
on the individual.
945
  
The compensation requirement in investment law is more rigid – the reimbursement 
of the full market value is an exact requirement of the network of IIAs.
946
 
Accordingly, Argentina’s proposition of adopting the ECtHR methodology under the 
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 Ibid, [354]. 
941
 James and Others, Judgment of February 21, 1986, ECHR 50, [54]. 
942
 A.R.Çoban, Protection of property rights within the European Convention on Human Rights, 
(Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 93. 
943
 U. Kriebaum, ‘Regulatory Takings: Balancing the Interests of the Investor and the State’, (2007) 
8 J. of World Investment and Trade 717, at 731, 739. 
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 Sporrong & Lönnroth v. Sweden, Eur. Ct.H.R. No. 52 (ser.A) (1982), [69], [73]. 
945
 James v. UK, European Court of Human Rights, 1986, 8, EHRR 123, [46], [48], [54]. 
946
 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph H. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP, 
2012), 100. 
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relevant BIT was correctly rejected as going against the very wording of the 
applicable BIT.  
On the other hand, the Tribunal, as examined below, may have an ability to adjust and 
diminish fair market compensation in a case where Argentina would have formulated 
its request differently. 
4.7.2. The impact of the investor’s own conduct on the expectations for 
compensation 
 
Several investment treaty tribunals, at their own discretion, have taken into account 
the investor’s own conduct (contributory negligence) as a relevant factor for 
quantifying losses and assessing the reasonableness of compensation expected by the 
investor.
947
 The investor’s own conduct has served as an element for reducing 
compensation to ensure it is fair in the given circumstances. Thus, the compensation 
requirement for expropriated property (or violation of the FET standard) is flexible 
enough to be adjusted in line with the equity principle.  
For example, in MTD v. Chile,
948
 the Tribunal diminished compensation for the 
breach of FET by 50 per cent because the investor’s own actions, by disregarding the 
national law requirements, increased the risks and losses of the investment. In these 
circumstances, the Tribunal decided that investors ‘should bear the consequences of 
their own actions as experienced businessmen’.949 Also, in Occidental v. Ecuador950 
the Tribunal diminished the fair market value compensation of expropriated property 
by 25 per cent since the investor acted illegally under Ecuadorian law. Similarly, in 
Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, the Tribunal did not award any compensation despite 
establishing the existence of an expropriation of the investor’s contractual rights.951  
                                                 
947
 I Knoll-Tudor, ‘The Fair and Equitale Standard and Human Rights Norms’ in PM Dupuy, F 
Francioni, EU Petersmann (eds), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration, (OUP 
2009), 342. 
948
 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. And MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, 
Award May 25, 2004, the 1992 Malaysia – Chile BIT. 
949
 Ibid, [178]. The ad hoc Annulment Committee upheld the award:  MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. And 
MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Decision on Annulment, 21 March 
2007 [101], [107]. 
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 Occidental Petroleum Corporation Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The 
Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, 5 October 2012, US-Ecuador BIT (1997) 
[670]-[687]. 
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 Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania [778]. 
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In this case the investor’s own conduct made the expropriated concession contract 
valueless.
952 
The investors own conduct as a barring factor for expectations for full fair market 
compensation is also integrated in some ‘new generation’ IIAs. For instance, the 
COMESA Common Investment Area Agreement 2007,
953
 Article 20(2) states that 
‘compensation [for expropriation] may be adjusted to reflect the aggravating conduct 
by a COMESA investor or such conduct that does not seek to mitigate damages’. 
To conclude, despite a rigid full market value compensation requirement, the amount 
of compensation may be subject to adjustments in line with the customary rule of 
contributory negligence (Article 39 of the International Law Commission’s Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts).  
4.7.3. Influence of the circumstances of the host State on the amount of 
compensation. SPP v. Egypt versus Santa Elena v. Costa Rica 
 
This section analyzes the possible role of the knowledge of the surrounding 
circumstances of the host State in informing the content of an investor’s expectations 
for appropriate compensation in cases where the existence of expropriation is found.  
The section juxtaposes two arbitral awards – SPP v. Egypt954 and Santa Elena v. 
Costa Rica,
955
 which represent contradicting approaches in this regard. It will be 
argued that the Santa Elena methodology is outdated because the integration element 
of the sustainable development objective requires paying more scrupulous attention to 
non-investment law and policy arguments by host States. 
The ability of arbitrators to take into account circumstances of the host State when 
establishing the amount of compensation for expropriation is demonstrated in SPP v. 
Egypt. In the SPP case, the Tribunal took into account the legal effect of the 
investor’s knowledge of non-investment obligations of Egypt in awarding 
compensation for indirect expropriation. The claim emerged from the termination of 
the Pyramids Oasis Project for developing a tourist resort near the Pyramids. Egypt 
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 Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, [789]-[792], [798]. 
953
 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Common Investment Area 
Agreement (CIAA) (2007) <http://www.comesa.int/investment/regimes/investment area/Folder.2007-
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terminated the Project after its approval because it had included an area in the World 
Cultural Heritage List. The Tribunal found the termination of the Project 
expropriatory.
956
 However, while deciding on the appropriate amount of 
compensation due, the Tribunal considered the effect of the application of the 
UNESCO Convention on Cultural Heritage Protection on the legality of the 
investment project. It consequently decided not to award lucrum cessans calculated as 
off the date of inclusion of the project area in the Word Heritage List as this is when 
the investment project became illegal.
957
 
In contrast, the Santa Elena v. Costa Rica award showed no responsiveness to non-
investment aspects in the determination of compensation for expropriation. Costa 
Rica had longstanding commitments and efforts to add the investment area ‘Santa 
Elena’, which was home to a variety of flora and fauna indigenous to the region, to a 
national reserve park and to the World Heritage List.
958
 Therefore, the State asked to 
take into account ‘the existing environmental legislation that would significantly 
restrict, if not prohibit outright, the commercial development of Santa Elena’ in the 
assessment of fair market value compensation for the expropriated property.
959
 In 
response, the Santa Elena Tribunal correctly concluded that expropriation, even if it is 
done for a public purpose (thus, being lawful), requires compensation;
960
 however, it 
missed  the main point raised by Costa Rica –  to take into account the circumstances 
of the investment field previously known to the investor in assessing the proper 
amount of compensation. The Santa Elena Tribunal remained ignorant to the possible 
effect the UNESCO Convention could have on the amount of compensation.  
As it is established that sustainable development context requires the integration of an 
investment protection aspect and surrounding non-investment interests, the Santa 
Elena approach goes contrary to the sustainable development context by focusing 
merely on the interests of the foreign investor. One may even suggest that by not 
taking into account the pre-existing knowledge of Costa Rica’s national and 
international environmental protection efforts as a line of argument, the investor’s 
                                                 
956
 SPP v. Egypt [159], [164]. 
957
 Ibid [190]-[191]. See also Amoco International Finance Corp. v. Iran, 15 Iran-US.C.T.R 189; 
Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, [775]. 
958
 Charles N. Brower, Jarrod Wong, ‘General Valuation Principles: The Case of Santa Elena’ in 
Todd Weiler (ed), International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, 
NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law (Cameron May 2005), Chapter 20, 747, 
763-764, referring to Counter-Memorial of Costa Rica [on file with authors]. 
959
 Santa Elena v. Costa Rica [35]. 
960
 Ibid [72]. 
 207 
 
responsibility to be a competent investor and to know the regulatory field is neglected. 
Therefore, the Santa Elena Tribunal’s argumentative approach is outdated. 
4.7.4. Interim conclusions 
 
This study suggests that a legitimate expectations analysis may serve as a tool in the 
assessment of compensation, in particular where non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory 
indirect expropriation takes place (SPP v. Egypt approach). This stance is justified 
because the object and purpose of international investment protection law necessitates 
establishing clearer limits on legitimate expectations of investors, and requires the 
compensation requirement not to be contrary to the inherent object and purpose of the 
IIAs regime by diminishing the prospects of a host State’s development.  
However, balancing requirement as such cannot be deducted from the concept of ‘fair 
market value’, since in essence it means a value that is calculated taking into account 
the highest and best use of the property. Thus, the concept itself is not functioning as a 
principle leaving room for optimization of its fulfilment. Nevertheless, it may be read 
as a sum of several variables instead of reading the full market value compensation 
requirement in an ‘all or nothing’ manner –  such elements as legality or illegality of 
the purpose for expropriation, legitimate investment-backed expectations and the 
investor’s own conduct must all affect the amount of compensation, for instance, 
whether lost profits are available. It is claimed these elements are an efficient enough 
place for integrating non-economic interests within the otherwise rather rigid full 
market value requirement. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study takes a fresh look at the interpretation of the indirect expropriation 
standard through the lens of the sustainable development objective, which necessitates 
an extension of the protected interests in investment law in comparison to the more 
traditional sole focus on foreign investment protection.  
It is usually the case that investment treaty arbitration involves a legitimacy review of 
the State’s general legislation or administrative acts aimed at protecting various public 
interests. The reviewing process of the governmental measures being challenged 
subsequently impacts upon the clash between the investor’s claims for its property 
protection and legal stability, on the one hand, and the interest of the host State to use 
its regulatory flexibility in order to respond to changing circumstances, on the other 
hand. Furthermore, the host State in its actions has a duty to take not only the interest 
of foreign investor into account, but also must ensure that the interests of its local 
population are protected and that it complies with its international obligations. These 
wider considerations are often put forward in investment arbitrations as defences by 
host States or invoked by amicus curiae. As some tribunals have ignored these wider 
considerations or have failed to address them properly, it is difficult to predict 
whether the interpretation of investment standards will unreasonably restrain the 
fulfilment of the State’s duties and interests in safeguarding the welfare of its citizens 
or the values of the global community. 
The narrow focus on foreign investment protection in interpreting the scope of 
indirect expropriation has been reached by applying customary treaty interpretation 
principles.  It has led to the impression that economic interests may trump other 
societal interests, and that host States may safeguard non-economic societal interests 
only as far as they do not interfere with foreign investment. Accordingly, several 
States have taken various radical steps, including the withdrawal from IIAs and 
investor-state arbitration mechanisms, in order to safeguard their ability to formulate 
and execute efficient policy in this area. These radical developments have emphasized 
the need to find a fair balance between the regulatory interests of States and an 
investor’s expectations for stability, predictability and protection which cannot be 
achieved merely by reference to enhanced application of customary treaty 
interpretation principles without a precise guideline aiming at a goal to be achieved. 
Otherwise, a differing understanding of what is the aim to be achieved causes the 
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situation that the same treaty interpretation principles are applied in a manner that 
often reaches radically conflicting conclusions. 
For this reason, this thesis views the concept of sustainable development as an 
interpretative tool that guides the use of treaty interpretation principles towards 
certain aims – the integration of economic and non-economic aspects of foreign 
investment protection in order to ensure that, firstly, the interpretation of the indirect 
expropriation standard always takes into account the needs and interests of both the 
investor and the host State.  Secondly, it argues that the pro-investor biased modes of 
reasoning within the interpretation of investment guarantees are excluded. Since 
changes in treaty drafting are slow and not always possible, the proposed 
reinterpretation of indirect expropriation standard in light of the objective of 
sustainable development is an alternative to redrafting treaties and it is capable of 
functioning within the network of IIAs as it stands.
961
 
 
First of all, it is claimed that sustainable development is the object and purpose 
of the network of IIAs. Its principle of integration is exact enough to guide the 
application and interpretation of investment guarantees in individual IIAs. 
The foreign direct investment protection regime, as part of the phenomenon of 
economic globalization, is inherently a related field of development law, and 
numerous investment protection treaties refer to economic development as their object 
and purpose. Economic development, thus, is the initial and inherent motivation for 
states to enter the network of IIAs that consists of bilateral and regional agreements 
gradually concluded over the last sixty years. However, over the last four decades it 
has become clear that the narrow focus on economic development is insufficient and, 
in the long run, harmful to the global community. As a result, in three global 
conferences the international community has committed to replace the focus on 
economic development with a broader term of sustainable development, which 
embraces economic development and its limiting aspects of social and environmental 
protection. Thus, by sustainable development one understands the achievement of an 
equal balance between economic development, social progress and environmental 
protection at every level of decision-making. Since FDI protection was intended as a 
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tool for achieving economic development, it is necessarily affected by the current 
global commitment to promote sustainable development. 
A number of ‘new generation’ IIAs, in their preambular language and operative parts, 
already include various acknowledgements of mutual support for investment 
protection and prima facie external issues to investment protection like protection of 
the environment, human rights and labour rights. Older IIAs, logically, are silent on 
the integration of economic and non-economic aspects of FDI protection. 
Nevertheless, it is argued that sustainable development is the current meaning of the 
intrinsic and evolutive object and purpose of the very network of IIAs. Thus, it has the 
capacity to participate in contextual and effective interpretation of specific treaty 
terms in individual IIAs irrespective of the existence of a specific reference to 
sustainable development. 
Consequently, the sustainable development objective of the foreign investment 
protection regime requires a change in mindset for adjudicators applying and 
interpreting investment standards. 
Accordingly, it has two main consequences. Firstly, the requirement to integrate 
places investment protection in the field of public litigation affecting the way in 
which arbitrators view themselves. The sustainable development perspective adds to a 
realization that investor–state arbitration is not exclusively about the protection of a 
foreign investor’s interests. It may considerably exceed the interests of pleading 
parties, adding to a public dimension of investment protection law, which accordingly 
requires arbitrators to adopt the role of ‘guardians of law’ instead of ‘service 
providers’. It is especially so because investment treaty arbitration as an impartial 
venue is meant to replace national and international courts, so as to ensure a careful 
and objective balance between the interests of investors and host States. The public 
dimension of investment protection subsequently means that investment treaty 
arbitration as an institution, dealing with a development-related field of law, must 
provide for a process which gives space for the consideration of competing factors 
such as investment protection and public interests targeted at achieving development 
goals. Secondly, the sustainable development context and its integration principle 
guides the inherent powers and the discretion of arbitrators, which they enjoy with 
respect to the interpretation of loosely drafted investment protection standards like 
indirect expropriation. To a certain extent, this leads to integrating all three pillars of 
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sustainable development irrespective of the limitations of jurisdiction and applicable 
law.  
So, adjudicators are required to act in a manner that expresses the values and goals of 
the legal regime, namely, the general commitment to promote sustainable 
development. The sustainable development context affects the ‘background theory’ of 
adjudicators in setting the content of the open-textured indirect expropriation 
standard, namely, the idea of values and goals that adjudicators are supposed to 
safeguard in solving the legal dispute. It explicitly requires that commercial interests 
are not prioritized but balanced and reconciled with competing public interests by 
choosing appropriate language and argumentation methods, which gives space for the 
consideration of these conflicting factors. 
Thus, the interpretation of investment guarantees, in light of the sustainable 
development objective, requires the incorporation of wider societal concerns other 
than those traditionally associated with investment protection law. That is to say, 
interpretation of such investment guarantees as indirect expropriation requires 
adjudicators to adopt a point of view that is not limited to the sole focus on 
safeguarding the private interests of investors.  
The extension of protected interests may effectively be taken into account through 
contextual and effective treaty interpretation and, if applied in a bona fide manner, 
those modes of reasoning that focus narrowly on the interests of a foreign investor 
will be outdated. This is especially so in a case of the application of ‘old school’ BITs 
that do not contain explicit references to safeguarding wider societal interests other 
than foreign investment protection. It is so because interpretation of common-form 
‘old generation’ BITs has led to the conclusion of the existence of two levels of object 
and purpose of investment protection regime. Namely, there is the ‘immediate’ one of 
investment protection, which is explicitly mentioned in BITs, and the ‘overall’ one of 
economic development. The latter is not always mentioned in IIAs but it stems from 
the very logic of the existence of the network of IIAs, and it also participates in the 
effective interpretation of ‘old school’ BITs. Since it is argued that economic 
development is intrinsically a generic legal term, the current meaning of which is 
sustainable development, it requires an evolutive interpretation of ‘old school’ BITs, 
resulting in the extended understanding of tolerated interests by the investment 
regime. 
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Second, although limited with narrow jurisdiction clauses, the sustainable 
development objective provides the necessary doctrinal foundation for 
incorporating prima facie non-investment obligations in the investment context 
by affecting the understanding of what is the ‘same subject matter’. Thus, 
arbitrators are required to recognize the potential existence of a conflict of 
norms in its widest sense and use appropriate tools for solving them. 
Even though arbitral tribunals have a wide range of customary conflict avoidance 
tools available, they differ significantly regarding their understanding of the need to 
use them when faced with arguments grounded in non-investment law or policies. 
Currently, arbitrators have showed two opposing attitudes towards the degree of 
relevance of non-investment law invoked by defending States. Defendant States have 
often invoked non-investment international obligations as a possible excuse for an 
alleged breach of investment protection standards. They refer to potential conflict in 
applicable law or indicate that a non-investment obligation is an element that allows 
setting the scope of investment guarantees. Taking into account that a state relying on 
external norms to the investment regime has the burden of proving the existence of 
norm conflict and their relevance to the settlement of the investment dispute, on the 
one side of the spectrum lies the Santa Elena award with its rejection of any relevance 
of non-investment law for informing the content of investment guarantees (Costa Rica 
argued its environmental obligations influenced the scope of the fair market value 
determination for the expropriated property). On the other side of the spectrum stands 
the Chemtura v. Canada award that used Canada’s international commitments as a 
‘broader factual context’ for informing the content of the bad faith standard and 
Parkerings v. Lithuania which took into account the UNESCO Convention so as to 
inform the content of the ‘like circumstances’ sub-element of the MFN standard. 
Thus, the current arbitral jurisprudence does not have a clear and predictable attitude 
towards the necessity to elaborate on non-investment international law as applicable 
law in investment claims or solving potential conflicts in applicable law through the 
customary law mechanisms available like the principle of integration enshrined in the 
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT.
962
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Investment treaty limitations with respect to jurisdiction and applicable law may 
explain the current reluctance of some investment tribunals to embark upon non-
investment international obligations in investment law context. This situation might 
also be explained by the lack of a clear link between foreign investment protection 
norms and the protection of non-economic goals such as the environment or public 
health. Therefore, it is argued that the sustainable development context automatically 
changes the perception of what issues might actually be ‘at the heart of the matter’. 
The sustainable development context thus provides the necessary link or a solid 
‘connection’ between various prima facie separate fields of law that go under the 
notion of sustainable development. It allows for their categorization as ‘relevant’ 
applicable law for informing the content of investment guarantees through 
interpretation. Sustainable development, thus, necessitates a ‘systemic’ thinking of 
international investment law implying that investment protection law is not 
autonomous from other legal regimes, functioning as a mechanism of ‘de-
fragmentation’.  
Thus, investment tribunals are now asked to realize that external or, in other words, 
non-investment norms may cause a conflict of norms situation and play a significant 
role in the interpretation of investment guarantees, e.g., by informing the content of 
indirect expropriation or its sub-elements as was done in SPP v. Egypt with respect to 
the investor’s legitimate expectations for fair compensation. 
 
Third, the integration element of sustainable development outdates the ‘sole 
effects’ doctrine and favours the ‘context doctrine’ of the interpretation of 
indirect expropriation standard because the latter allows for the adoption of a 
wider spectrum of elements than the integrity of an investor’s property in 
deciding whether indirect expropriation has taken place. 
Violation of the indirect expropriation standard, together with the FET standard, is 
often invoked in relation to a host State’s regulatory measures or administrative 
actions for public interest, e.g., in the case of a failure to issue a mining licence to 
protect the cultural heritage of an indigenous community or in the case of general 
changes to domestic regulatory frameworks like a phase out of nuclear energy. Thus, 
                                                                                                                                            
(2008) U. of St. Gallen Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2008-1. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1893692 (accessed at 12 December 2011), 16. 
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the core issue of the application of indirect expropriation standard is to distinguish 
compensable indirect expropriation from a legitimate, non-compensable exercise of a 
State’s power to regulate for public interest that has a detrimental effect on foreign 
investment. Arbitrators have applied three main methodologies for the assessment of 
the existence of indirect expropriation that differ significantly in their responsiveness 
to the public interest involved – the ‘sole effects’ doctrine, the ‘proportionality 
doctrine’ and the ‘context doctrine’. 
As investment treaty arbitration must provide for a process which gives space for the 
consideration of competing factors, such as investment protection and public interest. 
The ‘sole effects’ doctrine, focusing exclusively on the substantial deprivation of 
investment for establishing the existence of indirect expropriation, may not be 
anymore a result of an effective interpretation in light of the sustainable development 
objective. It is so because it limits the criteria that must be taken into account when 
deciding on the existence of expropriation. Furthermore, its application does not allow 
for the consideration of non-investment law or policies in informing the content of the 
indirect expropriation standard or its sub-elements.  
Regarding the ‘proportionality doctrine’ as applied by the Tecmed Tribunal and its 
approving awards, it is inspired by the ECtHR balancing but, unlike in the human 
rights system, it links the individual and excessive burden test exclusively with the 
level of interference in the foreign investment. Thus, the Tecmed proportionality 
analysis suggests that non-compensated substantial deprivation of foreign investment 
is non-proportional. This logic is circular and goes back to the ‘sole effect’ approach, 
limiting the criteria that could be taken into account in the assessment of whether an 
individual investor suffers an excessive burden that needs to be redressed.  
In contrast, the ‘context doctrine’ awards like Methanex v. US and Chemtura v. 
Canada, focusing on the general context and public interest of the interference in 
foreign investment, permits the integration of a more nuanced assessment of non-
economic considerations when deciding whether indirect expropriation has taken 
place. 
 
Fourth, employment of the ‘context doctrine’ needs to be accompanied by the 
inherent balancing between the interests of the investor and the State that most 
effectively takes place within the sub-element of legitimate expectations for legal 
stability. Legitimate expectations sub-elements provide a platform for the 
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nuanced integration of factual and legal circumstances in the appraisal of the 
existence of indirect expropriation. Furthermore, legitimate expectations sub-
element provides room for flexibility in setting the amount of fair market value 
compensation in the case that expropriation standard is violated. 
As the interpretation of investment guarantees, in light of the sustainable development 
objective, requires the incorporation of wider societal concerns than traditionally 
associated with investment protection law, legitimate expectations (for legal stability) 
sub-elements as an argumentative tool has the capacity to integrate a broad spectrum 
of factual and legal considerations in the expropriation analysis and provides room for 
a balanced way of distinguishing commercial risk from compensable political risk. 
Arbitral jurisprudence has gradually split the legitimate expectations element into 
various sub-elements that participate in the determination of what is a compensable 
political risk. These elements are general knowledge about business and the legal 
framework in the host State and in the chosen investment area; and competent 
businessman criterion and the investor’s own conduct. These elements have the 
capacity to function as entry-points for environmental, human rights and other 
considerations when setting the content of legitimate expectations. If applied in light 
of the integration principle of sustainable development, they set a higher threshold in 
the assessment of the reasonableness of the investor’s expectations and provide a 
broader framework for internalizing risks of a particular investment activity as a non-
compensable commercial risk.  
Thus, these elements provide a framework for balancing the investor’s interest in 
stability and predictability in the host State, on the one hand, and the State’s interest 
and duty to safeguard other societal purposes on the other. This balancing must reflect 
thw contextual and effective treaty interpretation principles and requires the 
interpretation of indirect expropriation and its sub-elements so as to give full effect to 
the objective of sustainable development that requires concrete outcomes – the 
integration of economic and non-economic concerns. 
Balancing at this stage is appropriate because an investor’s legitimate expectations for 
legal stability stems from the good faith principle, and it limits the State’s right to 
exercise its regulatory autonomy.  
In sum, the deliberate application of sub-elements of legitimate expectations in light 
of the sustainable development objective may ensure that: 
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(1) Arbitrators do not limit themselves to the narrow focus of the investment 
protection and promotion but also take into account the wider context leading to 
interference in foreign investment; 
(2) Scrupulous analysis of the inherent flexibility of these sub-elements implies the 
required balancing, not as an external technique but as an internal element of the 
indirect expropriation standard; 
(3) Risks of a particular investment activity are internalized in the assessment of 
whether indirect expropriation has taken place (the second step of indirect 
expropriation assessment). The assessment of an alleged violation of an investor’s 
legitimate expectations usually plays a role in determining the very existence of 
indirect expropriation, therefore the study argues it is a proper place where 
consideration and balancing between investor and State interests should take place.  
(4) This balancing adds the necessary dynamism and flexibility in the application of 
the standard. For instance, rigorous analysis of the above-mentioned elements might 
significantly affect the amount of compensation due for the expropriated property 
despite the rigid fair market value requirement in the network of IIAs (such as was 
done in SPP v. Egypt). Even in the case of the existence of specific commitments, 
unexpected circumstances and pressing public need may justify deviations form the 
comitments. 
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APPENDIX 
BOX 1. INTERPRETATION OF THE INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION STANDARD 
CONCERNING PUBLIC INTEREST MEASURES BY THE HOST STATE 
 
[..] - Relevant paragraph of an award. 
Awards are listed in chronological order. 
 
Arbitral award 
and alleged public 
interest act by the host 
State (general 
regulation, 
administrative measure 
or general treatment) 
which is challenged by 
a foreign investor as an 
expropriatory measure 
Defence by the host 
State 
Response by the 
Tribunal 
Comments 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ASPECT: ENVIRONMENTAL/PUBLIC HEALTH 
ISSUES 
Ethyl Corporation v. 
Canada
963
 
Investor, a producer of 
the gasoline additive, 
claimed that the 
Canadian trade ban of 
the gasoline additive 
for human health and 
environmental 
protection reasons 
constituted indirect 
expropriation of its 
investment in Canada.  
[9] Canada claimed 
that its trade ban was a 
law of general 
application and 
represented a 
legitimate regulation 
for environmental and 
health protection 
reasons. 
 
Disputing parties 
reached amicable 
settlement after the 
Tribunal rejected 
Canada’s objections to 
jurisdiction. 
Amicable settlement 
included the revocation 
of the trade ban and a 
substantial 
compensation to the 
investor.
964
   
The dispute left open 
the question of whether 
precautionary actions 
for the environment 
and health protection 
reasons banning an 
investor’s activity may 
be considered as a non-
compensable police 
powers exception.  
Santa Elena, S.A. v 
The Republic of Costa 
Rica
965
 
The award emerged 
from the disagreement 
between the foreign 
investor and the State 
on the amount of 
Costa Rica had 
longstanding 
commitments and 
efforts to add to the 
area of the national 
reserve park and to the 
World Heritage List.
966
  
[35] Hence, the State 
The Tribunal declared 
that: 
[71] ‘While an 
expropriation or taking 
for environmental 
reasons may be 
classified as a taking 
for a public purpose, 
In sharp contrast to the 
SPP v. Egypt award 
(see below and Box 3), 
the Santa Elena 
Tribunal reduced Costa 
Rica’s contentions of 
environmental laws 
affecting the value of 
                                                 
963
 Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 June 1998. 
964
 J. Soloway, ‘Environmental Regulations as Expropriation: The Case of NAFTA’s Chapter 11’, 
(2000) 33 Canadian Business Law Journal 92, at 116. 
965
 Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v The Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/96/1, Award of 17 February 2000, 15 ICISD REV – FILJ 169 (2000).  
966
 Charles N. Brower, Jarrod Wong, ‘General Valuation Principles: The Case of Santa Elena’ in 
Todd Weiler (ed), International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, 
NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law (Cameron May 2005), Chapter 20, 747, 
763-764, referring to Counter-Memorial of Costa Rica [on file with authors]. 
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compensation  
to be paid for direct 
expropriation of 
investor’s property for 
environmental 
conservation reasons. 
The State’s right to 
expropriate the 
property was not in 
dispute since the 
property was home to 
a variety of flora and 
fauna indigenous to the 
region.  
argued for such 
valuation of the 
property’s fair  market 
value that would have 
taken into account ‘the 
existing environmental 
legislation that would 
significantly 
restrict, if not prohibit 
outright, the 
commercial 
development 
of Santa Elena’. 
‘Respondent 
also submitted that, in 
the event that interest is 
applicable to the 
Award, international 
law supports an award 
of simple interest only, 
at a nominal rate.’ 
 
and thus may be 
legitimate, the fact that 
the Property was taken 
for this reason does not 
affect either the nature 
or the measure of the 
compensation to be 
paid for the taking. 
That is, the purpose 
of protecting the 
environment for which 
the Property was 
taken does not alter the 
legal character of the 
taking for which 
adequate compensation 
must be paid. The 
international 
source of the obligation 
to protect the 
environment makes no 
difference.’ 
[72] ‘Expropriatory 
environmental 
measures—no matter 
how laudable 
and beneficial to 
society as a whole—
are, in this respect, 
similar 
to any other 
expropriatory measures 
that a state may take in 
order to implement its 
policies: where 
property is 
expropriated, 
even for environmental 
purposes, whether 
domestic or 
international, 
the state’s obligation to 
pay compensation 
remains.’ 
the expropriated 
property to the mere 
declaration that even a 
lawful expropriation 
for environmental 
protection reasons 
raises the duty for the 
expropriating state to 
pay compensation. 
However, Costa Rica’s 
duty to compensate 
was never at question. 
The question was about 
the effect that Costa 
Rica’s international and 
national efforts of 
protecting the site had 
on the fair market 
value. However, the 
Tribunal declined to 
address that issue. 
Instead, the Tribunal 
focused merely on the 
integrity of the  
investor’s property 
interests. 
 
 
Metalclad v. US
967
 
The claim arose from 
the rejection by 
Mexico of the 
operation permit for 
the previously 
approved hazardous 
waste landfill project 
which met severe local 
resistance. 
 
[92], [106] The local 
municipality denied the 
permit for reasons 
which included the 
ecological concerns 
regarding the 
environmental 
effect and impact on 
the site and 
surrounding 
communities. One of 
the reasons for denying 
The Tribunal provided 
the widest indirect 
expropriation 
definition: 
[103] ‘[E]xpropriation 
under NAFTA includes 
not only open, 
deliberate 
and acknowledged 
takings of property, 
such as outright seizure 
or formal or obligatory 
Keeping in mind the 
difference between the 
prime focus on the 
‘effect’ of the 
interference, and the 
sole focus on the 
interference, the 
Metalclad award is a 
textbook example of 
the ‘sole effects’ 
doctrine  which focuses 
only on the effect of 
                                                 
967
 Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/97/1, Award 
August 30, 2000, NAFTA. 
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the permit was the 
Cactus Protection 
Decree which was 
applicable to the 
territory of the 
investment. 
transfer of title in 
favour of the host 
State, but also 
covert or incidental 
interference with the 
use of property which 
has the effect of 
depriving the owner, in 
whole or in significant 
part, of the use or 
reasonably-to-be-
expected economic 
benefit of property 
even if not necessarily 
to the obvious benefit 
of the host State.’ 
Regarding the Cactus 
Protection Decree: 
 [111] ‘The Tribunal 
need not decide or 
consider the motivation 
or intent of the 
adoption of the 
Ecological Decree. [...] 
However, the 
Tribunal considers that 
the implementation of 
the Ecological Decree 
would, in and of itself, 
constitute an act 
tantamount to 
expropriation.’ 
the measure by State 
which is challenged by 
the investor. 
The ‘sole effects’ 
doctrine leaves the 
wider circumstances 
and the alleged ‘public 
purpose’ defence 
outside consideration in 
the assessment of 
indirect expropriation. 
Such an interpretation 
of the standard 
generates room for a 
conflict between 
investment protection 
obligations other  than 
regulatory 
responsibilities by the 
host State.  
S.D. Myers v. 
Canada
968
 
The investor claimed 
that the Temporary 
export ban of 
hazardous chemicals 
between Canada and 
the US constituted, 
among others, a breach 
of the indirect 
expropriation standard 
and violated the 
national treatment 
standard. 
 
 
 
[99] - [107] Canada 
imposed the Export 
Ban of the hazardous 
chemical in line with 
its international 
commitments to 
minimise the risk to 
human health and the 
environment by the 
chemical. In particular, 
Canada argued the 
Export Ban was 
designed to fulfil the 
goals set by the Basel 
Convention that 
required managing 
hazardous waste  in an 
environmentally sound 
manner reducing the 
transboundary 
movement of them to a 
minimum. 
 
 
The Tribunal did not 
find a violation of the 
indirect expropriation 
standard because no 
substantial deprivation 
of the investment was 
found. However, the 
Tribunal ruled that: 
[281] ‘The general 
body of precedent 
usually does not treat 
regulatory action as 
amounting to 
expropriation. 
Regulatory conduct by 
public authorities is 
unlikely to be the 
subject of legitimate 
complaint under 
Article 1110 of the 
NAFTA, although the 
Tribunal does not rule 
out that possibility.’ 
[282] ‘Expropriations 
The expropriation 
claim failed as there 
was no lasting removal 
of the investor’s 
property rights. 
Therefore, the Tribunal 
did not address the 
influence of the Basel 
Convention under 
Article 1110 NAFTA. 
Nevertheless, the 
Tribunal acknowledged 
the necessity to draw 
the distinction between 
a non-compensable 
regulations and a 
measures that amounts 
to expropriation 
because of  a 
‘substantial 
deprivation’ of the 
investment. 
                                                 
968
 S.D.Myers, Inc. v Government of Canada, Partial Award, November 13, 2000, NAFTA, 
UNCITRAL. 
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tend to involve the 
deprivation of 
ownership rights; 
regulations a lesser 
interference. The 
distinction between 
expropriation and 
regulation screens out 
most potential cases of 
complaints concerning 
economic intervention 
by a state and reduces 
the risk that 
governments will be 
subject to claims as 
they go about their 
business of managing 
public affairs.’ 
[283] ‘An 
expropriation usually 
amounts to a lasting 
removal of the ability 
of an owner to make 
use of its economic 
rights although it may 
be that, in some 
contexts and 
circumstances, it 
would be appropriate to 
view a deprivation as 
amounting to an 
expropriation, even if it 
were partial or 
temporary.’ 
Tecmed v. Mexico
969
  
The dispute emerged 
from the revocation of 
the operation licence 
of the investor’s 
hazardous waste 
landfill. 
 [97] Mexico claimed 
that the non-renewal of 
the licence was a 
legitimate regulatory 
measure issued due to 
the environmental 
protection. 
 
 
 
[116] The Tribunal 
stressed the paramount 
importance of the 
effect of the state’s 
regulation to decide 
whether indirect 
expropriation took 
place. The Tribunal 
found a significant 
deprivation of the 
investment and, thus, 
the expropriatory effect 
generated by the non-
renewal of the 
operation licence. 
However, in contrast to 
Metalclad, the Tribunal 
proceeded with the 
analysis of the alleged 
expropriatory character 
of the governmental 
action (as it was 
The Tecmed award 
introduced the 
language of balancing 
within the indirect 
expropriation standard 
(the so-called 
‘proportionality 
doctrine’). Tecmed’s 
balancing analysis was 
later approved in 
LG&E Energy v. 
Argentina,
972
 
Continental Casualty v. 
Argentina
973
 and Azurix 
v. Argentina
974
 awards. 
Tecmed v. Mexico 
supplements the 
paramount ‘effects’ 
criterion with an 
assessment whether the 
character of the 
governmental measure 
                                                 
969
 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/00/2), Award of 29 May 2003 (Spain/Mexico BIT), ILM 43 (2004) 133. 
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required by the 
applicable BIT
970
) and 
analyzed the 
Municipality’s motives 
for the non-renewal of 
the licence.  
Here the Tribunal 
noted that 
[122] for a domestic 
measure to be 
legitimate under 
international law 
‘[t]here must be a 
reasonable relationship 
of proportionality 
between the charge or 
weight imposed to the 
foreign investor and the 
aim sought to be 
realized by any 
expropriatory 
measure.’971  The 
Tribunal found that the 
rejection of the licence 
was not supported by 
any real reason of 
public interest; 
therefore, the investor 
was found to bear ‘an 
individual and 
excessive burden’, and 
the expropriation was 
considered to be 
illegal. 
is expropriatory. In 
order to do that, the 
Tribunal has focused 
on whether there is a 
balance between the 
importance of the 
public purpose and the 
effect on the investor 
by the measure. It 
declared that there 
would not be a 
proportional 
relationship between 
these two elements in 
cases of substantial 
interference in the 
foreign investment is 
not compensated. 
Methanex v. US
975
 
The dispute emerged 
from the ban by 
California of the 
controversial gasoline 
additive (MTBE) 
which endangered 
human health and the 
environment. The 
investor – a company 
producing the 
chemical, claimed that 
a substantial portion of 
California substantiated 
its ban with research 
done by the University 
of California on  the 
effects of MTBE on  
human health and the 
environment. The 
research suggested the 
imposition of the ban.  
The amicus curiae 
brief emphasized ‘the 
immense public 
importance of the case 
[Part III - Chapter A – 
51 [101]] ‘The 
Tribunal accepts the 
UC Report as reflecting 
a serious, objective and 
scientific approach to a 
complex problem in 
California since it was 
subjected to public 
hearings, testimony and 
peer-review.’ 
[Part IV - Chapter D - 
Page 4, [7]] 
In contrast to the ‘sole 
effects’ doctrine 
represented by 
Metalclad, the so-
called ‘context 
doctrine’ represented 
by Methanex especially 
emphasizes the respect 
for wider 
circumstances for 
which an interference 
in a foreign investment 
occurs. Methanex gave 
                                                                                                                                            
972
  LG&E v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 
Argentina – US BIT 1991, [194-195]. 
973
 Continental Casualty v. Argentina, [208, 276]. 
974
 Azurix Corp. v. the Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.ARB/01/12, Award, July 14, 2006. 
970
 Ibid [115]. The Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments signed by 
the Kingdom of Spain and the United Mexican States (December 18, 1996) Section 5(1): “any other 
measure with similar characteristics or effects”.  
971
 Ibid [122]. The Tribunal referred to European Court of Human Rights, In the case of Mellacher 
and Others v. Austria, judgment of December 19, 1989, 48, p.24; In the case of Pressos Compañía 
Naviera and Others v. Belgium, judgment of November 20, 1995, 38, p. 19. 
975
 Methanex v. United States, UNCITRAL (NAFTA) Final Award, 3 August 2005. 
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its investments, 
including its share of 
the California and 
wider US oxygenate 
markets, was taken by 
the measure that was 
arbitrary in nature. 
 
 
 
and the critical impact 
that the Tribunal’s 
decision will have on 
environmental and 
public welfare law-
making.’ It was also 
contended that the 
interpretation of the 
Chapter 11 of the 
NAFTA should reflect 
legal principles 
underlying the concept 
of sustainable 
development.’976 
Tribunal famously 
declared: ‘[A]s a matter 
of general international 
law, a non-
discriminatory 
regulation for a public 
purpose, which is 
enacted in accordance 
with due process and, 
which affects, inter 
alios, a foreign investor 
or investment is not 
deemed expropriatory 
and compensable 
unless specific 
commitments had been 
given by the regulating 
government to the then 
putative foreign 
investor contemplating 
investment that the 
government would 
refrain from such 
regulation.’977 
[9] No such 
commitments were 
given to Methanex. 
emphasis to the public 
interest protection by 
explicitly recognizing  
the customary right of a 
State to regulate for the 
public interest as far as 
the regulation affecting 
the foreign investment 
is performed in good 
faith.  
However, the 
Methanex award does 
not propose a general 
exemption from 
compensation of all 
reasonable, non-
discriminatory general 
regulations since in the 
case at hand, there was 
no substantial 
deprivation of the 
investor’s property by 
the Californian ban.
978
 
Accordingly, the 
Methanex award does 
not provide a clear 
answer in a case of 
substantial deprivation 
would have been 
found. 
Chemtura v. 
Canada
979
 
Chemtura, a company 
producing lindane, 
filed the claim under 
the NAFTA Chapter 
11 due to the gradual 
phase-out of the 
agrochemical lindane 
by Canada. The 
investor alleged that 
the ban was lacking a 
rigorous scientific risk 
assessment, hence was 
being enforced in bad 
faith. The investor 
claimed violations of 
the FET, MFN, and 
indirect expropriation 
standards. 
[131], [134]-[137]  
Canada argued that its 
gradual ban was based 
on the legitimate 
human health and 
envioronmental 
protection 
considerations  in 
accordance with 
international 
undertakings by 
Canada. 
[128], [131], [134-7], 
[139], [147] 
The Tribunal found 
that the ban was non-
discriminatory, in 
compliance with due 
process and based on 
widely accepted 
scientific data 
recognizing lindane as 
a dangerous chemical. 
Legitimacy of the ban 
was supported by the 
fact that many 
countries had taken 
steps to ban the use of 
lindane, and that the 
ban was necessitated 
by Canada’s 
international 
environmental 
obligations. 
[266] The Tribunal 
stated that 
Like the Methanex 
award, the Chemtura 
Tribunal approved the 
‘context doctrine’ 
approach. However, the 
Tribunal found no 
‘substantial 
deprivation’ of the 
Chemtura’s investment 
([263]-[266]). 
Nevertheless, [266] the 
award arguably 
supports the position 
that a legitimate 
suppression of a 
previously legal 
activity through 
recognized police 
powers of state 
destroying the 
investor’s business may 
exempt the host state 
from the obligation to 
pay compensation 
                                                 
976
 Methanex v. United States  (NAFTA), Decision on Amici Curiae, 15 January 2001 [5]. 
977
 See also Saluka v. Czech Republic [262]-[263]. 
978
 Methanex v. US, Part, Part IV - Chapter D [16]. 
979
 Chemtura v. Canada, NAFTA, UNCITRAL, Award August 2 2010. 
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‘[i]rrespective of the 
existence of a 
contractual deprivation, 
(...) a measure adopted 
under such 
circumstances is a valid 
exercise of the State’s 
police powers and, as a 
result, does not 
constitute an 
expropriation’.980  
under international law. 
Pac Rim v. El 
Salvador
 981
  
El Salvador delayed 
and ultimately 
declined to issue 
certain environmental 
permits for gold 
mining in Ecuador.  
The investor, a United 
States mining 
company, complained 
that a revocation of 
permits for its 
exploration and 
exploitation projects 
had amounted, among  
others, to indirect 
expropriation of the 
investor’s investment 
in certain mining 
areas. 
The government 
protested the claim by 
stating it was 
concerned about the 
underwater pollution 
caused by industrial 
gold mining.
982
 
Therefore, El Salvador 
responded that Pacific 
Rim failed to complete 
domestic requirements 
for obtaining  
necessary permits 
including the 
environmental impact 
assessment.  
Merits of the case are 
pending under the 
domestic investment 
statute. 
 
Pac Rim v. El Salvador 
and San Sebastian v. El 
Salvador disputes 
represent a potential 
clash between the 
ability of the host State 
to shift towards a more 
environmentally-
friendly policy and its 
international 
investment protection 
obligations that might 
significantly limit that 
ability. 
San Sebastian v. El 
Salvador 
983
 
El Salvador revoked 
the investors’ 
environmental permits 
and did not renew their 
exploration licenses 
for gold mining in 
Ecuador. Commerce 
Group and San 
Sebastian alleged that 
these governmental 
actions violated 
several investment 
guarantees of the 
CAFTA, including the 
protection against 
indirect expropriation 
Similar as for Pac Rim 
arbitration (above). 
[140] ‘The Tribunal 
rejected its jurisdiction 
and competence 
pursuant to CAFTA 
primarily on the ground 
that the claimants had 
failed to discontinue 
local litigation in El 
Salvador before turning 
to international 
arbitration.’ 
 
See above (Pac Rim). 
                                                 
980
 referring to Saluka v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, [262]. 
981
 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, CAFTA, ICSID Case No.ARB/09/12, 
Award on Merits Pending (Decision on the Respondent’s Preliminary Objections Under CAFTA 
Articles 10.20.4 and 10.20.5, 2 August 2010). 
982
 Gus Van Harten, ‘Thinking twice about a gold rush: Pacific Rim v El Salvador,’ Columbia FDI 
Perspectives, No. 23, May 24, 2010. 
983
 San Sebastian v El Salvador, CAFTA, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/17, Award 14 March 2011. 
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of their interests in the 
gold mining venture. 
Marion and Reinhard 
Unglaube v. Costa 
Rica
984
 
Investors having an 
investment in the 
ecotourism sector of 
Costa Rica brought a 
claim to arbitration for 
several alleged 
violations of the Costa 
Rica-Germany BIT. In 
1991, Costa Rica 
issued a decree 
creating a new national 
park for the protection 
of leatherback turtles. 
The creation of the 
park implied 
expropriation of part of 
the investors’ land. 
Investors claimed that 
effective expropriation 
of their land inside and 
outside the Park 
territory took place. 
Other claims involved 
alleged FET violations, 
failure to grant full 
protection and security 
and arbitrary and 
discriminatory 
treatment ([168]). 
Overall, Costa Rica  
emphasized its 
important 
responsibilities 
to protect the seriously 
endangered leatherback 
turtles. These 
obligations were 
stemming from the 
Constitution of Costa 
Rica and the Inter-
American Convention 
for the Protection and 
Conservation of Sea 
Turtles ([101]-[103], 
[140]). 
Regarding Costa Rica’s 
actions that did not 
relate to the direct 
expropriation of the 
investors’ land strip 
within the Park 
territory, the country 
insisted it had 
exercised its bona fide 
regulatory autonomy 
for clear and important 
public interest that did 
not amount to 
expropriation ([144]). 
Concerning the direct 
expropriation of the 
investors’ land strip 
within the Park 
territory, Costa Rica 
alleged that the 
expropriation was legal 
and the claim was 
premature ([156]-
[158]), since the issue 
on the precise amount 
of compensation for the 
expropriation was 
pending before 
domestic courts. 
 
 
The Tribunal approved 
the importance of the 
public purpose at issue 
([163]) and customary 
right of the State to 
take property for such a 
purpose ([166]-[167]). 
However, the Tribunal 
held: ([167]) ‘While 
the subject of the 
protection of 
endangered species is 
an important one, the 
Tribunal finds that the 
crucial elements of this 
dispute involve more 
mundane issues of fact 
and law as they relate 
to the legality of the 
[expropriation].’ 
Thus, the only claim 
that survived was the 
one of the illegal 
expropriation of the 
land strip inside the 
Park territory. Even if 
the land was meant to 
be directly 
expropriated, the 
expropriation process 
was not complete. 
Until the day of the 
Award, the Investors 
and the country had on-
going domestic 
disputes over the 
legality of the 
expropriation and the 
amount of due 
compensation 
constituting significant 
delay in the intended 
taking. Therefore, the 
Tribunal held that 
Costa Rica did not 
make timely 
arrangements to 
determine and make 
payment to the Investor 
([209]-[210]) 
constituting a breach of 
the expropriation 
standard. Since the 
expropriation was 
The Unglaube Tribunal 
referred to the Santa 
Elena award as an 
authority, and it did 
limit the notorious 
parts of the Santa 
Elena ruling on 
expropriation. 
First, while dealing 
with the argument by 
Costa Rica that 
expropriation was 
lawful since the 
compensation issue 
was to be resolved in 
the future, the Tribunal 
highlighted the 
similarity with the 
Santa Elena case, 
where equally intense 
domestic legal 
proceedings resulted in 
delay of timely 
compensation. The 
Tribunal stated: 
[216] ‘Then, as now, 
Costa Rican law 
included provisions 
which required, inter 
alia, that property 
expropriated for a 
public purpose must be 
dedicated to that 
purpose within 10 
years [...]’  
Since the time limit 
was exceeded, the 
Unglaube Tribunal 
referred to the Santa 
Elena award as an 
authority for 
constituting the fact of 
unlawful expropriation   
of the Investors land in 
the Park territory 
([218]-[221]). 
Second, the Unglaube 
Tribunal held that lack 
of a timely 
arrangement of 
compensation was not 
justified because the 
expropriation was 
intended for bona fide 
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found to be unlawful 
due to the overly long 
time-period for paying 
prompt compensation,  
the Tribunal undertook 
to decide the proper 
compensation for the 
expropriation. 
Both parties agreed 
principally on the fair 
market value as the 
applicable standard of 
compensation ([309], 
[203]). 
public purpose ([213] -
[214]). 
In this context, the 
Unglaube Tribunal 
cited the notorious 
paragraph  72 of Santa 
Elena : 
[217] ‘Expropriatory 
environmental 
measures – no matter 
how laudable and 
beneficial to society as 
a whole – are, in 
this respect, similar to 
any other expropriatory 
measures that a state 
may take in order to 
implement its policies.’  
Hence, the Unglaube 
Tribunal is noteworthy 
for limiting the reading 
of that paragraph to 
merely prove the point 
that already established 
expropriation must 
meet its legitimacy 
criteria under 
international law 
including timely 
compensation.  
Vattenfall v. 
Germany
985
  
Swedish energy 
company Vattenfall  
claims compensation 
for alleged losses 
resulting from the 
recent decision by 
Germany to phase-out 
nuclear power. 
Vattenfall bases its 
claim on the Energy 
Charter Treaty.
986
 
Country’s precaution 
within its energy 
policy, shifting the 
policy after the 
Fukushima tragedy in 
Japan. 
Pending.  
Bilcon/Clayton v. 
Canada
987
 
The dispute arose from 
the environmental 
impact assessment 
process of the 
unpopular Nova Scotia 
basalt quarry site and 
Canada argues that 
differences in 
regulatory goals and in 
various projects allow 
different treatments for 
different projects. 
Canada argues that the 
complex and thorough 
environmental 
Pending. 
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its associated marine 
terminal. The investor 
brought Canada to 
arbitration after the 
rejection of its quarry 
terminal project due to 
the conclusions of the 
impact assessment. 
The investor claims 
various mistreatments 
by Canadian 
authorities including 
an overly excessive 
environment impact 
assessment, and hence, 
a violation of  the 
investor’s expectations 
for a stable legal and 
business environment. 
The investor also 
insists the application 
of the precautionary 
principle was 
discriminatory, as it 
was not applied to 
other comparable 
projects. 
assessment was 
necessitated because of 
‘the modern concept of 
the “environment” 
encompassing both 
biophysical 
components like the 
air, land, water, flora 
and fauna, and human 
components such as 
socio-economic 
conditions, 
environmental health 
and the physical and 
cultural heritage of a 
place’.988 Since all of 
these elements were 
potentially affected by 
the investment project, 
Canada has analyzed 
them in the 
environmental 
assessment resulting in 
the rejection of the 
project. 
Philip Morris v. 
Australia
989
/ Philip 
Morris v. Uruguay
990
 
The cases developed 
from the recently-
enacted laws by 
Australia and Uruguay 
mandating the plain 
packaging of tobacco 
products.  
Investors claim the 
existence of 
expropriation and 
violations of the FET 
standard and, in 
particular, the violation 
of legitimate 
expectations for legal 
stability. 
 
States argue that the 
plain packaging laws 
are necessary for public 
health protection 
reasons. These laws are 
said to be supported by 
a broad range of 
studies, and not 
amounting to 
expropriation since 
they do not raise a 
substantial deprivation 
of the investments. 
Furthermore, Australia 
claims the investor was 
able to expect such 
regulatory changes 
within the country 
since the regulations 
challenged are the 
consequential outcome 
Pending.  
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of the long term policy 
by the government. 
Australia also refers to 
its compliance with the 
practices of other 
member states of the 
World Health 
Organization and  
to the requirements of 
the Framework 
Convention on 
Tobacco Control. 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ASPECT: SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT/CULTURAL 
HERITAGE PROTECTION/HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES LIKE ACCESS TO WATER AND 
SANITATION SERVICES AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 
SPP v. Egypt
991
 
The claim emerged 
from the termination of  
the Pyramids Oasis 
Project for developing 
a tourist resort near the 
Pyramids. The project 
was rejected because 
Egypt had included the 
area in the World 
Cultural Heritage List 
after the investment 
was accepted in the 
country. 
[156], [158], [160]- 
[164] Egypt invoked its 
obligations under the 
UNESCO Cultural 
Heritage Convention as 
grounds for the 
termination of the 
project, claiming that 
the compensable 
expropriation did not 
take place.  
[158] The Tribunal 
maintained that, as a 
matter of international 
law, Egypt acted 
legitimately by 
cancelling a tourist 
development project 
situated on its own 
territory for the 
purpose of protecting 
antiquities belonging to 
the World Heritage. 
However, [159] the 
Tribunal noted that 
both Egyptian and 
international law 
required to pay fair 
compensation in the 
event of expropriation 
including for the 
purpose of 
safeguarding  
antiquities. 
Nevertheless, 
[190-191] the Tribunal 
limited the content of 
‘legitimate 
expectations’ for the 
amount of 
expropriation and 
consequently decided 
not to award lucrum 
cessans from the date 
of the inclusion of the 
project area in the 
Word Heritage List. 
Starting from that date 
the investor had lost its 
legitimate expectations 
to gain profit of such 
Similarly as in Santa 
Elena v. Costa Rica, 
the SPP Tribunal 
approved the general 
rule that any 
expropriation is 
compensable. 
However, contrary to 
Santa Elena, the SPP v. 
Egypt Tribunal took 
into account  the 
UNESCO Convention  
for informing the 
content of ‘legitimate 
expectations’ for fair 
compensation of the 
expropriated property 
(sub-element of 
indirect expropriation 
standard). 
This last aspect 
indicates a careful 
balance between the 
protection of public 
interest and the 
investor’s private 
interest. 
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an activity. 
Vivendi v. Argentina 
(Resubmitted)
992
  
The dispute arose out 
of the troubled 
relationship between 
the parties to a 
concession agreement 
that privatized the 
water and sewage 
services of the 
Province of Tucumán 
in Argentina.  
The problems occurred 
out of the complex 
factual issues like the 
increase by the 
investor of the tariffs, 
corresponding reaction 
by the governmental 
authorities, two 
incidents of water 
turbidity and an 
overreacted response 
by the authorities to it.  
 
 
[3.3.3.]- [3.3.5] 
Argentina claimed that 
its treatment of the 
investor by terminating 
the concession and 
supporting the 
customers not to pay 
the bills for 
contaminated water fell 
within its regulatory 
activity ‘and that this is 
even more so the case 
when the service 
provided is as vital as 
the provision of water 
and sewage services.’ 
[7.5.20], [7.5.34] 
The Tribunal took a 
different approach and 
focused merely on the 
effects of the 
governmental 
measures, stating 
‘There is extensive 
authority for the 
proposition that the 
state’s intent, or its 
subjective motives are 
at most a secondary 
consideration [...] 
While intent will weigh 
in favour of showing a 
measure to be 
expropriatory, it is not 
a requirement, because 
the effect of the 
measure on the 
investor, not the state’s 
intent, is the critical 
factor.’ 
[7.5.21] Further, the 
Tribunal held: 
‘If public purpose 
automatically 
immunises the measure 
from being found to be 
expropriatory, then 
there would never be a 
compensable taking for 
a public purpose.’ 
Overall, this award is 
another ‘sole effects’ 
doctrine award. 
It is apparent that 
Argentina and the 
Tribunal focused on 
different issues: 
Argentina allegedly 
referred to the police 
powers exceptions 
under customary 
international law but 
the Tribunal reduced 
the issue to the intent to 
expropriate, which, 
indeed, is not a 
decisive factor in the 
establishment of 
indirect expropriation.   
Similarly to the 
Metalclad award, the 
Vivendi Tribunal did 
not acknowledge the 
necessity to distinguish 
between regulatory 
measures amounting to 
expropriation and non-
compensable police 
powers exceptions, 
confusing two separate 
steps  - the 
establishment of the 
existence of 
expropriation and the  
legitimacy assessment 
of the already 
established 
expropriation. 
Biwater Gauff v. 
Tanzania
993
 
Biwater, an investor in 
water and sanitation 
services in Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania, had 
underestimated the 
difficulty of the project 
and had failed to 
allocate sufficient 
managerial and 
financial resources to 
it. The investor’s 
provision of water and 
[419] Tanzania rejected 
the existence of the 
expropriation since the 
very conduct of the 
investor had led to the 
mismanagement of the 
water and sanitation 
services and the 
investor had financially 
failed and, therefore, 
there was nothing to be 
expropriated. 
Furthermore, the 
Republic noted that: 
The tribunal held that 
some aspects of 
Tanzania’s conduct 
amounted to 
expropriation 
(substantial 
deprivation) of  the 
investor’s contractual 
rights to operate water 
and sewerage services 
([489]-[510], [518]-
[519]) and breached 
FET.  
The conduct in 
Although the Tribunal 
focused solely on the 
effects of the State’s 
conduct, it nevertheless 
took into account the 
circumstances of the 
case, namely the 
investor’s own failures 
in managing the 
company. 
Consequently no 
damages were awarded 
to the investor for the 
violations of the 
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sanitation services 
caused protests by 
local residents, 
objecting to the quality 
of the services. Since 
Biwater experienced 
serious financial 
problems, it requested 
an increase in tariffs. 
The raise in tariffs was 
rejected by the 
government. Later, the 
governmental 
authorities terminated 
the contract with 
Biwater, occupied 
investor’s facilities, 
took over the 
management of the 
company, and deported 
senior managers of the 
investor’s local 
company.  
Biwater brought a 
claim under the UK-
Tanzania BIT claiming 
that the combined 
effect of the 
Republic’s conduct 
amounted to de facto 
expropriation and 
other violations of the 
BIT ([393], [418]). 
 
‘Water and sanitation 
services are vitally 
important, and the 
Republic has more than 
a right to protect such 
services in case of a 
crisis: it has a moral 
and perhaps even a 
legal obligation to do 
so.’  
[436] ‘In short, City 
Water had created a 
real threat to public 
health and welfare. 
DAWASA and 
the Government judged 
quite reasonably that 
the system had to be 
freed of City Water’s 
control. Considering 
the importance of the 
issue at hand, the fact 
that City Water was 
entitled to remain in 
control for three weeks 
at most, and City 
Water’s own 
responsibility 
for creating the crisis, 
the Government acted 
well within the 
Republic’s margin of 
appreciation under 
international law.’ 
violation of the BIT 
was the seizing of the 
assets of the Company, 
the usurpation of the 
management control, 
and the deportation of 
the company’s 
management. 
However, the Tribunal 
did not award damages 
to the investor because 
of lack of economic 
damages done. 
investment protection 
guarantees. 
Glamis Gold v. US
994
 
The claim arose from 
the non approval of the 
investor’s, a Canadian 
mining company, 
new mining project 
and from the 
limitations imposed on 
its existing mining 
rights by new 
California legislations 
requiring a complex 
environmental and 
cultural impact 
assessment and full 
back-filling of open-
pits in order to protect 
the Quechan Indians 
religious, cultural and 
historic sites in the 
investment area. The 
investor asserted that 
[107]-[110], [153] In 
its defence, the US 
Government had 
insisted that the new 
regulations were 
designed to promote 
important public 
interests – including 
public safety and the 
protection of Native 
American cultural sites. 
Any other alleged 
procedural 
mistreatments were 
caused by the fact that 
Canada was dealing 
with a mining project 
with particularly 
notable environmental 
and cultural 
implications. 
 
[536] The Tribunal 
rejected the 
expropriation claim 
because ‘the first factor 
in any expropriation 
analysis is not met’, 
namely there was no 
substantial deprivation 
of the investor’s 
investment. 
[354] Nevertheless, the 
Tribunal approved that 
‘a State is not 
responsible, however, 
“for loss of property or 
for other economic 
disadvantage resulting 
from bona fide … 
regulation … if it is not 
discriminatory.’995  
As a result, all 
investor’s claims were 
Glamis Gold is a good 
example of regulatory 
expropriation, where 
the protection of such 
non-investment 
interests as indigenous 
rights, cultural heritage 
and environmental 
protection has caused 
allegations of 
regulatory 
expropriation of the 
investor’s property. 
The Tribunal (in 
contrast to Methanex v. 
US) started its analysis 
with the assessment of 
the existence of 
‘substantial 
deprivation’ of the 
investor’s property and 
rejected the existence 
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these new 
requirements 
amounted to regulatory 
expropriation of its 
mining rights making 
the project 
economically 
unfeasible [356]. 
Further, Glamis 
claimed violation of 
FET under the NAFTA 
Article 1105. The FET 
claim was based on the 
same factual 
circumstances, and the 
investor regarded the 
situation as arbitrary 
and in breach of its 
reasonable 
expectations for legal 
stability. 
rejected, and the 
company was ordered 
to pay 2/3 of the 
arbitration costs and 
their own legal 
expenses. 
of indirect 
expropriation since the 
investor’s losses were 
not significant enough. 
However, like 
Methanex, the Glamis 
award reflects the 
approval of non-
compensable police 
powers in a wider 
sense, namely without 
a substantial 
deprivation of the 
investor’s investment. 
 
Merrill v. Canada
996
  
The case lodged by a 
U.S. forestry company 
arose from the 
restrictions imposed by 
Canada on the export 
of logs from Canada to 
the United States. The 
restriction was the 
surplus testing 
procedure requiring 
that logs from both 
private and public land 
had to be deemed 
surplus to provincial 
needs before they 
could be exported 
([28]). 
The investor argued 
that the Log Export 
Control Regime 
resulted in indirect 
expropriation since it 
controlled the 
processing and selling 
of its logs ([120]- 
[129]). Further, the 
investor claimed these 
restrictions were 
arbitrary and 
discriminatory, since 
their real aim was to 
provide low cost raw 
material for domestic 
sawmills in British 
 [134] Canada insisted 
that there was no 
substantial deprivation 
of any of investors 
investment, and [235] 
that the Log Export 
Control Regime 
reflected a legitimate 
industrial public policy 
objective – to promote 
local processing of its 
timber through the 
creation of domestic 
employment and 
retention in Canada of 
part of the timber value 
chain (which applied 
both to nationals and 
foreigner).  
 
The Tribunal dismissed 
the expropriation claim 
on the basis of lack of 
the substantial 
deprivation.  There 
cannot be an 
expropriation of 
potential future income 
like expectations of 
getting a certain price 
level at the 
international market . 
([150], [215]). 
Further, the Tribunal 
accepted Canada’s  
Log Export Control 
Regime as a legitimate 
public policy that did 
not constitute an abrupt 
change of the legal 
environment ([236]). 
However, in reaching 
that conclusion, the 
Tribunal analyzed in 
detail the purposes and 
objectives of the 
Regulation so as to see 
if they were issued 
genuinely for public 
interest([223] –[224]).  
The Tribunal dealt with 
the legitimacy of the 
Log Export Control 
Regime under the 
wider FET standard. 
The Merrill award 
indicates a balanced 
approach between the 
interests of an investor 
and a State by paying 
detailed analysis to the 
sub-elements of the 
FET standard. 
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Columbia at the 
expense of private log 
producers ([217]). 
Under FET, the 
Tribunal approved the 
legitimacy of Canada’s 
measure ([153], [217]-
[246]), among others, 
because the investor 
did not have legitimate 
expectations to the 
contrary effect and 
there were no actual 
damages that the 
investor had suffered, 
even if some of the 
motives of the 
Regulation were hardly 
serving genuine public 
interest. 
Suez v. Argentina
997
  
The case was related to 
the Argentina crisis 
management measures, 
and concerned the 
concession for water 
distribution and 
treatment services in 
Buenos Aires. During 
and after the crisis, 
Argentina refused a 
revision of the tariffs, 
even if the costs of the 
concession increased. 
Nevertheless, 
Argentina required full 
compliance of the 
obligations under the 
Concession. In 
addition, Argentina 
alleged the existence 
of high levels of 
nitrates in the water 
being distributed by 
the investor, 
commencing formal 
investigation. In the 
end, Argentina 
terminated the 
Concession, and 
transferred it to the 
company owned by 
Argentina. Investors 
brought a claim against 
Argentina asserting 
violations of 
guarantees against 
indirect expropriation 
Argentina argued that 
none of its actions 
violated the BITs and 
that the measures 
where aimed at fighting 
the crisis and providing 
access to water services 
in the country. 
The Tribunal affirmed 
the importance of the 
‘effect’ of the measure 
as a decisive criterion 
for finding 
expropriation. ([133]-
[134]). 
However, the Tribunal 
went on by stating  
(referring to the 
Methanex and Saluka 
awards): 
[139]  ‘As numerous 
cases have pointed out, 
in evaluating a claim of 
expropriation it is 
important to recognize 
a State’s legitimate 
right to regulate and to 
exercise its police 
power in the 
interests of public 
welfare and not to 
confuse measures of 
that nature with 
expropriation.’ Hence, 
the Tribunal concluded 
that the Argentina 
crisis management 
measures were within 
the general police 
powers of Argentina, 
and they did not 
constitute a permanent 
and substantial 
deprivation of the 
investment ([140]). 
Further, no substantial 
In contrast to 
Metalclad v. Mexico 
and Vivendi v. 
Argentina 
(Resubmitted), the Suez 
v. Argentina Tribunal 
acknowledged the 
necessity to distinguish 
between regulatory 
measures having the 
effect of expropriation 
and a valid exercise of 
a customary non-
compensable State’s 
regulatory powers 
(police powers in both 
a wide and narrow 
sense). 
[134] Hence, the 
Tribunal took a much 
more cautious approach 
with regard to the 
effects of the 
requirement as the 
‘sole effects’ doctrine 
awards do. The 
Tribunal characterized 
the criterion of the 
effect on the 
investment ‘as an 
important element in 
determining if the 
measure constitutes an 
expropriation 
requiring 
compensation’ but not 
as the sole element. 
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of their investments 
and breaches of FPS 
and FET. 
The investors alleged 
these measures 
amounted to 
expropriation:1) acts 
of a general legal or 
regulatory nature, 
enacted to cope with 
the financial crisis and 
its aftermath; 2) the 
failure of the 
Argentine government 
to revise the tariffs in 
line with the legal 
framework established 
by the Concession 
Contract and 3) the 
actions taken by the 
Argentine government 
at the time of the 
termination of 
the Concession. 
deprivation was found 
by Argentina’s refusal 
to revise the tariffs 
([145]). Finally, 
regarding the 
termination of the 
Concession, the 
Tribunal noted it was 
contractual in nature 
([147]). Thus, the 
investor’s claim under 
the indirect 
expropriation standard 
failed. 
Piero Foresti v. South 
Africa
998
 
The investors 
complained about 
South Africa’s Black 
Economic 
Empowerment 
programme requiring 
the introduction of 
compulsory equity 
divestiture benefiting 
the historically 
disadvantaged South 
Africans. Italian 
investors claimed that 
these South African 
attempts to deal with 
the consequences of 
apartheid amounted to 
expropriation of Italian 
investment in the 
granite sector.   
South Africa claimed 
its measures were 
within its regulatory 
autonomy as an attempt 
to deal with the 
consequences of 
apartheid. 
Amicable settlement 
was reached between 
the parties after the 
Tribunal found 
jurisdiction over the 
claim. 
The investors 
discontinued the claim 
as they agreed with the 
State on the individual 
Black Economic 
Empowerment 
arrangements. 
Initiation of this 
arbitration raised 
politically sensitive 
questions, since it 
touched upon the 
interrelation between 
South Africa’s 
constitutional, human 
rights law and 
international 
investment law 
obligations. 
[79]  
This situation has 
fuelled concerns about 
the overly broad reach 
of the indirect 
expropriation standard 
on the host State’s 
ability to safeguard 
legitimate public 
welfare objectives 
unduly limiting its 
administrative, 
legislative, or judicial 
powers. 
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BOX 2. UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO INVOKE NON-INVESTMENT 
OBLIGATIONS  
[..] - Relevant paragraph of an award. 
Awards are listed in chronological order. 
 
Arbitral award 
Facts of the case 
Public interest 
defence by a host 
State (and/or amici 
arguments) invoking 
non-investment 
international 
commitments 
Response by a tribunal 
on the necessity to 
address non-investment 
international obligations 
Comments 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ASPECT: THE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION 
Santa Elena, S.A. v 
The Republic of Costa 
Rica
999
 
The award emerged 
from the disagreement 
between the foreign 
investor and Costa 
Rica on the amount of 
compensation to be 
paid for the direct 
expropriation of the 
investor’s property 
which was supposed to 
be included in the 
nature protection park. 
Costa Rica noted that: 
[18] ‘The lands [...] 
contain flora and fauna 
of great scientific, 
recreational, 
educational, and 
tourism value, as well 
as beaches that are 
especially important as 
spawning grounds for 
sea turtles.’ 
Furthermore, Costa 
Rica had longstanding 
commitments and 
efforts to add the area 
of the investor’s 
property to the World 
Heritage List under the 
World Heritage 
Convention. Costa 
Rica’s conservationist 
objectives for unique 
flora and fauna were 
buttressed by numerous 
treaties to which it was 
party like the Western 
Hemisphere 
Convention, the 
Convention 
Concerning the 
Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural 
Heritage, the 
Convention on 
Wetlands, the 1992 
Convention on 
Biological Diversity 
and the Central 
[71] ‘While an 
expropriation or taking 
for environmental 
reasons may be classified 
as a taking for a public 
purpose, and thus may be 
legitimate, the fact that 
the Property was taken 
for this reason does not 
affect either the nature or 
the measure of the 
compensation to be paid 
for the taking. That is, 
the purpose of protecting 
the environment for 
which the Property was 
taken does not alter the 
legal character of the 
taking for which 
adequate compensation 
must be paid. The 
international 
source of the obligation 
to protect the 
environment makes no 
difference.’ 
[72] ‘Expropriatory 
environmental 
measures—no matter 
how laudable 
and beneficial to society 
as a whole—are, in this 
respect, similar 
to any other 
expropriatory measures 
that a state may take in 
order to implement its 
policies: where property 
The Santa Elena 
award is notable for 
skipping entirely the 
identification of the 
existence of a 
potential conflict in 
applicable law in 
contrast to SPP v. 
Egypt.  
Moreover, Santa 
Elena did not address 
the potential effect 
non-investment 
obligations invoked 
by Costa Rica could 
have on the valuation 
of the expropriated 
property (contrary to 
the approach taken in, 
e.g., SPP v. Egypt, 
where the Tribunal 
had considered the 
effect of the World 
Heritage Convention 
on the valuation of 
expropriated property 
([156]) and on the 
amount of 
compensation due). 
The Santa Elena 
Tribunal unduly 
reduced the issue of 
the effect that non-
investment 
international law 
might have on the 
amount of 
compensation to the 
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 Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v The Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/96/1, Award of 17 February 2000, 15 ICISD REV – FILJ 169 (2000).  
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American Regional 
Convention for the 
Management and 
Conservation of the 
Natural Forest 
Ecosystems.
1000
 
For these reasons, [35] 
the State argued for 
such valuation of the 
property’s fair  market 
value that would have 
taken into account ‘the 
existing environmental 
legislation that would 
significantly restrict, if 
not prohibit outright, 
the commercial 
development 
of Santa Elena’. 
is expropriated, 
even for environmental 
purposes, whether 
domestic or international, 
the state’s obligation to 
pay compensation 
remains.’ 
mere statement that 
‘[t]he international 
source of the 
obligation to protect 
the environment 
makes no 
difference’ and that 
expropriation for 
whatever purpose 
needs to be 
compensated (the fact 
that was never 
questioned by Costa 
Rica). 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ASPECT: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
RELATED TO CRISIS MANAGEMENT MEASURES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES LIKE 
ACCESS TO WATER AND SANITATION SERVICES 
 Azurix v. 
Argentina,
1001
 
The investor was 
seeking compensation 
for the termination of a 
water and sewage 
concession in Buenos 
Aires. 
[254] Argentina had 
attempted to invoke as 
applicable law human 
rights that protect 
consumers’ rights and 
had pointed to the 
potential conflict 
between the relevant 
BITs and Argentina’s 
human rights 
obligations. Argentina 
had stated that a 
conflict had to be 
resolved in favour of 
human rights. 
[261]The Tribunal 
rejected Argentina’s 
arguments on the 
potential conflict of 
norms in applicable law 
as not fully elaborated, 
since Argentina failed to 
establish the 
incompatibility in the 
specifics of the instant 
case. 
 
It was Argentina’s 
first attempt to invoke 
the existence of the 
conflict between the 
BIT and its human 
rights obligations. 
Anyhow, Argentina’s 
claim that human 
rights should ‘trump’ 
investment law would 
be difficult to 
substantiate, unless 
the human rights 
invoked are covered 
by jus cogens norms 
and Article 103 of the 
UN Charter.
1002
 
Siemens v. 
Argentina
1003
 
Investors claimed that 
Argentina had 
expropriated Siemens’ 
contractual rights and 
had denied the firm 
FET when it 
[75] ‘Argentina 
contended its human 
rights obligations 
would be disregarded 
by recognizing the 
allegedly expropriated 
contractual property 
rights asserted by 
[79] ‘In this respect, the 
Tribunal notes the 
reference made by 
Argentina to 
international human 
rights law ranking at the 
level of the Constitution 
after the 1994 
It was Argentina’s 
burden to prove 
credibility of the 
existence of the 
conflict between 
human rights and the 
BIT. 
Since the network of 
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 Charles N. Brower, Jarrod Wong, ‘General Valuation Principles: The Case of Santa Elena’ in 
Todd Weiler (ed), International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, 
NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law (Cameron May 2005), Chapter 20, 747, 
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terminated its 
controversial 
concession contract for 
the delivery of national 
identity cards. 
Siemens given the 
social and economic 
conditions of 
Argentina. Argentina 
claimed that the 
measures it took were 
in defence of vital 
security of the State, to 
keep the data on its 
inhabitants secure since 
otherwise it would 
violate rights enshrined 
in international treaties 
on the protection of 
human rights.’  
[346] ‘Argentina 
argues that the fair 
market value of an 
expropriated property 
as the measure of 
compensation for an 
expropriated 
investment is not 
always applicable 
when an expropriation 
becomes necessary for 
social policy reasons. If 
this would not be the 
case, it would be a 
serious limitation on 
State sovereignty, and 
no social or economic 
reforms could be 
accomplished by 
poorer nations. 
Argentina maintains 
that it had effectively 
become bankrupt, and 
that to maintain that an 
expropriation is only 
lawful if full market 
compensation is 
payable is incompatible 
with the principle of 
self-determination. 
Argentina also refers to 
the statement of the 
European Court of 
Human Rights in 
James v. UK, which 
held that Article 1 of 
the First Protocol does 
not “guarantee a right 
to full compensation in 
all circumstances. 
Legitimate objectives 
of ‘public interest’ such 
as pursued in measures 
of economic reform or 
measures designed to 
constitutional reform and 
implying that property 
rights claimed in this 
arbitration, if upheld, 
would constitute a breach 
of international human 
rights law. This 
argument has not been 
developed by Argentina. 
The Tribunal considers 
that, without the benefit 
of further elaboration and 
substantiation by the 
parties, it is not an 
argument that, prima 
facie, bears any 
relationship to the merits 
of this case.’  
[354] ‘Argentina has 
pleaded that, when a 
State expropriates for 
social or economic 
reasons, fair market 
value does not apply 
because otherwise this 
would limit the 
sovereignty of a country 
to introduce reforms in 
particular of poor 
countries. Argentina has 
not developed this 
argument, nor justified 
on what basis Argentina 
would be considered a 
poor country, nor 
specified the reforms it 
sought to carry out at the 
time. Argentina in its 
allegations has relied on 
Tecmed as an example to 
follow in terms of 
considering the purpose 
and proportionality of the 
measures taken. The 
Tribunal observes that 
these considerations 
were part of that 
tribunal’s determination 
of whether an 
expropriation had 
occurred and not of its 
determination of 
compensation. The 
Tribunal further observes 
that Article I of the First 
Protocol to the European 
Convention on Human 
Rights permits a margin 
of appreciation not found 
in customary 
IIAs requires full 
market value 
compensation for 
expropriation, 
Argentina’s argument 
in [346] meant the 
deviation form the 
very wording of the 
applicable BIT. 
Argentina could argue  
that the determination 
of  fair market value 
was affected by 
Argentina’s non-
investment 
international 
obligations and their 
effect on the content 
of the investor’s 
legitimate 
expectations for what 
fair market value 
would be (as it was 
successfully done in 
SPP v. Egypt). 
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achieve greater social 
justice, may call for 
less than 
reimbursement of full 
market value.’ 
international law or the 
Treaty.’  
Biwater Gauff v. 
Tanzania
1004
 
Biwater, an investor in 
water and sanitation 
services in Tanzania, 
had underestimated the 
difficulty of the project 
and had failed to 
allocate sufficient 
managerial and 
financial resources to 
it. The investor’s 
provision of water and 
sanitation services 
caused protests by 
local residents 
objecting to the quality 
and price of the 
services. Since Biwater 
experienced serious 
financial problems, it 
requested an increase 
in tariffs which was 
rejected by the 
government. Later, 
governmental 
authorities terminated 
the contract with 
Biwater, occupied the 
investor’s facilities, 
took over the 
management of the 
company, and deported 
senior managers of the 
investor’s local 
company.  
Biwater brought a 
claim under the UK-
Tanzania BIT claiming 
that the combined 
effect of the 
Republic’s conduct 
amounted to de facto 
expropriation and 
other violations of the 
BIT ([393], [418]). 
[380] Since Biwater’s 
investment was in 
water and sewage 
systems  that are 
‘intimately related to 
human rights and the 
capacity to achieve 
sustainable 
development’ and also 
carrying with it ‘very 
serious risks to the 
population at large’,  
Amici noted: 
‘[H]uman rights and 
sustainable 
development issues are 
factors that condition 
the nature and extent of 
the investor’s 
responsibilities, and the 
balance of rights and 
obligations as between 
the investor and the 
host State’.  
 [434, 436]Tanzania 
maintained that its 
actions were in order to 
safeguard its local 
population’s vital 
rights to water, since 
the investor was not 
performing its 
obligations and had 
created a real threat to 
public health and 
welfare. Tanzania 
further argued that: 
‘[w]ater and sanitation 
services are vitally 
important, and the 
Republic has more than 
a right to protect such 
services in case of a 
crisis: it has a moral 
and perhaps even a 
legal obligation to do 
so.’ 
Regarding the takeover 
of the control of the 
investor’s company, 
Tanzania asserted: 
[814] The Tribunal found 
amici’s observations 
useful, but did find it 
necessary to elaborate on 
Amici’s proposed issues 
on the investor’s 
responsibility, 
sustainable development 
and human rights, and 
decided the case strictly 
in accordance with the 
BITs terms. 
Similarly, the Tribunal 
did not enter into a 
discussion as to the 
margin of appreciation 
that might be owed to 
Tanzania. 
 
The tribunal held that 
Tanzania had committed 
the expropriation of the 
investor’s contractual 
rights to operate water 
and sewerage services in 
Dar es Salaam and had 
breached FET but did not 
award any compensation 
to the investor. 
The Biwater award is 
remarkable in twofold 
ways. First, it did not 
recognize and, 
therefore, did not deal 
with the potential 
conflict in applicable 
law as it was invoked 
by amici and by 
Tanzania’s reference 
to the margin of 
appreciation doctrine 
for deciding, which 
measures are 
necessary in providing 
the right to water.  
Nevertheless, despite 
sticking strictly to the 
rules of the relevant 
BIT, the Tribunal 
provided a noteworthy 
outcome of the case 
by not allocating any 
damage compensation 
to the investor for 
Tanzania’s violations 
of the expropriation 
standard and FET. 
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[436] ‘Considering the 
importance of the issue 
at hand, the fact that 
City Water [Investor’s 
Company] was entitled 
to remain in control for 
three weeks at most, 
and City Water’s own 
responsibility for 
creating the crisis, the 
Government acted well 
within the Republic’s 
margin of 
appreciation under 
international law.’ 
Suez v. Argentina
1005
 
The case emerged 
from the crisis 
management measures 
of Argentina affecting 
the Concession for 
water distribution and 
treatment services in 
Buenos Aires.  
The investors which 
held the Concession 
complained about the 
crisis management 
measures – freezing of 
the tariffs during and 
after the crisis in 2001-
2002 and contractual 
termination of the 
Concession. 
Argentina had been 
found liable for 
denying FET to the 
foreign investors for 
parts of the challenged 
acts. 
 
[249]-[250],[252],[256] 
Argentina and amicus 
curiae submissions 
invoked Argentina’s 
human rights to water 
obligations as a 
rationale and context 
for the challenged 
actions by Argentina 
during and after the 
crisis. Hence, human 
rights to water 
obligations needed to 
inform the content of 
both Argentina’s 
necessity defence and 
the potential violation 
of investment 
protection guarantees. 
Remarkably: 
[252] ‘Argentina states 
that water cannot be 
treated as an ordinary 
commodity. Because of 
the fundamental role of 
water in sustaining life 
and health and the 
consequent human 
right to water, it 
maintains that in 
judging the conformity 
of governmental 
actions with treaty 
obligations 
this Tribunal must 
grant Argentina a 
broader margin of 
discretion in the 
present cases than in 
cases involving other 
[262] The Tribunal 
interpreted Argentina’s 
and amicus arguments as 
suggesting ‘that 
Argentina’s human rights 
obligations [...] somehow 
trumps its obligations 
under the BITs and [...] 
implicitly gives 
Argentina the authority 
to take actions in 
disregard of its BIT 
obligations’.  
The Tribunal noted that 
the ‘trumping’ argument 
was unsound under the 
BIT and international 
law, and went on by 
stating that in the case at 
hand ‘Argentina’s human 
rights obligations and its 
investment treaty 
obligations are not 
inconsistent, 
contradictory, or 
mutually exclusive’ and 
‘Argentina could have 
respected both types of 
obligations.’ 
 
There are three 
remarkable aspects of 
this award relating to 
the non-investment 
law arguments: 
First, like in Biwater 
v. Tanzania ([436]), 
the Tribunal did not 
address Argentina’s 
argument of wide 
margin of 
appreciation for 
safeguarding human 
rights. 
Second, the Tribunal 
shaped the arguments 
raised by Argentina 
and amici to potential 
conflict in applicable 
law, which it solved 
by presuming against 
the existence of a 
conflict between 
human rights and 
investment protection. 
In contrast, the 
Respondent required 
applying its human 
rights obligations as a 
context that informs 
the content of 
investment 
guarantees; 
nevertheless, it was 
done without much 
precision. 
 It may be guessed 
that Argentina 
intended the Tribunal 
to take human rights 
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commodities and 
services.’ 
Argentina went on by 
stating that: 
‘In order to judge 
whether a treaty 
provision has 
been violated, for 
example the provision 
on fair and equitable 
treatment, Argentina 
argues that this 
Tribunal must take 
account of the context 
in which Argentina 
acted and that the 
human right 
to water informs that 
context.’ 
[256] Amici ‘pointed 
out that human rights 
law recognizes the 
right to water and its 
close linkages with 
other human rights, 
including the right to 
life, health, housing, 
and an adequate 
standard of living. 
Human rights law[..] 
required that Argentina 
adopt measures to 
ensure access to water 
by the population, 
including physical and 
economic access, and 
that its actions in 
confronting the crisis 
fully conformed to 
human rights law. 
Since human rights law 
provides a 
rationale for the crisis 
measures, they argue 
that this Tribunal 
should consider that 
rationale in 
interpreting and 
applying the provisions 
of the BITs in 
question.’ 
obligations into 
account in a way that 
resembles SPP v. 
Egypt (in relation to 
compensation) and 
Parkerings v. 
Lithuania awards 
(relating to ‘like 
circumstances’ under 
MFN).  
Third, since the 
Tribunal applied one 
of the conflict 
avoidance techniques 
under international 
law, namely the 
presumption against 
conflict, it 
significantly differs 
from the earlier Santa 
Elena award that took 
the ‘self-contained’ 
regime approach by 
ignoring entirely the 
possibility of a 
conflicts in applicable 
law. 
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BOX 3. SUCCESSFUL EXAMPLES OF TAKING NON-INVESTMENT LAW 
INTO ACCOUNT IN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION PROCESS 
OF INVESTMENT GUARANTEES 
[..] - Relevant paragraph of an award. 
Awards are listed in chronological order. 
 
Arbitral award 
Facts of the case 
Public interest 
defence by a host 
State (and/or amici 
arguments) invoking 
non-investment 
international 
commitments 
Response by a tribunal 
addressing the potential 
relevance of non-
investment international 
obligations on the merits 
by 
(1) presuming against 
conflict and interpreting 
away conflict, 
(2) informing the content 
of investment guarantees 
by reference to external 
fields of law, or 
(3) addressing non-
investment international 
obligations through 
teleological, effective or 
evolutionary treaty 
interpretation of the 
content of an investment 
guarantee. 
Comments 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ASPECT: THE ENVIRONMENT AND/OR PUBLIC 
HEALTH PROTECTION 
Maffezini v. Spain
1006
 
The investor decided 
to embark on the 
production of various 
chemical products in 
Galicia, Spain. The 
investor established a 
corporation and began 
construction works of 
the plant before the 
environmental 
impact assessment 
(EIA) was obtained. 
The company began to 
experience financial 
difficulties. The 
investor, among 
others, claimed 
responsibility by Spain 
[66] Spain noted that 
the investor ‘was 
specifically informed 
of the applicable legal 
requirements in Spain 
and under the European 
Economic Community, 
particularly as the 
project involved the 
highly toxic chemical 
industry’.  Hence, the 
EIA requirement was 
not arbitrary and could 
not per se lead to the 
discontinuance of the 
project. Spain insisted 
the financial 
difficulties were raised 
by bad business 
decisions entirely 
[67] ‘The Tribunal has 
carefully examined these 
contentions, since the 
Environmental Impact 
Assessment procedure is 
basic for the adequate 
protection of the 
environment and the 
application of 
appropriate preventive 
measures. This is true, 
not only under Spanish 
and EEC law, but also 
increasingly so under 
international law.’ 
[69] ‘Strict procedures 
in this respect are 
provided in EEC 
Directive 85/337 of June 
27, 198523 and in 
The Tribunal took into 
account that not only 
Spanish law required 
an environment 
impact assessment of 
the investment 
project. The EU 
Directives buttressed 
the national law 
requirement.  Hence, 
the Tribunal informed 
the content of the BIT 
provision on 
compliance with local 
laws by taking into 
account Spain’s 
obligations under EU 
law. 
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for EIA as an arbitrary 
requirement imposing 
additional costs on the 
Project. 
unrelated 
to the EIA. 
 
Spain’s Royal 
Legislative Decree No. 
1302/1986 of June 28, 
1986. 
Chemical industries are 
specifically required 
under both measures to 
undertake an EIA. Public 
information, consultation 
with pertinent 
authorities, 
licensing and other 
procedures are also a part 
thereof. The EEC 
Directive, like the one 
that later came to amend 
it, requires “that an EIA 
is undertaken before 
consent is given to 
certain public and private 
projects considered to 
have significant 
environmental 
implications.” 
Suspension of projects 
can be ordered under 
Spanish law, particularly 
if work thereon is begun 
before the EIA is 
approved.
1007
 
[71] The Kingdom of 
Spain and SODIGA have 
done no more in this 
respect than insist on the 
strict observance of the 
EEC and Spanish law 
applicable to the industry 
in question. It follows 
that Spain cannot be held 
responsible for the 
decisions taken by the 
Claimant with regard to 
the EIA. Furthermore, 
the Kingdom of Spain’s 
action is fully consistent 
with Article 
2(1) of the Argentine-
Spain Bilateral 
Investment Treaty, which 
calls for the 
promotion of investment 
in compliance with 
national legislation. The 
Tribunal accordingly 
also dismisses this 
contention by the 
Claimant.’ 
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S.D. Myers v. 
Canada
1008
 
The investor claimed 
that the temporary 
export ban of 
hazardous chemicals 
between Canada and 
the US constituted a 
breach of NAFTA 
Chapter 11, including 
Article 1102 on 
national treatment and 
Article1110 on indirect 
expropriation. 
[150] ‘CANADA’s 
position is that 
[Investor’s] 
construction of Chapter 
11 is inconsistent with 
Canada’s other 
international 
obligations, including 
the Basel Convention 
and Transboundary 
Agreement and that 
these prevail over 
Chapter 11 obligations 
in the circumstances to 
the extent of the 
inconsistency.’ 
[99] - [107] Canada 
argued that its export 
ban of the hazardous 
chemical was in line 
with its international 
commitments to 
minimise the risk to 
human health and the 
environment by the 
chemical. In particular, 
Canada argued the 
export ban was 
designed to fulfil the 
goals set by the Basel 
Convention that 
required managing 
hazardous wastes in an 
environmentally sound 
manner reducing the 
transboundary 
movement of them to a 
minimum. 
 
 
The Tribunal addressed 
the Basel Convention 
argument under Article 
1102 NAFTA. 
[247] ‘The Tribunal 
considers that the legal 
context of Article 1102 
includes the various 
provisions of the 
NAFTA, its companion 
agreement the NAAEC 
and principles that are 
affirmed by the NAAEC 
(including those of the 
Rio declaration).’ 
[250] ‘The Tribunal 
considers that the 
interpretation of the 
phrase “like 
circumstances” in Article 
1102 must take into 
account the general 
principles that emerge 
from the legal context of 
the NAFTA, including 
both its concern with the 
environment and the 
need to avoid trade 
distortions that are not 
justified by 
environmental concerns. 
The assessment of “like 
circumstances” must also 
take into account 
circumstances that would 
justify governmental 
regulations that treat 
them differently in order 
to protect the public 
interest.’ 
[255] ‘Canada was 
concerned to ensure the 
economic strength of the 
Canadian industry, in 
part, because it wanted to 
maintain the ability to 
process PCBs within 
Canada in the future. 
This was a legitimate 
goal, consistent with the 
policy objectives of the 
Basel Convention. There 
were a number of 
legitimate ways by which 
Canada could have 
achieved it, but 
The S.D.Myers 
Tribunal analyzed the 
Basel Convention so 
as to see if a real 
conflict of norms 
existed and whether 
the compliance with 
the Basel Convention 
was a ‘real’ 
motivation for 
Canada’s export ban. 
In contrast to Biwater 
Gauff and Suez v. 
Argentina skipping 
the margin of 
appreciation 
arguments raised by 
States, S.D.Myers 
Tribunal dealt with 
the limits on the 
margin of 
appreciation imposed 
by Article 104 
NAFTA on Canada to 
choose the alternative 
that is least 
inconsistent with 
NAFTA for fulfilling 
its international 
commitments under 
the Basel Convention 
‘provided that the 
alternative is equally 
effective and 
reasonably available’. 
Since there were 
alternative methods 
available to Canada 
for achieving the 
policy objectives of 
the Basel Convention 
not contravening 
Canada’s international 
commitments under 
the NAFTA, the 
Tribunal found a 
violation of the 
NAFTA Chapter 11. 
In sum, the Tribunal 
presumed against 
conflict and 
interpreted away 
conflict of norms with 
the NAFTA and the 
Basel Convention in 
order to establish a 
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preventing SDMI from 
exporting PCBs for 
processing in the USA 
by the use of the Interim 
Order and the Final 
Order was not one of 
them.[...] 
Canada’s right to source 
all government 
requirements and to grant 
subsidies to the 
Canadian industry are 
but two examples of 
legitimate alternative 
measures.’ 
breach of investment 
guarantee.  
 
  
Chemtura v. 
Canada
1009
 
Chemtura filed the 
claim under the 
NAFTA Chapter 11 
due to the gradual 
phase-out of the 
agrochemical lindane. 
The investor claimed 
that the ban was 
lacking a rigorous 
scientific risk 
assessment, hence 
being enforced in bad 
faith. The investor 
claimed violations of 
FET, MFN, and 
indirect expropriation 
standards. 
[131], [134]-[137]  
Canada argued that the 
scientific review of 
lindane and its gradual 
ban was based on 
legitimate 
considerations  in 
accordance with 
Canada’s international 
undertakings  like the 
Aarhus Protocol on 
Persistent Organic 
Pollutants to the 
UNECE Convention on 
Long-Range 
Transboundary Air 
Pollution of 1979, 
which was adopted by 
both the United States 
and Canada, and the 
Stockholm Convention 
on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants, including 
lindane in the list of 
chemicals designed for 
elimination. 
[134]-[143] The Tribunal 
took into account the 
international agreements 
invoked by Canada as a 
‘broader factual context’ 
to assess whether Canada 
had acted in its mandate 
under its international 
commitments. This 
broader factual context 
was relevant in assessing 
the point raised by the 
Claimant that Canadian 
agencies acted in bad 
faith. 
International treaties and 
experience of other states 
were a significant 
argument used by the 
tribunal for rebutting the 
investor’s claim that the 
public purpose of 
environment and health 
protection was a hidden 
motive, and State 
agencies actually acted in 
bad faith to irritate trade. 
The Tribunal 
indirectly presumed 
against potential 
conflict in applicable 
law and used 
Canada’s international 
commitments that 
were not explicitly 
addressed by NAFTA 
Article 104 as a 
‘broader factual 
context’ for informing 
the content of the bad 
faith standard. 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ASPECT: CULTURAL HERITAGE PROTECTION 
SPP v. Egypt
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The claim emerged 
from the termination of  
The Pyramids Oasis 
Project for developing 
a tourist resort near the 
Pyramids. The project 
was terminated after its 
approval since Egypt 
had included the area 
in the World Cultural 
[156], [158] Egypt 
invoked its obligations 
under the UNESCO 
Cultural Heritage 
Convention as grounds 
for the termination of 
the investment project, 
claiming the 
compensable 
expropriation did not 
take place.  
[153]-[154], [159] The 
Tribunal found no real 
conflict between the 
norms of the UNESCO 
Convention and Egypt’s 
requirement to pay 
compensation for 
expropriation because 
‘the choice of the sites to 
be protected is not 
imposed externally, but 
Contrary to Santa 
Elena v. Costa Rica, 
the SPP v. Egypt 
Tribunal took into 
account the UNESCO 
Convention, which 
served as a motivation 
and justification for 
expropriating the 
investor’s property. 
First, the Tribunal 
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Heritage List. results instead from the 
State’s own voluntary 
nomination’.1011  
[158] The Tribunal 
maintained that, as a 
matter of international 
law, Egypt acted 
legitimately by 
cancelling a tourist 
development project 
situated on its own 
territory for the purpose 
of protecting antiquities 
belonging to the World 
Heritage. 
Therefore, 
[190-191] the Tribunal 
limited the content of 
‘legitimate expectations’ 
and consequently 
decided not to award 
lucrum cessans from the 
date of the inclusion of 
the project area in the 
Word Heritage List 
because from that date 
the investor had lost its 
legitimate expectations 
to gain profit of such an 
activity. 
recognized and solved 
potential conflicts in 
applicable law. 
Second, the Tribunal 
used the date of the 
Convention’s coming 
into effect for 
informing the content 
of ‘legitimate 
expectations’ for fair 
compensation for the 
expropriated property. 
 
 
Parkerings v. 
Lithuania
1012
 
Norwegian investor 
Parkrings was 
involved in the 
business of 
construction and 
management of 
parking garages. The 
investor submitted the 
claim against 
Lithuania for alleged 
breaches of FET, MFN 
and expropriation 
standard. The investor 
claimed, inter alia, that 
another investor, 
Dutch company Pinus 
Proprius,  was granted 
a right to make a car 
parking lot in the Old 
Town of Vilnius but 
the Parkerings was 
rejected this right. 
[371]-[389] 
For its defence, 
Lithuania invoked its 
international 
obligations under the 
Convention of the 
Protection of the 
Architectural heritage 
of Europe and the 
European Convention 
on the Protection of the 
Archaeological 
heritage. Lithuania 
explained that the area 
where Parkerings 
intended to make a 
parking lot was listed 
in the UNESCO List of 
World Heritage. Due to 
these obligations, the 
local authorities feared 
that the construction of 
the parking lot in that 
specific area would 
have a significant 
[382], [394] 
The Tribunal took into 
account the UNESCO 
Convention for the 
determination of the 
content of ‘like 
circumstances’ under the 
MFN standard. The 
Tribunal justified the 
differentiation between 
the two similar foreign 
investment projects in 
Vilnius, since one of the 
projects was meant to 
operate in the area that 
was protected under the 
UNESCO Convention, 
providing justifiable 
grounds for a different 
treatment. 
 
 
The Tribunal took into 
account the UNESCO 
Convention so as to 
inform the content of 
‘like circumstances’ 
sub-element of the 
MFN standard. 
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Thus, Lithuania had 
violated the MNF 
standard. 
 
impact on 
internationally 
protected cultural 
properties. Thus, the 
relevant authorities 
rejected the project by 
Parkerings. 
 
